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Libya in the Modern Orientalist World-System: A Critical Analysis of English 
Language Acquisition (ELA) as a Factor in Libya‟s New Developmental Strategy 
 
Abstract 
This thesis is a critical examination of the „new vision‟ strategies that the Libyan government 
undertook in order to promote the deeper integration of the Libyan economy into the global 
economy of the Modern Orientalist World-System (MOWS). This process has been taking 
place since the lifting of the trade embargo on Libya by President Bush in April 2004. A 
crucial part of this new vision strategy was the promotion of human capital development 
amongst the Libyan population and with a particular emphasis upon English Language 
Acquisition (ELA). The argument, derived from neo-liberal thought, is that for Libya to 
transform itself it must embrace neo-liberal ideas that will see the government adopt the role 
of the enabling state, preparing Libyans for employment in a newly established private sector. 
ELA, the learning of what is called „global English‟, is the central part of the new vision 
human capital development goals. The assumption here is that by developing the English 
language skills of Libyans it will enhance their job prospects with foreign firms arriving in 
Libya. This strategy is being pursued in the aftermath of a state directed ban on the learning 
of English that was first decreed in 1986 and the consequences of which placed a significant 
obstacle in the way of the immediate employment prospects of a generation of young Libyan 
graduates. If the state developmental strategy now embraced by the Libyan government is to 
be successful then it must promote the rapid improvement in the second language skills of its 
young people (specifically „global English‟) if they are to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by a newly opened economy. However, this strategy is fraught with dangers for the 
government as liberalising the Libyan economy weakens the control of the state over society. 
Thus the thesis addresses a number of key questions regarding the relationship between 
human capital (language skills) and the sociology of development; of human capital as a 
concept in the „modern Orientalist world-system‟; and the changing nature of state-society 
relations in Libya as the government attempts to integrate it more firmly into the MOWS. To 
what extent can the Libyan government transform its economy and society in a way that 
enhances its position in the MOWS rather than simply rendering it more dependent upon the 
power of the core? 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Languages are often seen as symbols of a nations‟ identity and it is a commonly held view 
that each nation has the right to maintain its identity, however problematic this has become in 
practice. One strong version of this thesis says that “there is one national language which is 
spoken by everyone with the same national identity” (Byram, 2006:03). Arabic holds a 
distinct place in world languages in that it connects a cultural group (the Arabs) and a series 
of distinct nation-states. Hence, Arabic is the most important language for Arabs regardless 
of their nation-state and has become a unifying symbol of both their national and cultural 
identity, a point recognised by writers such as Fanon (1965; 2006a). Having said that it is also 
the case that the era of Western colonialism which followed the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire saw colonial languages like French and English become dominant in many Arab 
societies throughout the Arab Maghreb. As a consequence of this many Arab people, 
particularly writers, intellectuals and politicians, have now come to view colonial languages 
such as English and French as a threat towards their culture and a problematic legacy of 
colonialism. This is a major reversal of many intellectual positions held in the Arab world in 
the late C19 and early C20 when many Arab intellectuals accepted and interpreted European 
power over the Arab world as a reflection of its cultural superiority. This, in turn, as Massad 
notes, saw Arab intellectuals portraying Arab culture in the Orientalist terms of their colonial 
rulers (Massad, 2008: 39). Indeed, this theme of the relationship between language, power 
and identity has animated the work of important figures such as Fanon and Said, and more 
recently Wallerstein, and been central to the rise of Postcolonial Theory.  
Since independence in 1951 Libyan governments have been resistant to the lure of colonial 
languages such as Italian or English on the grounds that they might undermine the national 
culture. In the early days of the revolution Fanon was a major influence on the Gaddaffi led 
government but over time his warnings about the limitations and complexities of national 
culture and consciousness for the colonised became replaced by a much stronger commitment 
to national culture (Fanon, 2006b). However, this essentialising of language in the 
construction of cultural identity has also raised problems that critics of post colonialism have 
emphasised in that it exaggerates the importance of a unifying national language in the 
construction of newly independent nation-states and fails to recognise the diversity of 
languages throughout the region and in Libya too (Ahmed, 2008; Ayubi, 2001; 
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Kumaraswamy, 2006). The first chapter of the thesis will set out and expand upon the 
framework of the MOWS and its usefulness as a way of understanding Libya‟s new vision 
policies. It will also examine the nature of Libya‟s dependent relationship with the core of the 
MOWS as well as how Libya‟s history relate to the „Developmental State‟ literature. In the 
second chapter of this thesis concentrates on examining the place that language has played in 
Libya during and since colonialism as part of its process of resistance to colonialism and of 
nation-building. It does this because it helps to contextualise the role that language came to 
play as a factor in Libyan government strategies after the confrontation with the USA in the 
1980s. For the Libyan government and people language became a site of resistance to 
Western power. 
Libya‟s adoption of a policy of resistance to the languages of colonialism was part and parcel 
of a number of policy decisions that whilst helping to preserve the Arabic language also 
served to deepen the countries isolation, economically, culturally and politically. The key 
factors in this process of Libyan retreat from the world-system were primarily: First the 
decision made by the Libyan government to stop the teaching of foreign languages including 
English in 1986 as a reaction to the US attack on Tripoli; second, the international sanctions 
against Libya in 1993 which followed on from the Lockerbie bombing where the country was 
greatly affected in terms of its international communications economically, socially, 
politically, and culturally. During this period of international sanctions more than two 
generations of Libyan graduates have been affected in terms of their capacity to travel and 
study abroad and develop their communication skills. This lack of skills and knowledge has 
in turn affected these groups (graduates) and their job opportunities today. It has also 
undermined the possibility of social change within Libya as the state failed to utilise the 
resources it had available to it, most crucially what is often described in the developmental 
literature as its „human capital‟. The „New Vision‟ strategy adopted in 2004 has been an 
attempt to overcome this problem with a view to reintegrating Libya into what has recently 
been described as the „Modern Orientalist World-System‟ (MOWS) (Samman and Al-Zo‟by, 
2008). In policy terms this is described as attempting to overcome a great „skills gap‟ 
amongst those graduates with regard to what is required today by the Libyan and 
international job market. Skills and knowledge (more broadly, education) are seen as the 
central aspects of human capital development and this is a view now shared by the Libyan 
government (OECD, 2006).  
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In order to assess this transformation in Libyan state strategy chapter‟s four to six examine 
recent Libyan educational strategies relating to English language skills, as well as the role of 
the state and the private sector regarding this matter. As the global language (Global English) 
the acquisition of English has been an important developmental policy goal for many 
countries in recent decades (Nunan, 2003). Since the lifting of the sanctions on Libya in 2004 
the Libyan government has sought to re-introduce English language as a priority for social 
and economic change. Ultimately this has meant that since 2004 the Libyan government has 
chosen to pursue economic policies that aim to develop new trade links with the EU and the 
USA (Zoubir, 2002). Accordingly and pragmatically the English language is no longer seen 
as a colonial language by the Libyan government, but instead as a tool that can be embraced 
as part of its new vision developmental goals of enhancing its human capital. The English 
language has moved from being a language of colonial domination to simply an instrument 
for social and economic transformation of Libyan society. However, the question now facing 
this human capital centred strategy of English language acquisition (ELA) is the extent to 
which it can succeed in strengthening the Libyan economy and society? If many states in 
periphery and semi-periphery of the MOWS are pursuing such strategies how useful will it 
prove to be to Libyan development? To what extent is the exclusive knowledge of English 
language part of its utility for developing countries? Indeed, how should we make sense of 
„human capital‟ as a concept as part of the MOWS? Further, how effective are the means by 
which the Libyan state is promoting ELA amongst Libyan university students? Chapter‟s 
four, five and six will examine these issues and develop the argument that despite the 
constraints of the MOWS that Libya faces, in particular its overwhelming dependency on its 
oil industry and exports to Italy, Germany, France and Spain, that its petroleum resources 
remain an important strength which might enable it to invest strategically in its population in 
a way that will enable it to diversify and strengthen its economy and society. As part of this 
potential diversification the development of human capital skills such as English language 
have an important role to play. The MOWS offers important structural constraints 
(ideological and material) on the Libyan government policies. At the same time it also has 
some room for manoeuvre, the decisions that it makes are not irrelevant to the future 
development of Libya. In short, the MOWS both constrains and enables Libya in its 
integration into the world-system. Crucially, its oil resources give it a relative advantage over 
many developing countries that are reliant on less valuable resources to aid their economy 
and society. 
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1.2 The Methodological Framework: Research Methodology   
This section provides a rationale and description of the research methods developed and 
employed in light of the investigation‟s aims, the review of contributions in relevant 
literatures and the social and policy contexts of the study. Accordingly, this study tends to 
shed light on complex, evolving and sometimes contradictory policies and attitudes with 
regard to the relationship between the acquisition of English language, human capital and the 
job prospects of Libyan graduates as the Libyan government pursues policies to fully 
integrate it into the MOWS. Therefore, the research design is exploratory in nature and 
qualitatively oriented in order, in part, to measure the interpretations, perceptions and 
motivations of key actors in this field. Methods employed were as follows: 
 
1. Ten focus groups with each containing 6 to 8 people 
2. Seven individual „elite‟ interviews with representatives from the state and private 
sector.  
 
I will begin with a brief comment on the epistemological positioning of the research and then 
summarise the research design.  The discussion then moves on to justify the choice of focus 
groups and interviews as research methods. This is followed by an explication of the 
sampling strategy and choice of research participants in the investigation. An indication of 
the thematic prompts used in the conduct of the focus groups and interviews is also provided. 
The section then turns to the issue of data capture, translation, transcription and approaches to 
analysis before considering the relevant ethical issues. 
  
1.3 The Epistemological Location of the Research 
Positivist assumptions about social research view properly conducted investigations as a 
means to access objective, verifiable, facts about research participants and their social 
situations/backgrounds. Obviously, participants can lie or be mistaken in the course of 
research, but this is seen, from a positivist perspective, as distortion or bias that masks the 
facts. Similarly, researchers themselves are seen as a potential distorting factor. Accordingly, 
the emphasis is very much upon standard questions, a drilling of interviewers and a 
willingness to discount data that appears to have arisen in response to leading questions. And 
considerable emphasis is also placed upon the verifiability of research data - can the data 
represent the real situation and can it be corroborated or “triangulated” by other means? 
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Conversely, interpretive research is not necessarily concerned with ascertaining objective 
facts, but more with understanding the personal perceptions and interpretations of research 
participants with regard to the nature of the topic. Hence, the emphasis is on uncovering 
these perspectives so that they can illuminate a particular issue without, necessarily, 
providing us with a specific quantification or solution (Bryman 2008).  
 
So, it might thus be useful to think of different approaches to social research in terms of a 
continuum. At one end of the continuum, the positivist position, investigation is concerned 
solely with the extraction of accounts or discrete responses from the research participants. 
The researcher constructs the questions and directs the discussion in such a way that he or she 
asks all the questions and the research participant provides the answers - answers that are 
then used by the researcher to help construct an account of objective reality as far as is 
possible. At the other end of the continuum, a wholly interpretive approach is concerned 
solely with a situation as the informant sees it. The focus is on the interpretations and 
meanings of the informant rather than any absolute account of an objective reality. My 
research, however, sat between these two extremes. In rejecting the assumptions of positivist 
methodology I nonetheless tried to remain objective in the sense of providing as true an 
account as I could, recognising that my own claims are always fallible. In this respect I strove 
to be as objective and non-directive as possible in the course of the investigation but this was 
done within the parameters of the broad aims of the research. In this context as much 
emphasis as possible was given to allowing research participants to speak for themselves. 
Accordingly considerable emphasis was placed on the development of research instruments 
for qualitative research oriented towards contextualised description of “reality”, the recording 
of data gathering and transparency in the analysis phase of the investigation. The specific 
methods chosen in this respect were focus groups and interviews, but Figure-1 provides an 
introductory overview of the research design.  
1.3.1 Focus Groups as a Research Method 
Oppenheim (2005) observes that focus groups offer a number of advantages to the researcher. 
Such groups can gather a wide variety of data on the subject under consideration (rather than 
limiting the interviewee to fixed responses); can explore hypotheses (by trying out lines of 
enquiry); can test the appropriateness of questions and what form or line they should take and 
allow the development of direct observation and examination of participants‟ knowledge and 
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ideas within a given context. Focus groups, although they can be time-consuming to set-up 
and although the process of data analysis can be prolonged, also offer relatively quick access 
to groups of informants (Rabiee 2004). In addition, this method of investigation encourages 
the exploration of how opinions are constructed and modified through interaction between 
participants.  More specifically, Hyden and Bulow (2003) suggested this method as an 
important means for gaining access to participants‟ experiences, attitudes and views, rather 
than just a communicative and interactive event.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Research Design 
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But, Hyden and Bulow (2003) also point to an important issue in the design of focus groups – 
should “participants represent various groups outside the focus group, like professional or 
social groups; or do they just represent themselves as individuals; or do they act as members 
of focus group” (Hyden and Bulow cited in Lehoux, 2003:308). In other words, does a 
researcher need to represent the outside groups of the specific society by those who have 
been interviewed, or to only represent specific groups as individuals? In an attempt to 
respond to this question, Rabiee (2004:655) has quoted Lederman (cited in Thomas et al, 
1995) that a focus group is “A technique involving the use of in-depth group interviews in 
which participants are selected because they are a purposive, although not necessarily 
representative sampling of a subject population, this group being focused on a given topic”. 
The issue of the lack of English language capabilities among Libyan graduates is commonly 
discussed among Libyan university students. Hence, my choice of focus group participants 
was essentially purposive, but also oriented towards the inclusion of diverse stakeholders. 
 
In terms of size, Krueger and Casey suggest that small focus groups of not more than six to 
ten participants allows for greater direction and control on the part of the researcher (Krueger 
and Casey, 2000 cited in Rabiee, 2004:656). They add that “the number generally suggested 
as being manageable is between 6 to 10 participants; large enough to gain a variety of 
perspectives and small enough not to become disorderly or fragmented”. The capability of 
the researcher (moderator) is also a vital element that should not be underestimated. Madriz 
(2000) argues that one advantage of the interaction encouraged by his focus groups is that the 
role of the moderator decreases while that of participant‟s increases. In addition Madriz, 
(2000), notes that there is an important distinction to be made between horizontal and vertical 
interactions. Madriz claimed that both vertical and horizontal aspects of discussions may help 
interaction, and thereby aid the researcher in gathering information (Madriz, 2000 & cited in 
Al-Yousef, 2006). It is very important that the researcher shows his/her ability and skills in 
terms of discussion management by breaking the ice and fostering an atmosphere of open 
dialogue.  Further, as moderator, attention should be paid to allowing participants to lead but 
not dominate discussions (FAO 1990). Therefore, the role that the researcher plays not only 
depends on whether he/she exhibits strong or weak guidance but may also require an ability 
to deal with unexpected problems or participant behaviour.  
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Indeed, Stewart and Shamdasani (2006) highlight the need for all researchers to be aware of 
potential problems arising from the ebb and flow in the power and social relations within a 
focus group (Stewart and Shamdasani cited in Al-Yousef, 2006). According to Al-Yousef 
social relations could cause problems between the group members, if not managed/handled 
appropriately (Al-Yousef, 2006). Such factors could have an impact on the processes and 
outcomes of focus groups. During this study however, problems were not experienced since 
the topic of the study was one of recent and ongoing public debate in Libyan society 
(especially, among employees and university graduates).  In view of that, the participants 
were selected on the basis that they would probably have something to say about the topic 
because of their knowledge and experience.  
 
The ten focus groups were stratified to create homogeneity within each forum in order to 
preclude interaction and data that might be “obscured by the presence of participants who 
differ widely from each other” (Gall, Borg, and Gall, 2003 cited in Lim, 2004:94). Indeed 
Krueger (1994 cited in Rabiee, 2004:656) suggests that “Participants should share similar 
characteristic: gender group, age-range, ethnic and social class background‖. Account was 
thus taken of education, gender and professional background. But on the subject of gender 
groups in particular, Libyan customs and traditions were respected in that female participants 
were largely separated from men when required.  
  
1.3.2 Interviews as a Research Method 
Individual interviews were used as the second significant method during this research. As 
intimated, a wholly positivist interview of any length that deals with ideas, attitudes or 
emotions is necessarily compromised simply by the fact that the notion of an objective reality 
is without doubt filtered and shaped by the nature and limits of human perception and 
interpretation (Silverman 2001). But, a wholly interpretive approach is not possible either. 
This would involve interviewees just speaking without any intervention, guidance or 
prompting by the interviewer or anyone else. The only issue is thus where an interviewer sits 
between the two extremes and to which end - the positivist or interpretivist pole - the 
interviewer is trying to push the dialogue. Given that my research was governed by an overall 
aim and pre-determined issues of interest drawn from the literature and the context, the 
interviews conducted reflected a clear degree of thematic structure and purpose. 
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These interviews were used mainly in relation to senior individuals who were unable or 
unwilling to meet within groups. Such individuals included informants from the United 
Nation Information Centre, British Council, the Curricula Department and the Libyan 
Foreign Investment Co (see Table-1.3.1). These individual interviews did however 
complement the focus groups by offering more specific (and perhaps less inhibited) 
perspectives plus a degree of triangulation (Pope et al, 2000; Rabiee 2004).  
 
1.3.3 Sampling and Research Participants 
The sampling rationale for the focus groups and interviews was purposive and was informed 
by two strands of investigation. First, secondary data that was collected by reviewing relevant 
academic literature and policies e.g. books, articles in journals and online. The academic 
literature provided insights around the themes of human capital and ELA, but was limited in 
terms of relating these topics directly to contemporary Libyan society. An appreciation of 
evolving and current policies within Libya did however point to a number of specific 
organisations and fields that appeared to encompass key stakeholders.  These organisations 
and fields initially included:  
1. The Libyan Ministry of Education  
2. Al-Fateh University in Tripoli  
3. Al-Saba Min April University in Al-Zawia  
4. Libyan Foreign Investment Board  
5. United Nations Information Centre  
6. The British Council  
7. National Oil Corporation   
8. The curricula department in Libya  
9. Academy of graduate studies in Janzour  
10. The Labor Power Institution (Workforce)  
 
As Pennycook (cited in Lessner and Escobar and Portillo, 2003) observed, prior to interview, 
it is important to „get to know‟ potential participants so that more introverted individuals can 
be encouraged, with sensitivity, to participate as fully as possible (Lessner and Escobar and 
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Portillo, 2003). Accordingly, in August 2008 permission
1
 was obtained to interview selected 
individuals and representatives of several organisations within Libya. As Krueger (1994, 
cited in Rabiee, 2004:656) notes, “Rich data can only be generated if individuals in the group 
are prepared to engage fully in the discussion and, for this reason advocates the use of a 
homogenous group”. This process of selection was sometimes vitiated by potential 
participants becoming unavailable is summarised below.  
Table 1.1: Organisational Fields from which Participants were secured  
Libyan Foreign Investment Broad Cancelled and 
Replaced by 
The Libyan Foreign 
Investments Company  
Al-Saba  April University in Al-Zawia Cancelled and 
Replaced by 
The Libyan 
Participatory of Higher 
Education 
Libyan air Lines Added  
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank Added  
Private  investment companies Al-Manar Added  
The Language Centre at Al-Fateh 
University 
Added  
The Libyan Participatory Education Added  
The Libyan Employees at the UK Added  
 
1.3.4 Focus Group Participants 
The study was conducted in Libya. The participants were all from Libya, but they were 
different in terms of background. They reflected three categories - university graduates, 
employees and decision makers. The main criteria for inclusion were their knowledge 
regarding the topic of study. Ten focus groups, each composed of between five and eight 
participants, were conducted in 2009-10 (the organisational fields of the participants and the 
location and timing of each focus group is described in Table 2). Each focus group lasted 
between one and two hours.  
                                                          
1 The trip to Libya was made in summer 20081. The purpose of this visit was mainly to obtain permissions for interviews as 
it has been mentioned above with the relevant people and institutions for second year 2009, of my thesis.  
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Table 1.2: Focus Groups, 2009-10  
The Name of the 
Institution 
Location Time Date No and who
2
 
Al-Fateh University in 
Tripoli 
Language centre 1pm-2pm 12/04/2009 6 M H student 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank In the same place 10am-12am 14/04/2009 6 members 
Academy of graduate studies  In the same place 1 pm-2 pm 17/04/2009 8 F H students  
Academy of graduate studies  In the same place 3 pm-4 pm 17/04/2009 8 M H students  
Al-Fateh University in 
Tripoli 
Language centre 1pm-3 pm 21/04/2009 6 F H students  
National oil institution HR branch  10am-12am 22/04/2009 8 members  
Libyan air Lines In the same place 11am-1pm 23/04/2009 6 members 
Al-Fateh University in 
Tripoli 
Language centre 3pm-5pm 04/05/2009 6 F assistances  
Libyan Ministry of 
Education  
In the same place  10am-12am 10/05/2009 5 members 
The Libyan employees at the 
finance institutions in the 
UK 
Costa café  5pm-7pm 25/01/2010 5 members 
 
 
1.3.5 Interviewees 
In 2009-2010, seven interviews involving nine informants were conducted in Libya. Most of 
these individuals were Libyan decision-makers, but some were managers in the private sector 
(see Table 2.1). The interviews were also used to obtain additional relevant documentation 
regarding the recent situation of Libyan strategies towards the acquisition of English 
language skills, the Libyan higher education system and the job market. Each interview lasted 
between one and two hours and, cumulatively, did not point to any obvious omissions in 
terms of potential interviewees.  
Table 1.3: Interviews, 2009/2010  
                                                          
2 (FH) female higher education students and (MH) male higher education student 
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The name of the institution Location Time Date No and who 
Private  investment 
companies 
In the same place 12pm-1pm 24/03/2009 1 Manager 
The curricula department In the same place 12pm-2pm 25/03/2009 1 Administrator 
UN information centre In the same place 12pm- 2pm 31/03/2009 L formal speaker 
British council In the same place 10am-12pm 21/04/2009 2 administrators 
The Labor Power Institution In the same place 3pm-5pm 02/05/2009 1 Administrator 
Libyan Foreign Investment 
Co 
In the same place 9am-10am 12/05/2009 1 Minister   
The Languages Centre  In the same place 11am-12pm 00/03/2010 1 Manager  
 
 
1.4 Guiding Questions 
Preparation for the interview and focus groups involved the creation of themes and prompts 
to guide (but not “script”) the conversations. The overarching theme concerned the extent to 
which English language was seen to enhance the job prospects of Libyan graduates but a 
conscious effort was also made to allow the research participants to raise and expound upon 
issues not foreseen by the questions relating to problems in the Libyan educational system 
and the significance of the „new vision‟ policies introduced after 2004. With that caveat in 
mind, preliminary lines of questioning centred upon: 
1. The difficulties experienced by Libyan graduates due to their lack of English 
language skills and the perceived benefits/advantages among university students 
in relation to speaking English. 
2. Factors that impact on learning English such as the international sanctions against 
Libya, Libyan education policy and the age at which graduates began or 
recommenced study of English  
3. The quality of Libyan higher education programmes for of the teaching of 
English. 
4. Human capital investment and job market requirements in terms of English 
language skills.  
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5. The fields in which English language can be used in Libya, such as foreign 
investors/companies and the Libyan private sector. The significance of foreign 
investment for the Libyan economy and job market. 
6. The Libyan government and its recent policies/strategies towards the economy 
and ELA (and to what extent do the policies of the Libyan state respond to the 
idea that human capital might be a part of an Orientalist discourse about 
development?). 
 
1.4.1 Data Capture 
Interview data were recorded largely via audio-recordings. Focus group data were captured 
by audio-recording and selective video-recording combined with a digital audio-recorder.  
The relatively low capacity of the memory card of the digital-recorder used was an 
unexpected problem in some cases, but recourse to the recording facility in a mobile 
telephone overcame this obstacle. 
 
1.4.2 Data Analysis 
Tentative data organisation and analysis began during the data collection process 
(Oppenheim, 2005; Rabiee, 2004). This was oriented towards an ―iterative testing and 
retesting of theoretical ideas using the data” (Pope et al 2000:115).  For example, an early 
theme addressed was one of disagreement over the importance of ELA. Most of the 
participants from the Libyan universities believed in the importance of English language 
skills as an added value in terms of their human capital. But participants from the education 
ministry appeared to be less convinced in that regard. Indeed, as we will see in chapters three 
and four some of the Libyan decision-makers considered ELA as a threat to Libyan culture. A 
flexible approach to the use of guiding questions thus provided an insight into the diversity of 
the participants‟ perspectives and enabled early synthesis of emerging ideas with regard to 
the findings and wider literature.  In more formal terms this allowed for the iterative 
development of an interpretive framework, a process described in more detail below.  
 
1.4.3 Translation and Transcription 
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The process of transferring data from audio to written form not only involved transcription, 
but initial thoughts on translation.  Transcription of the data into Arabic took between three 
and five hours per interview and focus group. This provided an initial overview but also 
stimulated thoughts on the most appropriate translations into English. But translation still 
took between one and three days for each recorded session. 
1.4.4 Coding  
Initially, tapes and accompanying transcripts and contemporaneous notes were reviewed in 
detail several times in order to begin familiarising myself with the data (Rabiee 2004). But as 
Robson (1993, cited in Rabiee, 2004: 657) notes, “a central aim of data analysis is to reduce 
data” (or to at least reconfigure it to a more manageable and comprehensible form). Thus, 
after the familiarisation stage I started coding the data with a view to more focused 
interpretations. Preliminary coding of themes started at a broad level and then moved to more 
detailed categories and iterations. At the most basic level each emergent broad theme was 
colour-coded. The educational system and policies category - for example – was coded 
brown; the government‟s developmental strategies category in green; the human capital 
category in yellow and so on. Subsequently, the themes of the same colour were cut and 
pasted together in new digital files designed to facilitate the interpretation and further coding. 
The limited size of the data set and ongoing familiarisation rendered use of qualitative 
software largely superfluous in this respect (though notes were made of key decisions in the 
coding process).   
1.5 Ethical Considerations 
Informed consent was obtained orally and in written form from all research participants in 
using a pro forma in Arabic. I also explained in detail the research objectives, the precise 
purpose of the interviews and focus groups and the intended use of the data. Participants were 
also invited to ask for clarification at any stage of the research process. Permission was 
sought for the use of audio and/or video recording devices in all cases is only being for 
ethical academic purposes. Some participants preferred audio recording rather than use of a 
video and their requests were met.   
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1.6 General Interpretations 
1.6.1 English and Identity/Culture: 
Some issues regarding the topic‟s ideas and concerns were handled to some extent 
ambiguously by the participants. For instance, in answer to the question „to what extent do 
you think that the acquisition of English language enhances the job prospects of Libyan 
graduates in the Libyan job market?‘, some participants were quite determined to link 
English acquisition with a threat to their culture, values and identity and they suggest a 
deterministic relationship, while the others suggest a substantial independence. The issue here 
for interviewees is the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the idea that  
learning English alongside Arabic as a language of knowledge/development is acceptable and 
helpful in terms of job prospects, whilst on the other hand English language is seen as it is 
also seen as an expression of power and inequality in the world-system.   
 
1.6.2 English and Employment:  
The participants confirmed that establishing this relationship between ELA and employment 
in the Libyan job market is crucial in terms of both reducing the unemployment rate among 
the university graduates which is about 30% and its historical over-reliance on the 
hydrocarbon industry for economic growth.  
 
1.7 Summary  
This part of the research methodology has described the research rationale and design used in 
the fieldwork for the investigation. These methods largely reflected the exploratory nature of 
the research regarding the relationship between the acquisition of English language and the 
job prospects of Libyan graduates. Focus groups and individual interviews were presented as 
appropriate methods in this study. With regard to the derivation of findings, the data were 
analysed in textual form in the creation and development of analytical categories apposite to 
the research aims. Finally, it is worth mentioning that qualitative research requires a 
researcher with high analytic skills which during this study the researcher made an effort to 
develop it.    
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Chapter 2: The Modern Orientalist World-System: The Theoretical Framework of the 
Thesis 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Modern Orientalist World-System 
The theoretical approach taken in this thesis builds upon developments in world-systems 
analysis that have taken place over the past decade. In particular it presents the argument that 
the modern world-system is a modern Orientalist world-system (MOWS). This theme 
emerged in the work of Khaldoun Samman (2006) and has subsequently been taken up by a 
number of writers in the field including Immanuel Wallerstein (Abdel-Malek, 2000). In this 
chapter I will set out the key claims of this theoretical framework and how it applies to Libya 
before examining it in the context of literature on the idea of a developmental state. The 
chapter will conclude with an examination of the dependent nature of Libyan development in 
the MOWS and the ways in which this has constrained its options and choices. 
 
In many respects this (MOWS) is an understandable development in world-systems analysis 
that brings together the work of three writers whose theoretical ideas have overlapped in a 
number of ways: Franz Fanon, Edward Said and Immanuel Wallerstein. Fanon had a huge 
influence on both Said and Wallerstein with his analyses of the impact of colonialism on the 
psychology and identity of subaltern groups (Fanon, 2006d, Wallerstein, 2009). Fanon‟s 
influence on politics was enormous during the period of post-colonial liberation, including in 
Libya and on Gaddaffi himself in the later 1960s. The key concept in Fanon‟s work is 
perhaps the psychopathology of colonialism. By this he meant that colonialism was not 
simply a matter of occupation and coercion but that it literally embeds itself upon the identity 
of the colonised that accept and normalise their repression in racial terms, something that has 
been described as „psychopolitics‟ (Hook, 2004). As Fanon makes clear, racism is at the heart 
of the colonial experience and must be fought by subaltern groups if they are to move beyond 
the constraints of their colonial experience. This view proved to be a powerful influence on 
the subsequent goals of the post-1969 revolutionary government which shifted Libya from 
being a conservative state to a radical nationalist one (Fanon: 1991). Fanon‟s analysis, 
informed by his intellectual background in phenomenology and Marxism, said that the only 
way for the colonised to become truly free was for them to physically cast off their 
oppressors, the colonial power. Further, and importantly, he made the point that if all that 
colonial liberation amounts to is the replacing of European ruling bourgeois elites with 
national ones then the revolutions will end in failure. 
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For Said, Fanon is a hugely important figure whose ideas prefigure his own work on 
Orientalism and also, perhaps even more importantly, on the plight of the Palestinian people. 
Said is important to this thesis and the emergence of the work on MOWS because his analysis 
of colonialism shows how cultural forms underpinned and were central to the colonial 
enterprise, providing the rationale, the art, the moral justification, the philosophy and 
scholarship that legitimised European brutality towards their colonised territories (Said, 
1978). What he takes from Foucault is the idea of Orientalism as a discourse that configures 
the Occident and the Orient as a binary dualism with each defining the others qualities in 
opposition to each other (rational/irrational, modern/pre-modern, civilised/barbarian, 
science/superstition). This is an important account of the ways in which the production of 
forms of knowledge are in fact forms of power that serve to support the violence and 
domination of the colonial powers. Said is often viewed as the founder of post colonial theory 
and associated with post modern social theory but in fact this is a largely a mis-reading of 
Said‟s work. As Selby notes, Said was influenced by two intellectual figures during his life, 
Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky (Selby, 2006). But in interview Said makes clear that 
ultimately he drew closer to Chomsky‟s work and rejected what he saw as the elitism and 
problematic politics inherent in Foucault‟s theoretical approach to language and power. As 
Said says in response to the suggestion that Foucault and Chomsky are the two big influences 
upon his work „...in the final analysis one has to choose between them, but I‟ve always felt in 
fact that one could incorporate both of them. In the end, I think that Chomsky‟s is the more 
consistently honourable and admirable position, thought it may not be the most emulatable 
position. It‟s certainly a less cynical position than Foucault‟s‟ (Said, 2005: 77). More 
pointedly and in sharp contrast with the politics of postmodern social theory, Said said that 
politically he felt closest to anarcho-syndicalism, echoing Chomsky, with its emphasis on 
working class solidarity, mutual aid, workers control of industry and internationalism, 
embodied in groups like the Industrial Workers of the World (I. W. W.) (Said, 2005: 28-29). 
Said‟s life exemplified a practical and theoretical commitment far removed from the normal 
academic career.  
 
The third part of the theoretical framework of the MOWS comes from the founder of world-
systems analysis, Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein concedes in an essay the importance of 
Fanon for his approach to the study of the world-system and in particular the way in which 
colonial power manifested itself both during and after the colonial period (Wallerstein, 2009). 
Wallerstein‟s early work focussed on the underdevelopment of Africa and he moved towards 
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the work of dependency theorists to explain the way in which the structure of the world-
system controlled and rendered dependent the development of economies in the periphery 
and the semi-periphery on the economic power of the states in the core zone of the world-
system (Wallerstein: 2006a). Unhappy with dependency theory and its limitations 
Wallerstein, however, moved to the study of the modern world-system that provided a model 
of the emergence and rise of a system that was based on the expansion of European power 
and capital from the period that he describes as the long C16 onwards (Wallerstein, 1974). 
Early critics of world-systems analysis tended to view it as economistic and determinist in its 
approach, lacking a theory of the state or of class, and most famously the division arose 
between orthodox Marxists such as Brenner who argue that underdevelopment in the third 
world is due to a lack of capitalism while for world-systems analysts it is due to having 
already been a part of the capitalist world-system (Aston and Philpin: 1978).  
 
In fact as has become clear over the past 45 years the model of the modern world-system that 
Wallerstein set out opened up the way for an approach to the study of the social world that, in 
rejecting the classic C19 social science intellectual divisions of labour, brought together 
scholars from a wide array of fields in their analyses of both the modern world-system and 
earlier ones as is clear from the on-line Journal of World-System Research (Hall, 2000). Thus 
as a fully-fledged field of research world-systems analysis, focusing upon the world-system 
as single unit of study and rejecting the methodological nationalism of the social sciences, 
has stimulated research in a wide range of areas including: archaeology, art history, 
international relations, computer systems, world history, development studies and feminism. 
Wallerstein‟s own work has deepened and widened over the years to embrace a wide array of 
subjects including the relationship between knowledge and power that so preoccupied both 
Fanon and Said (Wallerstein: 1998, 2001, and 2004). Thus it is no surprise that Said and 
Wallerstein praised each other‟s work and drew upon it in their own studies. For Said world-
systems analysis was an example of a non-Eurocentric approach to the study of social life and 
therefore a challenge to the presumptions of Orientalist writers (Said, 2001: 65). So the fact 
that out of the overlapping ideas and activities of these three figures has emerged the idea of 
the modern Orientalist world-system is hardly surprising. But what exactly does the term 
mean? 
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2.2 Putting the Orient in World-Systems Analysis 
According to Samman „I‟d like to identify this global order as the Modern Orientalist World-
System to describe a world which is politically, economically, and culturally stratified, with 
race constituting the very epicentre of the stratification with the “West” and “whiteness” 
ranked as the superior race/civilization, signifying all those qualities and characteristics in a 
manner exactly opposite to the Orient (Said 1979). In this conception, the racialization of the 
binaries constructed by the MOWS produces the opportunity for a sector of the racialized 
groups (the constructed Orientals) to racially reconstruct themselves from one side of the 
dichotomy (the Orient) to the other side (the Occident).‟ So what Samman makes clear is that 
the cultural logic of this system has been fundamentally racist and that in so doing it has 
produced racist categories as a way of sustaining the system that are integral to its 
functioning, not mere superstructure, as some of the more Marxist inclined scholars working 
in the field might argue. Thus on this reading of the MOWS all ideas of civilisation (Western, 
Islamic, and so on) are fundamentally the product of one modernity that both unifies and 
differentiates people into categories that have racist assumptions at their core, once biological 
and now increasingly but not exclusively, cultural. Thus the commonly held assumption that 
the Islamic world is somehow pre-modern or outside of modernity makes no sense on this 
reading. Rather, the Islamic world has been fundamentally shaped and structured, 
economically, politically and culturally, by its incorporation into the MOWS, but the myth 
remains that the Islamic world is pre-modern and must transform itself to emulate the 
advanced modern states found in the core of the world-system. Thus MOWS does not just see 
the states of the core zone as taking resources from or physically colonising the periphery and 
the semi-periphery, it fundamentally restructures those societies including, crucially, the 
forms of knowledge and identity that they come to accept about themselves and their place in 
the world-system. In this way the work of Wallerstein connects and synthesises with that of 
Fanon and Said in producing the MOWS. So how does this system work and how should we 
understand the model of the modern Orientalist world-system? 
 
The MOWS builds upon and develops the idea of the modern world-system first put forward 
by Wallerstein in 1974. It does so in a number of ways that both extend and widen the scope 
of the model of the world-system to incorporate cultural power and ideology as a 
fundamental mechanism of power sustaining the system; most crucially it argues that racism 
is as fundamental to the logic of the MOWS as any other form of power. As is well 
recognised world-systems analysis abandons the traditional methodological nationalism of 
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the social sciences whereby discrete nation-states and the relations that pertain within and 
between them are seen as the main object of study (Wallerstein, 2001 and 2004b). Rather 
world-systems analysis argues that in order to understand the nature of the world-system 
what was required was: 
 
1. To take the world-system as a single unit, its history, structure and development, as 
the basic unit of analysis. This does not, of course, mean that it is simply an exercise 
in macro sociology. In fact the macro-micro distinction is unhelpful here. The world-
system unifies populations into a single structure but at the same time it differentiates 
people into nation-states, fragments and divides experiences, culture, politics and 
history, and pitches people against each other on grounds of race, gender, nationalism 
and sexuality. 
2. The world-system is fundamentally structured through an international division of 
labour that connects people over time and space.  
3. The world-system is structured into spatial and temporal zones called the core, 
periphery and the semi-periphery. The core refers to the zone within which are found 
nation-states that are the main capitalist powers of any given period and at various 
times there emerges a hegemonic state that acts as the dominant force to maintain the 
order of the system. There have been three hegemon's since the emergence of the 
modern world-system in the C16: the Netherlands in the C17, The UK (early to late 
C19) and the USA (1945 to 1971).  
4. The world-system has a capitalist logic that sees the accumulation of capital as being 
fundamental to the way in which operates. This means, in practice, that the core zone 
dominates capital accumulation and exerts its power over the periphery and semi-
periphery through a variety of mechanisms from colonialism and the restructuring of 
their economies, states and societies; domination of the advanced capitalist industries 
(computers, biotechnology etc); domination of the financial industries (banking, 
investment, insurance) and the flow of capital in the world-system always in search of 
profit maximisation and increasingly over the past 30 years driven by speculation 
rather than investment in production in the core (Wallerstein, 2004b)).  
5. The core is defined by a number of properties: it concentrates on the most advanced 
forms of capitalist activity; it tends to have forms of representative democratic 
government; it tends to dominate the use of violence within the system. The states in 
the core have effectively built the modern world-system, written its rules, and defined 
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its norms of behaviour, primarily in their own interests and in particular in the 
interests of the ruling classes (Wallerstein, 2004b).  
6. The periphery is the most exploited area of the world-system and usually comprises 
those countries that went through colonialism or else were admitted later in the 
evolution of the system. The periphery is defined by a number of qualities: extreme 
poverty, large populations, lack of democratic government or welfare, regular use of 
violence by ruling elites against their own population in order to subjugate them and 
the production of raw materials or a few primary commodities whose prices are 
largely controlled in markets found in the core. The consequences for the colonised 
countries were to see the destruction of their own industries and the transformation of 
their economies and societies so that they became providers of raw materials for the 
core and consumers of the goods and services of the core. Thus the periphery became 
dependent for its growth upon the actions of states and population in the core 
(investment and consumption of goods and services in the periphery). This is a 
structural relationship that cannot be broken in the sense that there will always be a 
core and a periphery in the modern world-system as it is inherent to the logic of how 
capital accumulation works. However, it is always possible that states can move 
between zones of the world-system, in either direction. Witness the decline of 
Portugal versus the rise of India or Brazil, for example. It is this movement in the 
world-system that helps to generate the conflicts and war between states who wish to 
either avoid decline or to gain power, what has come to be called geopolitics 
(Wallerstein, 1991).  
7. The semi-periphery is a category to describe those countries found between the core 
and periphery that have an important role to play in sustaining the world-system. The 
semi-periphery represents the possibility of development and growth for the exploited 
majority in the world-system. States in the semi-periphery zone of the world-system 
are defined by such qualities as: a mixture of advanced industries (those passed down 
from the core as costs became too high, such as ship-building, for example) and 
primary commodities; a movement between democratic and authoritarian 
government; often large populations and land mass (Brazil, Russia, China and India); 
a growing middle class whose role in the world-system as consumers of goods from 
the core has become increasingly important. Over time the power of the four major 
states in the semi-periphery (Brazil, Russia, India and China) has grown and seen the 
production of energy supplies, goods and services shift towards them (Wallerstein, 
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2011). It is likely that any or all of these states will move into the core zone of the 
world-system over the C21, displacing states that can still be found there such as the 
Netherlands and Italy. The current global financial crisis has revealed starkly the 
skewed and unstable balance of power in the world-system with a highly productive 
semi-periphery and a highly indebted core.  
8. However, there are also states found in the semi-periphery who possess different 
qualities to those mentioned above and whose position is to do with particular geo-
political or economic factors. The East Asian states or Asian Tigers, for example, 
(South Korea, Taiwan Hong Kong and Singapore) have developed rapidly since 
WW2, largely, so Amsden argues, by defying the liberal capitalist ideology that 
currently dominates the outlook of the world-systems major national and international 
financial institutions: by having a strong state, protected trade and preferential trade 
agreements with the core after WW2 that arose in part to deflect the appeals of 
national communist movements in the region (Amsden, 1992) 
9. In addition there are those states known as rentier states that can be found in the semi-
periphery and Libya falls into this category. Rentier states possess crucial natural 
resources, almost invariably oil, which are essential to the way of life found in the 
core and that generate vast wealth for these rentier states (Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz, 
2008; Amin and Kenz, 2005). Thus since WW2 rentier states have generated vast 
flows of capital into the state treasury without the need to develop an economic or 
social infrastructure or to produce goods in the way that, say, Britain did in the C19. 
And crucially, they do not need to tax their citizens in order to raise revenue, which 
for some writers is part of the explanation for the lack of democracy in such states 
(Ross, 2001; Moore, 2004). These countries have attempted, more or less 
successfully, to preserve their relative wealth and power through forming a cartel, but 
in practice they remain reliant on the core to consume their resources (Smith, 2004). 
In addition the ruling elites in these countries, as elsewhere in the semi-periphery and 
the periphery, have tended to establish strong military, political and cultural ties with 
elites in the core, sharing their outlook and ideology and with a great distance 
between themselves and their own populations (Delacroix, 1980; Schwarz, 2008; 
Amin, 2000). When popular protest emerges in countries in the semi and periphery it 
has tended to be brutally suppressed with the use of police or military trained and 
armed by the dominant states in the core. In this sense it is in the interests of the 
ruling classes in the core to develop these relations of convenience with elites in the 
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periphery and semi-periphery. As we will see, though, as a rentier state Libya has 
been quite different to most others, certainly since the 1969 revolution, embracing an 
ideology and pursuing goals that are very different even from its near neighbouring 
rentier states such as Algeria and Iran under the Shah.  
 
This summary of the way in which world-systems analysis views the evolution of the modern 
world-system is schematic and cannot do justice to the broad and complicated analyses that 
have emerged within the field of study and across the range of subject matter it now 
embraces. For a full discussion of this see the Journal of World-Systems. However, the 
distinctive turn that world-systems analysis has taken over the past decade has seen the 
emergence of the MOWS and this entails a qualitative shift in the focus of the model of the 
world-system and the way in which power operates within it and that inequality is generated 
and sustained. These developments can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Orientalism – The argument that has developed is that racism and the construction of 
racist categories as a form of power/knowledge (following Said rather than Foucault) 
is a central component of the construction of the modern world-system (Burke, 1998). 
The significance of this is important in that Wallerstein‟s original focus was on the 
rise of the modern world-system which implied a much broader reading of the 
evolution of the system than simply a focus upon the capitalist world economy. 
However, the latter came to dominate certain readings of world-systems analysis that 
situated it more firmly into a Marxist/Hegelian framework than was originally 
entailed. The work of many (including Wallerstein) within world-systems analysis has 
been to expose the limitations of a mono-logic approach to the world-system by 
bringing in the logics of other factors such as the state form, kinship systems, racism 
and sexism as well as a focus on the production of knowledge itself as all being 
constitutive of the way that the modern world-system came into being and has sought 
to produce and reproduce itself over time and space.  
2. In particular the MOWS tells us that the Western states in the core of the system 
monopolised not just violence , production and wealth but the means by which forms 
of identity and understanding are established.  Thus the construction of categories of 
„civilisation‟ are themselves outcomes of the unfolding of the world-system and the 
power of the core to define itself in relation to what Fanon and Said called „the other‟, 
in this case the despotic orient. Modern political Islam, as Wallerstein, Mocombe and 
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Trichur all note (2008), has come to take on this despotic meaning in the MOWS. It 
has come to represent something anti-modern and outside the world-system.  
3. That in the MOWS the undeveloped nations bears the status of potential Europeans if 
they choose the correct developmental policies.  
4. The MOWS, built on racist categories that are themselves the product of modernist 
thought and scientific claims about the biological differences between the races, is 
sustained through the ways in which the core European states sought to reorganise the 
world-system as a social space right down to restructuring the way in which colonised 
people understood their own history and culture. In this respect Orientalist and racist 
categories as a discourse persist and evolve over time and space as part of the basic 
infrastructure of the MOWS (Stremlin, 2008: 93).  
5. Thus to understand the modern world-system is to understand it as a system built not 
just through economic and military power but through the production of forms of 
knowledge that had a scientific status and which generated racist categories that 
persist and help structure and impart meaning in the system about different „racial‟ 
groups. As Said made clear, it is the mainstream media that have a fundamental role 
to play in sustaining orientalist myths about the non-Western world (Said, 1978; Said 
and Hitchens, 2002) 
 
Thus the theoretical framework aims to build upon and develop the insights from this 
development in the study of the modern world-system. 
 
2.3 Exiting the Periphery? Libya as Developmental State   
How does Libya‟s developmental history relate to the concept of the developmental state that 
has dominated much political economy of development literature in recent decades? Ikpe 
states that: 
 
―the Developmental State Paradigm has its conceptual origins in the empirical 
experiences of ―developmental States‖ including Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, 
which constitute the First Tier developmental States. Increasingly, the newly 
industrialising economies of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, are also influencing 
the discourse. However, it is important to note that the term, developmental State, was 
first used with reference to Latin America‖ (Ikpe, 2008: 2).  
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As a concept it refers to those countries where the state plays the major role in the structural 
transformation of economy and society, something which the Libyan government has 
undertaken in the past but appears to be relinquishing now (Ipke, 2008: 5). The importance of 
the developmental state paradigm is two-fold: it offers an apparent escape route for nation-
stare sin the periphery of the world-system; it does so by arguing for a model of economic 
development that is aimed at state-building and economic growth and is in direct contrast 
with the neo-liberal model which posits a commitment to free trade and all that it entails.  
 
Of course, unlike other rentier states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) Libya has had a far more 
independent geo-political and political economic outlook since the 1969 revolution brought 
Gaddaffi to power (Vandewalle, 2006). But this is not necessarily an indication of the Libyan 
states capacity to act as a developmental state. In the literature the developmental state is 
characterised by a number of qualities that are said to unite countries as disparate as Japan, 
South Korea and Malaysia: economic nationalism, by which I mean economic policy that is 
in part directed towards national goals such as raising educational standards; a large and often 
unaccountable government bureaucracy; a corporatist model of governance and resistance to 
a truly neoliberal consumer culture whereby citizens are free to choose in the market place 
(Amsden 1990; Pirie, 2008; Wade, 2003). Libya may share these qualities to a lesser degree 
but its political ideological outlook has placed it outside the framework of other developing 
states in the world-system, a pariah state to be curbed and quarantined by the core (Oakes, 
2011). This is an experience well outside that of most of the classic developmental states. The 
term is often linked with the idea of a strong state and in some respects Libya has been a 
strong state given the extensive and wide-ranging powers that the post-revolutionary state has 
exerted over the population (Vandewalle, 2006). But as with other rentier states (states that 
survive from unearned income or profits in the classical political economic sense) the power 
of the state in Libya has always been fragile in that it has rested on cronyism and buying 
support rather than building a modern state apparatus that might help direct the country 
towards modernising goals (Karl, 1997). A dilemma and contradiction in Libya‟s policy now 
of pursuing economic growth and integration into the global capitalist economy is that it is 
going against the grain of the developmental state model. It is pursuing economic growth 
rather than state-building, as happened in the East Asian countries. Without a modern state 
form the Libyan government will struggle to contain the social forces that economic growth 
and integration will unleash (Pirie, 2009: 63).  
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In the context of the MOWS the developmental state is to be found in the periphery and the 
semi-periphery were states have the resources necessary to compete and advance through the 
tiers of the world-system (Wallerstein, 1984). China and India, for example, have the benefit 
of being vast territories with huge populations and therefore a significant internal market 
through which they can develop their economic capacity, just as happened with the USA 
(Harman, 2006; Merrill, Taylor and Poole, 2008; Panagaryia, 2008). As a consequence they 
have been able to shed their peripheral status in order to advance towards the core of the 
world-system, despite carrying a hugely impoverished population along the way. The 
polarisation of these countries is symptomatic of their advance as developmental states and 
late entrants to the MOWS. 
 
 But what of Libya? By contrast Libya has none of these advantages but instead, has the 
mixed blessing of oil resources, or the curse of oil as it is sometimes described in the 
literature (Torvik, 2009; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Karl, 1997 and 
2009). One of the recurring themes in analyses of oil rich countries are that they often suffer 
from poor levels of economic growth when compared to much poorer resource countries. 
Sachs and Warner make this clear when they note that: 
 
“None of the countries with extremely abundant natural resources in 1970 grew rapidly 
for the next 20 years. This fact holds up using a variety of measures of resource 
abundance. Moreover, most of the countries that did grow rapidly during this period 
started as resource poor, not resource rich‖ (2001: 3). 
 
Torvik develops this pint and says: 
 
―On average resource abundant countries have had lower growth over the last four 
decades than their resource poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the 
paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources – but its variation. For 
every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana‖ (Torvik, 2009: 1).  
 
He goes on to note in a way that seems highly apt for Libya that: ―Nevertheless, it may be 
reasonable to believe that many countries that export natural resources have a weak 
protection of property rights, much corruption, and bad quality of the public bureaucracy‖ 
(Torvik, 2009: 4-5). There is, however, no consensus on why this is the case and a variety of 
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reasons are put forward by those studying this phenomenon (Sachs and Warner, 2001). From 
a world-system perspective it is important to situate developmental states in the context of 
their dependent relationship with the core. This dependency is not simply measured in terms 
of trade relations but in a number of other ways too, such as military aid, training of police to 
curb internal dissent, cultural dependency by providing education and luxurious lifestyles to 
the elites form these countries (Wallerstein, 1984; 1991). The flip side of this is that it entraps 
the poor of these countries in dependent relations of often great violence and poverty.  
 
In the context of the MOWS Libya is something of an aberration. It is a classic rentier state 
possessing many of the characteristics that we expect to find there but it has also been 
something different. Despite its economic dependency on the core it has sought to assert a 
political and cultural autonomy, as far s possible, form the core. This has manifested itself in 
ambitious if not reckless moves towards pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism and over threats 
against core countries such as France in support of its allies in the Third World (Sturmin, 
2003). But the policies of the developmental state, whether South Korea or Libya, are always 
contingent and shaped by the dependent relations on the core. And for Libya the weakness of 
its authoritarian state has been its inflexibility in terms of internal development of society and 
the modernising and diversification of the economy (another specific problem for rentier 
states) but also that its antagonistic relations with the core have left it unable to secure the 
expertise and capital goods that it needs to even begin to develop and modernise its society 
and economy (Vandewalle, 2009). In short, Libya as a developmental state has asserted 
autonomy to a degree but has never been able to escape the structurally dependent 
relationship that is oil production necessitates. Proponents of the developmental state model 
sometimes make a case for the exceptionalism of states like South Korea as examples that all 
third world countries can follow in order to develop. But as Chang makes clear, these states 
did not develop by following free trade principles, and nor did the core (Chang, 2007 and 
Rogers, 2011). On the contrary, they used strategic state intervention to protect and direct the 
economy coupled with favourable terms of trade with the USA who had a geopolitical 
interest in seeing their development as a bulwark against the threat of communism during the 
Cold war period (e.g. the multi-fibre agreement etc) (Wade,  2003: 91; Cumings, 2002). What 
they have shared in common with Libya is an authoritarian form of government and there is a 
strong argument to say that the developmental state model hinges upon just this and a lack of 
democracy (Khoo, 2007: 20). 
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For the Libyan government aspects of the developmental state literature have been very 
influential, not least its emphasis upon developing human capital as a means for promoting 
economic growth (Ikpe, 2008; Khoo, 2007). The idea here is that by developing the education 
and health of a population a state can develop the factors needed for successful economic 
development, almost akin to Rostow‟s classic stages of growth model of development. But 
the problem with human capital in the developmental state literature is that it tends to be 
treated as a form of independent variable, as indeed it is in the human capital literature in 
general. But this glosses over the fact of the deponent nature of the relations between the 
developmental state and the core. Thus South Korea was able to develop (as was Taiwan) 
through a strong state, investing in authoritarian manner in education and human capital but 
precisely because of its geopolitically important relationship to the USA and the favourable 
economic terms of trade that this generated (Cumings, 2002). Indeed Pirie notes that: 
 
 “The Korea of the early 1960s was, in many respects, a paradigmatic example of 
‗Asian despotism‘. The government was corrupt, the economy was underdeveloped, and 
no bourgeoisie worthy of the name existed. By the end of the decade Korea clearly had 
a government both capable of and committed to promoting economic growth. While the 
country was still relatively poor, a wholesale shift in the structure of economic 
organisation was clearly underway: industrial and export growth averaged 18.4 per 
cent and 27.75 per cent, respectively, between 1962 and 1970‖ (Pirie, 2009: 59). 
 
Without this strong and authoritarian government to direct the economy an investment in 
human capital might have proven to be insufficient to generate the startling rates of 
development that ensued. Empirically the developmental state model is persuasive as 
significant rates of economic growth can be show for some states but theoretically this 
growth has to be situated in the ebbs and flows of power relations in the MOWS between the 
core and the periphery. Contrary to what orthodox Marxist-Leninists like Harman have 
argued, WSA has never made the claim that there can be no development in the periphery 
because of capitalism (Harman, 2006). 
 
Thus over the course of the C20 Libya‟s integration into the MOWS has itself moved 
backward and forwards as colonial states have sought to integrate it into their orbit (Italy, 
France, the UK) before settling on a post-colonial relationship where control could be 
exercised through the nominal independence given to the Libyan elites who were themselves 
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dependent on the core for political legitimacy and military support. It was this model of 
developmental state that the Libyan revolution dislodged in 1969 meaning that no such 
relationship as existed between South Korea and the USA would be possible. Since the 
rapprochement with the EU and the USA in 2003-2004 the Libyan government has sought to 
situate the Libyan economy in the context of increasing trade and investment with the EU in 
particular in order to help diversify the economy, largely under the urging of Gaddafi‟s LSE 
educated son Saif, and with a view to integrating Libya into the MOWS more fully than in its 
history (Alafi and Bruijn, 2010). As part of this process the Gaddaffi regime has focussed its 
attention on aspects of the developmental state literature with its emphasis on developing 
human capital. But at the same time it has rejected it strong commitment to managed and 
protected trade in order to embrace neo-liberal reforms to economy and society, however 
tentative these may be, which potentially poses significant threats to the legitimacy of the 
regime (Al-Kabeer, 2008). If it cannot continue to satisfy its clients who occupy strategic 
places of power and influence in Libyan state and society as it surrenders state authority to 
the market, then it may well raise more fundamental questions about the nature of the Libyan 
state as it has developed since the 1969 revolution. In concluding this section it is important 
to note that those developing states that have embraced neo-liberal type economic policies 
since 1970 have, on the whole, fared badly when compared to the strong state model of 
developmental found in East Asia (Chang, 2007). 
 
2.4 Libya as Dependent State in the MOWS - Human Capital and the Curse of Oil 
Resources 
Despite its relative independence as a political actor since the 1969 revolution Libya has 
remained a dependent state in the periphery of the MOWS in a variety of ways. As this is a 
structural relationship determined by a range of political, economic and cultural factors this is 
not a relationship that can be overcome by a change of policies or government (Wallerstein, 
1984). Libya is crucially dependent upon the core in a number of ways. Economically the 
core controls the institutions that shape the capitalist world economy (the World Bank, The 
IMF, The WTO, for example) and also the processes that organise the  movement of capital 
in the MOWS (Banking, investment, currency exchange dominated by eh Dollar, and so on) 
(Arrighi, 2009; Harvey, 2005). Although Libya, like any country in the periphery of the 
MOWS, has options and degrees of autonomy and manoeuvre fundamentally it is not in a 
position to challenge these factors by itself. In contrast with other countries from the 
periphery that have developed significantly over the past 40 years, notably China and India 
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but also Brazil and Russia, Libya lacks the size, population, resources and internal markets 
needed to move from the periphery to the core.  
 
Thus Libya is dependent in that it depends upon markets for trade that it cannot control or 
influence significantly. Thus the price of oil as primary commodity has at best been directed 
by the OPEC cartel which included Libya but even so there has been major disagreements 
amongst members of the cartel as to the price of oil, with conservative members such as the 
Saudi‟s not wanting to risk disturbing their relationship with the Core state son whom they 
dependent for military and political support (Karl, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Only in 
the mid-70s and in response to the Israeli attacks on Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinians did 
OPEC use its collective power as a form of punishment against the core. But even then it has 
to be born in mind that key parts of the oil industry are themselves under the control of 
corporations based in the core, so there is a complicated relationship here which does not 
simply translate into power for rentier states. The military, cultural and political dependence 
they have on the core clearly limits their ability to act against the interests of the core without 
incurring grave risks. Libya is also dependent on the core and indeed the semi-periphery for 
basic things that it needs to keep its oil industry functioning such as capital goods, 
investment, food, markets to sell their oil in and the like. In the political and military realm 
the Libyan government has bought the bulk of its arms from France, Germany and the UK 
(Rogers, 2011).  
 
Libya‟s dependence on the core is illustrated by the nature of the oil market which has been 
shaped by massive volatility since the early 1970s, driven by increased and uneven demand 
in the capitalist world economy with the so-called BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) increasingly coming to demand oil from Libya and other rentier states (Ciccantell and 
Bunker, 2004). The weakness of these rentier states has been well documented in the 
academic literature, often viewing oil as a curse which leads to bloated form s of 
bureaucracy, political and economic corruption, untrained and under-educated workforces 
and a general lack of investment in the infrastructure of the country (Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Karl, 1997). In short, oil revenues in rentier states produce kleptocratic forms of government, 
often dominated by families as in Libya, who control and direct the wealth produced from a 
natural monopoly to preserve their own power first and foremost (Ahmida, 2005). These 
tendencies can all be seen as part of the Libyan economy and society which has failed to 
develop in a way that leads it to being a productive state. In short, as with most other rentier 
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states, Libya cannot diversity its economy as a means of aiding its general development, and 
it is this factor that has led to the post 2003 policy changes in the Gaddafi government. 
Investing in human capital is seen by the government as the key to accelerating Libya‟s 
growth and integration into the MOWS. The problem with this view, as we will see in the 
thesis, is laid down by Chang when he argues that there is no significant evidence to suggest 
that an investment in education alone will lead to enhanced economic performance (Chang, 
2010: 214, 239-240). Equally, as Wade suggests, the pursuit of such external integration in 
the MOWS is often at the expense of internal integration within developing countries that 
remain polarised in terms of most social indicators, a problem that affects Libya (Wade, 
2003: 94).This is a huge dilemma for the Libyan government that it has to find a way around 
if its transformation to a neo-liberal enabling state is to generate any success. Bluntly, there 
are no examples of rentier states moving from the periphery to the core through an 
investment in education. The successful periphery states over the past 50 years have all 
shared a strong form of state directed and protected capitalism that has been able to use cast 
resources (human and natural) in order to generate its economic development. And as noted 
before, these are things that Libya does not possess.  
 
The renewed emphasis on human capital as a means of promoting economic growth in Libya 
is certainly endorsed by sections of the academic and policy oriented literature but it remains 
a highly contentious claim ((Ikpe, 2008; Merrill, Taylor and Poole, 2008)). In particular the 
experiences of the East Asian developmental states (Malaysia, China, Thailand, South Korea, 
Taiwan) are held up as part of a globalising of the developmental state model (Ipke, 2008) As 
we will see in the thesis, embracing human capital as a concept is part of Libya‟s integration 
into the MOWS and carries with it theoretical assumptions about the ways in which capitalist 
economies function that are starkly at odds with the arguments of WSA.  
 
Libya‟s dependency remains central to any account of its recent policy changes which are 
best understood as an attempt by the government to produce more favourable forms of 
investment and terms of trade for Libya in the global economy. but a paradox here for the 
Libyan government is that in doing this it only makes itself more deponent on the core not 
less. As it integrates its economy, political ties (acting as a partner in the core‟s „war on 
terror, for example) and cultural ties it is intensifying the variety of mechanisms that the core 
uses as a means of dominating and exploiting the rest of the MOWS  and this can only create 
problems for authoritarian governments such as the Gaddaffi regime. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The theoretical framework used in this thesis aims to develop work that has originated in the 
world-systems analysis over the past decade. This move towards  and understanding to the 
modern orientalist world-system helps to produce anon-Eurocentric account of the 
development of Libya and its place in the MOWS as it illustrates, amongst other things, the 
way in which theoretical knowledge about Libya, political economy and international 
relations has itself been highly Eurocentric in its assumptions. Even now the power of the 
core to produce the theoretical knowledge that shapes common sense understandings of 
political economy is profound as the current embrace of human capital by the Libyan 
government illustrates. The integration of Libya into the global economy is crucial in the 
current phase of the MNOWS as the core and in particular the USA as its hegemon need to 
secure access to the most important source of energy. As Harvey notes, whoever controls the 
flow of global oil effectively controls the global economy, something which gives an 
indication of Libya‟s future relations with the core (Harvey, 2005: 19). 
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Chapter 3: Language and Development in Libya 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin with a brief account of the history of language in Libya before 
examining its development during and after colonialism. It does this in order to provide a 
context for the debates about the role that language came to play in post-colonial Libya where 
it was seen as central to the emergence of Libyan national identity.  As a consequence it was 
a political and cultural factor for the revolutionary government under Gaddaffi. It will also 
explain the extent to which the Libyan governmental decision to stop the teaching of foreign 
languages in Libya in 1986 was in part a response to the problematic and ongoing legacy of 
colonialism. Thus an argument was made at the time that this decision arose, in part, out of 
the fear that Libyan Arab culture and language would be diluted by the intrusion of foreign 
cultures. This view is supported, for example, by Kloss (1969 cited by Rashid, 2000) who 
argues that second languages always try to displace the natural language both geographically 
and economically. This struggle over language and identity in colonial and post-colonial 
Libya is a central feature of the MOWS and the recent new vision policies place this issue at 
the centre of Libyan politics again. In terms of this relationship to the MOWS, as set out in 
chapter two, the nature of power in the MOWS is not simply economic. Crucially the ability 
of the core to dominate the world-system and in particular of the hegemonic state to do so 
(the UK followed by the USA post WW2) depends upon a range of hierarchical relations and 
forms of social power. In this instance the cultural power of what is now called „global 
english‟ is a the heart of the current phase of the MOWS. As we will see I later chapters this 
drive towards learning global English as part of an investment in human capital is a tendency 
that almost all states in the periphery and semi-periphery are undertaking on a colossal scale.  
Historically Libya has been occupied by some of the most powerful Western colonial nations 
such as Italy, France and Britain. Libya has been subject to the usual colonial policy of 
imposing and spreading the language of the colonial power in order to deepen the occupation 
culturally as well as economically and politically (Ahmida, 1994; Ahmida, 2005; St. John, 
2008; Said, 1987; Fanon, 1976). However, Libya is an example of a nation which tried to 
keep its identity against colonialism and neo-colonialism by making the Arabic language the 
sole language in Libyan society. As such, this chapter will present an overview of language in 
Libya during and since colonialism through addressing the following key questions: what is 
the history of language acquisition in Libya; what role has colonialism played in this as Libya 
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has entered the MOWS; in what way has colonialism used language acquisition as a form of 
power/knowledge (following Said) over the subaltern classes; to what extent does the new 
vision policy of promoting ELA perpetuate these factors?  
 
3.2 Languages in Libya During and since Colonialism 
Libya‟s experience of colonialism shared much in common with that of other countries in the 
region and the periphery of the world-system but also some important differences. Western 
colonial rule was quite different to that of the Ottoman period, for example, particularly as 
Ottoman rule was by Muslims (Vandewalle, 2006).  Hence, the Libyan people showed less 
resistance towards the latter and were more accepting of the legitimacy of Ottoman rule than 
that of the subsequent western colonialism. There were, however, significant disadvantages 
resulting from the isolation policies for Libya that were imposed by the Ottoman Empire on 
their Arab colonies.  
 Fig: 3.1 Ethnic Group and Languages of Libya
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Libya is composed of several ethnic groups (see table-1) although the majority of the 
population is Arabic-speaking whose ancestries are a mix of Arab and Berber. Thus, the main 
language spoken in Libya is Arabic, which is also the official language (Metz, 2004). The 
                                                          
3
  http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/mylinks1.htm viewed in 2008   
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Aamazight Berber language is spoken by Libyan Berbers who live in the Jebel Nafusa region 
(Tripolitania), the town of Zuwarah on the coast, and the city-oases of Ghadames, Ghat and 
Awjila. In addition, Tuaregs speak Tamahaq, the only known Northern Tamasheq language. 
Italian and English are sometimes spoken in the big cities, although Italian speakers are 
mainly among the older generation. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA” 4 
Year of publication, title), Libyan Berbers and Arabs constitute 97% of the population; the 
other 3% are from Greek, Maltese, Italian, Egyptian, Afghani, Turk, Indian, and Sub-Saharan 
African origins.
5
  
 
Table 3.1: Ethnic Groups and Languages of Libya
6
 
Ethnic Group Language Population in Country (est.) 
Arabised Berber  Arabic. Moroccan  230,000 
Arabized Black  Arabic. Yemeni  98,000 
Cyrenaican Arab  Arabic. Libyan  1,400,000 
Fezzan Bedouin  Arabic. Hasaaniya  170,000 
Ghadames Berber  Ghadames  20,000 
Halebi Gypsy (Nawari)  Domari  33,000 
Jalo Berber  Arabic. Hasaaniya  34,000 
Jofra Berber (Al – jawf)  Tamahaq, Hoggar  22,000 
Kufra Bedouin  Arabic. Hasaaniya  22,000 
Nefusa Berber (Jemmari)  Jabal Nafusah  170,000 
Palestinian Arab  Arabic. Levantine  54,000 
                                                          
4 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html last viewed April 20th 2008 
5 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html last viewed April 20th 2008  
6 http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/mylinks1.htm Last viewed April 20th 2008.   
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Riyah Bedouin  Arabic. Hasaaniya  28,000 
Sanusi Bedouin  Arabic. Hasaaniya  510,000 
Sirtican Bedouin  Arabic. Hasaaniya  28,000 
Sudanese Arab  Arabic. Sudanese  190,000 
Teda (Tubu)  Teda  32,000 
Tripolitanian Arab  Arabic. Moroccan  1,600,000 
Tunisian Arab  Arabic. Tunisian  160,000 
Zuara (Zwara, Zuraa) Zuara  33,000 
 
In order to explore and account for these population distributions, this section will present a 
brief historical background to the languages in Libya that covers the ancient Libyan, Islamic 
and Ottoman Empire in Libya, the Italian Colonial Era and Libya under UN Administration. 
 
3.3 Ancient Libya 
The history of language in Libya can be traced back to the people who were occupying partly 
or wholly the area corresponding to modern-day Libya such as the Phoenicians, 
Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals and Byzantines (St John, 2008). Although the 
Greeks and Romans left ruins at Cyrene, Leptis Magna and Sabratha, little other evidence 
remains of the other ancient cultures. The Phoenicians founded colonies on the coast of 
Tripolitania, which were conquered by Carthage in the 6th century BC. The Greeks 
established settlements in Cyrenaica in the 4th century BC. Under the Greeks the city of 
Cyrene flourished as a centre of intellectual life and was noted for its schools of medicine and 
philosophy. Both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became part of the Roman Empire in the 2nd 
century BC. For about 500 years, under Roman rule, great advances were made in 
agriculture, especially with the introduction of irrigation, and in the construction of roads and 
cities. When Roman emperor Diocletian divided the empire into parts in the late 3rd century 
ad, Tripolitania remained directly under Roman rule while Cyrenaica was assigned to Greek 
rule (St John, 2008, and Metz, 2004). 
 
The oldest known Berber inscriptions date back to the 
4th century B.C., but Berber-speaking people have lived in North Africa since at least 3,000 
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B.C., and references to them occur frequently in ancient Egyptian, Greek word barbarous 
"barbarians." It is understandably disliked by many Berbers who prefer the term "Tamazight" 
which is often used instead, particularly with reference to Northern Berber languages. 
However, "Tamazight" also refers to a language spoken in the Atlas Mountains region of 
Morocco, thus creating some terminological confusion. 
 
Greek historian Herodotus, writing in 
the 5th century BC, described the Garamantes people of the Fezzan as sedentary farmers who 
used horse-drawn chariots in warfare. His account was verified in the 20th century by ancient 
cave art, discovered in the Jabal Akākus (jabal means “mountains”) of the western Fezzan 
and the Jabal al „Uwaynāt near the Egyptian border (Smith, & Metz, 2004)7  Societies are 
never static, of course; cultural traits and social patterns evolve through time.
 
The name 
"Libya" is an indigenous (i.e. Berber) one, which is attested in ancient Egyptian texts 
as , R'bw (= Libu), which refers to the tribes of Berber peoples living west of 
the Nile. As a result, Berber did take root in Libya yet not to extent that Arabic does till this 
time. 
 
3.4 Libya in the Islamic and Ottoman Empires  
By the time of the death of the prophet Mohamed in A.D 632, Islam had been carried by its 
followers from Arabia into North Africa, where Islam came to Libya, by Omar ibn Al-As, in 
A.D 642. Libya underwent economic, social and cultural flourishing due to its strategic 
location in North Africa. From North Africa Libya developed successful trade links with 
countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia (Ahmida, 1994). This trade was especially successful 
with Arab Moslem countries as the common Arabic language became more widely used. 
Further Ahmida (1994) said that “Islam and the Arabic language replaced other religions 
and languages by the turn of the fourteenth century” (Ahmida, 1994:17). This affected not 
only the economies in the Arabian region but, also social and culture life in Libya, through 
such trends as migration, intermarriage between other Arabic nationals and Libyans and the 
changes in the labour market especially, since discovery of oil in 1959 (St John, 2008, 
Ashorax, 1985, & Metz, 2004). This exchange of trade and the successive waves of Arab 
                                                          
7 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html Last viewed April 20th 2008. 
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migrants helped to spread Islam and the Arabic language. It also helped that Arab cultures 
intermingled with the other local cultures of the peoples conquered by the Arabs, to produce 
Islam's fundamental orientations and identities. The Arabic language became a vehicle for the 
transmission of high culture, and helped facilitate the concept of Pan-Arab cultural unity that 
came to play such prominence in the post-colonial period (Amin and Kenz, 2005; Ashorax, 
1985). Arabism and Islamism were growing rapidly in Libya by the mid twentieth century to 
the extent that teaching which had previously been limited to the Koran now progressed onto 
natural and social sciences, as well as studies into the origins of Islam (Arabsheibani & 
Manfor, 2000-5).  
The Banu Hilal invasion of 1049 and succeeding attacks of the Banu Sulaym later in the 11th 
century, however, brought migrations of large pastoral nomadic tribes from the eastern 
Arabian Peninsula 
 
(Ahmida, 1994, and St John, 2008).  According to Metz (1987) the 
Berbers were the major original inhabitants of Libya, and the region was ruled successively 
by the Umayyads, Fatimids, and a Berber dynasty. Yet, the situation in Morocco and Algeria 
for example, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, was quite different from that experienced in 
Libya. Arabization and Islamization did not have the same impact where Berbers who had yet 
to become arabised continued to form a substantial ethnic minority (Harris, 1986; St John, 
2008). As a consequence, Arabic remained the dominant Language in Libyan society and in 
people‟s daily life as well as in all levels of the Libyan education sector.  
 
By the mid-12th century the Normans of Sicily dominated the Mediterranean region and 
ruled part of Libya from 1146 to 1158. They soon abandoned it, however, and it passed on to 
the Berber Almohad dynasty. During the following centuries the control of Libya, or parts 
thereof, frequently passed through a succession of Arab Muslim leaders. This pattern of the 
power of the Islamic unity in the Arabic region was the same in Libya and was continued 
until it was divided in the 16th century by the Ottoman Empire. During the time of 1711-
1835 of Ottoman Empire Al-Karamanli family was governed Libya for 124 years mainly by 
Ahmed Pasha Karamanli (Ahmida, 2005; St John, 2008). During the Ahmed Pasha era Libya 
to a large extent had enjoyed political stability and economic prosperity where Libya 
witnessed active progressive foreign and domestic policies. In addition, Ahmed Pasha‟s rule 
did see the expansion of commercial and diplomatic relations with Europe. Such a step 
encouraged the influx of Turks to Tripoli increasing the agriculture productivity for both 
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Libyans and Turks, and thus enhanced the overall economy (St John, 2008). However, after 
Ahmed Pasha‟s death in 1745 the political and economic prosperity of the Ottoman Empire 
declined, and it came to an end by the Sublime Porte in 1835
8
. According to Ahmida (2005) 
and St John (2008) after 1835 Libya had become a dynamic area for the improvements with 
administrative, economic, and educational reforms. For instance, during Mohammed Amin 
Pasha‟s rule, 1842-1847, modern primary schools were opened (see fig-2) and were funded 
by parents to teach the Arabic Language, Turkish Language, Islamic religion, Turkish 
history, mathematics and geography for three years. He was followed by Ahmed Izzet Pasha 
in 1857 who was the first to open the military schools which were followed in 1867
9
 by the 
first junior high school in Tripoli (St John, 2008, Ashorax, 1985, & Metz, 2004).  
 
The year 1878 then witnessed the establishment of schools in the main Libyan cities of 
Tripoli, Benghazi and Fezzan and some villages together with the first junior high school for 
girls in Tripoli in 1903. In 1910 a private school for teaching French Language was opened in 
Tripoli
10
. 
                                                          
8 1835 was considered as the second Ottoman occupation over Libya after the Karamanli regime was declined and overthrew 
by the Sublime Porte.  
9 According to St John (2008:46) During this time of 1860s ―Ottoman administrators began to implement several political 
and administrative reforms in Libya where new institutional developments included the creation of administrative and 
village councils, court system, new methods of tax assessment and collection system, the postal system, a telegraph line 
between Tripoli and Malta, Trative system, and thus Ottoman rule became more centralized and Libya became highly 
integrated within the authority of the Sublime Porte”.  
10 http://www.jeel-libya.com/show_article.php?id=4124&section=2 
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Fig: 3.2 some of Libyan/Turkish Schools and Military school. 
 
The Ottoman Empire made some important reforms in the Arab world, including in the 
region of Libya, developing roads, hospitals, Mosques, and councils in addition to those 
educational reforms already mentioned the latter being crucial in the institutionalisation of the 
learning of Arabic across Libyan society. Thus at this stage Libya was still rooted in the 
Ottoman Empire which was itself slowly being incorporated into the European constructed 
and dominated MOWS. By the mid-1880s “the Arab-Ottoman” relations started to be at risk 
where Italy showed the serious threat to its African territory (Libya). At the same time, 
disagreement between the leaders of Sanusi Order and the Ottoman government was taking 
place which led to economic, social, political and military setbacks in Libya, and thus 
undermined significant development of the early stage of the Ottoman Empire. However, the 
relationship between Turks and Arabs deteriorated as the Ottoman Empire weakened, 
ultimately collapsing due to Italian invasion in 1911 (Ashorax 1985). This collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire saw it finally and fully incorporated in the MOWS, with some areas in the 
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periphery and others in the semi-periphery. Libya remained firmly rooted in the periphery of 
the MOWS, however, until the discovery of oil in 1959 saw it begin, like other rentier states, 
its transition into the semi-periphery because of its natural rather than its productive 
resources.  
 
3.5 The Italian Colonial Era  
Since 1878 Libya has been subject to the power-political bargaining of three countries:  
France, Britain and Italy. In order to avoid a political clash over Tunisia and the Suez Canal 
and Egypt, France and Britain urged Italy to occupy Libya as a means of harmonising policy 
over a militarily weaker people. This policy of harmonization gave Italy a satisfactory share 
of the Ottoman Empire which by then had become known as “the sick man” of Europe11 
following the 1877-1878 Berlin conference where the major European Powers met to decide 
its fate and put an end to the Ottoman Empire (Samalot, 1981, & Ashorax, 1985). After the 
Ottomans renounced their rights over Libya in 1912, the Italians met resistance from Libyans. 
Italian occupation was confined to certain areas of the Libyan coast until 1922, but by 1932 it 
had been extended to the entire interior. Libya was eventually made a part of the national 
territory of Italy under Dictator Benito Mussolini in 1939 (Ahmida, 1994, 2005, and St John, 
2008). The Italian colonisation of the Arabic language in Libya was no more successful than 
that of the Turks under the Ottoman Empire where both introduced their own languages as 
means of transforming local culture. In contrast with French colonialism in Algeria and 
British colonialism in Egypt, where both French and English languages have been heavily 
introduced into those colonies through their educational and cultural institutions, Italy‟s 
colonialism in Libya was mainly military based rather than cultural. However, the Italian 
government was keen to erase the Arabic language in order to extend their control and 
occupation of Libya (Ahmida, 2005). Therefore, in 1914 a decree was issued allowing the 
establishment of Arab schools in Libya but only under the supervision of the Italian education 
ministry (St John, 2008). In 1917 an additional decree was issued with the following two 
provisions for the main regions of Tripoli and Burka: Freedom of education for Libyans and 
compulsory primary education for Libyan boys; Teaching of Arabic language in all classes 
and teaching of Italian language after the third year. 1922 marked a major turning point in 
                                                          
11  It is the name given to the Ottoman Empire then due to its weakness of its strategies towards development in its latest 
stage. 
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Libyan history when the Italian Fascist Government came to power in Rome and abandoned 
traditional Italian colonial practices. Instead the Fascist government rejected the colonial 
practice (followed since 1911) of collaborating with local Libyan elites, terming it a failure. 
Like apartheid in South Africa and Aryan supremacy in Nazi Germany, the Italian fascist 
policy was based on an ideology of racial supremacy. It stressed hierarchy, holding that as a 
superior race Italians had a duty to colonize inferior races which included in their views 
Africans. It was Mussolini‟s plan to settle between ten and fifteen million Italians in Eritrea, 
Somalia, and Libya to populate what he heralded as “the second Roman Empire” (Ahmida, 
2005:41). Italian Fascism has had a deep impact on today‟s Libyan society where Ahmida 
(2005:36) described it as „…not just a case of war accidents, but rather genocide experienced 
by human beings.‘ Moreover, according to Ahmida (2005:41) this situation became worse: 
 
 “Rights accepted before 1922 by the previous government were dismissed. Educational 
policies changed in accordance with racial supremacy views: while previous colonial 
officials had moved to Italianize Libyans by broadening education, the fascists barred 
Italian culture from natives, replaced the Italian language with Arabic in the 
classroom, and banned education to Libyans after sixth grade”.  
 
After the sixth grade Libyans were not allowed to continue their studies at secondary schools 
until the year of 1927-1928 where an Italian government passed a resolution that decreed that 
young Libyans willing to continue their education were allowed to enter Italian secondary 
school
12
.
   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 http://www.libya-alyoum.com/look/article.tpl?IdLanguage=17&IdPublication. Last viewed November 15th 2009. 
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Fig: 3.3 Establishment of the Primary Girls Schools in 1914, during the Italian Reign.
13 
 
 
 
This was the main route for introducing the Italian language into Libyan society and to 
imposing it at all levels of the Libyan schools to “Italianize” Libyans (including 
Kindergartens).  
 
Historically, then, colonial languages in the MOWS were employed as means of 
power/knowledge (following Fanon and Said) in order to deepen the influence of colonialism 
over subject populations. However, the spread of the Italian language via that route was not 
effective due to the fact that those who joined the Italian schools were only the sons of the 
“elite” while the majority of the pupils were sons of the poor. The poor students were 
studying at the Kuttab “informal school” (see fig-3) where their studies were mainly confined 
to the Koran and other Islamic studies (Arabsheibani & Manfor, 2000-5). This is significant 
as it is factor in explaining the limits to the cultural transformation of Libyan society under 
colonialism, compared say, with that of Algeria which was a Department of France 
 
                                                          
13 http://www.libya-alyoum.com/look/article.tpl?IdLanguage=17&IdPublication. Last viewed November 15th 2009. 
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Fig: 3.4 the Informal Schools “Kuttab” for the poor people “the majority” 
 
 
This situation significantly contributed to the survival of Arabic during the occupation era in 
Libya, but is also contributed to high rates of illiteracy of more than 90% that persisted into 
the early post-colonial period. The racist Italian policies had been reflected in the Italian 
Anthem at that time in which soldiers chanted against the holy Koran and Libya, “don‟t you 
know Mum, that Italy is calling me, to go to Libya and to my happiness, I will shed my blood 
to eradicate this nation and combat the Islamic religion, I will fight the Koran with all my 
Strength” (Ashorax; 1985). In the meantime, the Libyan resistance together with the changing 
international circumstances and the start of the Second World War saw Italy forced to 
withdraw from Libya in 1943. As the conflict between states in the Core over the direction of 
the MOWS was played out in WW2 its denouement had huge implications for Libya‟s 
subsequent integration into the system. 
 
3.6 Anglo-French Administration 
In 1943 the Italian army was defeated in Libya and thus Libya was placed under an Anglo-
French military government. By the peace treaty of 1947 Italy renounced all claims to the 
territory, and in 1949 the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution calling for 
the granting of independence to Libya by January 1, 1952 (Vandewalle, 1998, and St John, 
2008). In 1944 an English woman was appointed as an inspector of girls‟ schools in Tripoli, 
with the support of some Egyptian women, under the supervision of the then British 
administration. In the following year, sixteen Libyan teachers were sent to Egypt for a short 
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training programme in the area of school management (Samalot, 1981).
 
Although the 
strategies of the education system at that time in Libya were dependent on the English 
administration, in 1947, an Arab advisory committee consisting of a number of prominent 
citizens was formed in order to discuss matters pertaining to education and development. 
Thus the issue of language and development that is central to this thesis has been a recurring 
theme in Libyan history since the end of the 2nd World War. This intention to develop the 
educational system as an opening issue to the Cambridge conference which was to take place 
in 1948 and which was to focus upon the issue of under-development. The main aim of this 
conference was to devise policies that would achieve a better life for people who live in so-
called under-developed countries (Samalot, 1981, and St John, 2008). A year later (1949), an 
Institute for the preparation of teachers was formed to tackle the shortage of Arab teachers.  
Fig: 3.5 an Institute for the Preparation of Libyan Teachers in Egypt in the late 1940s 
 
3.7 Libya under Loyal Rule 
In the Second World War in 1943 the Libyan people joined the allies after Britain had 
promised that when the war ended Libya would become independent. After the defeat of 
Italy, and the fall of Benghazi and Tripoli to British forces, Britain separated two of the main 
regions granting Burka and Tripoli to England, and Fazan to France. However, on the 1st of 
June 1949, after many negotiations it was agreed to grant Burka its independence and the 
Libyans transferred the issue to the United Nations (St John, 2008; Metz, 2004). In the same 
year 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nation passed Resolution No. 289 granting 
Libya independence no later than the first of January 1952, and formed a committee to 
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implement this decision. Moreover, on 12/10/1951 Libya received all the federal government 
and regional governments‟ full authority, except with regard to matters of Defence, Foreign 
Affairs, and Finance. On, 15/12/1951 financial authority passed to the Libyan Government 
Central, and this was followed by defence and foreign affairs in the same year and in 1963 
the Constitution was amended and Libya became a unified state (Vandewalle, 1998) 
 
Simpkins (2008) argues that at the time of independence Libya was one of the world‟s 
poorest countries. However, the discovery of oil in Libya in 1959 made it potentially one of 
the richest nations in the post-colonial world. Having said that, even when oil was produced 
on a commercial level, political, economic and social development within Libya was slow. 
This lack of development was in significant part due to the continuing dominance exercised 
by both Britain and the USA over the Libyan monarchy and economy. In MOWS terms 
Libyan economy and society (periphery) remained highly dependent upon sections of the 
core (Britain and the USA) to fund its development through its use and purchase of its 
primary export material, crude oil. However, in a pattern reflected in other Maghreb countries 
such as Morocco and Algeria, the resources generated from oil revenues were never used to 
meet the basic needs of the Libyan people. More specifically, in classic MOWS pattern, most 
of the wealth from oil revenues fell into the hands of the country‟s elites and the capitalists 
from the core that dominated the nascent oil industry (Ahmida, 2005; St John, 2008, Ashorax, 
1985). The wealth accumulated by the Libyan elites was used primarily to reinforce their own 
dominance over the domestic population. The underdevelopment of Libyan society 
continued. For example in 1963 it is estimated that approximately 81% of the population was 
illiterate (Arabshebani & Manfor, 2000: 5).   
 
At the same time, Arab nationalism was emerging in Egypt under Nasser who was 
comprehensively against colonialism, domination and foreign military bases as well, 
considering them as a threat to Arab nationalism and unity. This situation in Egypt made an 
impression upon the educated classes in Libya who were increasingly disappointed by King 
Sanusi and his politics, in particular over his decision to allow more than forty foreign 
companies to fully control the hydrocarbon industry. Moreover, according to Ashorax (1985), 
in the Sanusi era, although, Libya became one of the three richest countries in Africa due to 
its productive capacity in oil, most of the Libyan people remained in poverty, living in huts 
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and tents in and around most Libyan cities. As a result of this the Libyan people sought to 
mobilise politically to demand the rights to freedom, security, economic wealth and basic 
needs. As a result, they were met with repressive measures by the state including the shooting 
of protesting Libyan students in 1964 (Ashorax, 1985, First, 1974, and Ahmida, 2005). These 
two situations increased public resistance to neo-colonialism and made people realise that 
they would have to fight for their rights for a better life, effectively dividing Libyan society 
and turning many against the ruling regime. According to First (1974) “Mass politics, though 
on a limited scale, were initiated within the student movement when students demonstrated in 
defiance of the police in 1964 schools went on strike, and the authorities had to close 
universities” (First, 1974:84). Hence, this resistance was mainly supported by the student 
population especially (Ashorax, 1985, and First, 1974).   
 
The movement was of a section of Libyan student‟s and other Arab students in some 
European countries and was against the suppression of their colleagues in Libya and aimed 
for the reopening of the university and the Libyan Student Union (First, 1974). In 1966 the 
Libyan student movement successfully held its first union conference that was 
overwhelmingly directed towards issues of Arab nationalism, a solution to the Palestinian 
problem, to amend the country‟s oil policy and to remove the foreign military bases (St John, 
2008). 
 
3.8 Libya and its Language in the post-colonial period  
Those issues did not, however, prevent the government and education officials from 
attempting to solve the problems of the then education system where the rate of illiteracy was 
estimated to be 90% in 1951. Interestingly, in 1968, the Libyan education Minister, Mostafa 
Baaio, issued a decision to include English in the curriculum and to teach subjects such as 
mathematics and sciences in both schools and universities in English (Ashorax, 1985). Such a 
decision had mixed support. Those who supported the decision considered it a key to a 
“scientific renaissance”. However, some Libyan intellectuals did not welcome the decision 
and considered it a threat to the Arabic language and identity. These intellectuals believed 
that Arabic, being the symbol of Arab Islamic nationalism, would be undermined by this 
decision. This opinion still exists amongst strata of Libya‟s educated population and is one of 
the factors behind some discontent over the new vision policies towards ELA. For example, 
in interviews conducted regarding the relevant areas of this thesis, some of the participants 
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explained how by introducing English language or other foreign languages it could harm 
Libyan culture and identity. Mussa
14
 a postgraduate student at the higher education academy 
stated that:  
 
“I think that although learning a second language like English has many 
advantages, it also has other disadvantages such as affecting our culture, as 
learning a foreign language might cause the loss of our traditional culture, 
especially if this language was learnt at an early age. And you notice the way that 
our young generation are thinking, behaving and even communicating with each 
other, it is all coming from copying Western culture rather than following their own 
way of life. Thus, we might lose some of our Arabic oriental culture, or worse 
deviate from our Arabic moral values”   
 
In response to Mussa‟s statement Akrem15 from the same institution replied: 
 
 “I do not really understand why we still connect learning foreign language such as 
English with cultural damage, or with the fake idea of western manipulation, which 
might have been the case in the past, but today no one can take another‘s culture 
unless they are allowed to.  We have strong aspirations and pride in our Arabic 
language, the language of the holy Quran, and our Arabic culture, as it represents 
our identity. Basically, all we need is communication with others, knowledge 
exchange and catching up with what is going on around the world, and most 
important being confident of ourselves, our language, culture, and identity‖. 
 
For Mussa the fear of Libyan dependency remains implicit in the spread of English language 
amongst Libyan graduates while for Akrem the key is that the Libyan people retain 
                                                          
14
  Mussa a participant from the higher education Academy, and the focus group method was used in 17/04/2009.  
15 Akerm one of the focus group participants at the higher education academy in Tripoli which was made in 17/04/2009. 
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confidence and pride in their culture rather than allowing it to be subordinated to Western 
values and practices.  Akrem‟s view of second language acquisition is an instrumental one: a 
second language is simply a tool that can be used to one‟s advantage. In other words, using 
foreign languages such as English with certain standards and criteria, for commercial, 
scientific or any particular uses can be beneficial for a society‟s development. For example, 
Gaddafi himself was one of those Libyan young students who studied at the British Military 
Academy at Benghazi whilst in the Libyan army in 1965-66. He also studied in the UK, 
spending nine months for advanced military training at Beaconsfield, learning English on a 
tank-training course in Dorset and an infantry signal instructor‟s course at Hythe (St John, 
2008). Thus, Gaddafi viewed the acquisition of English language in instrumental terms, too. 
It enabled him to pursue his wider strategic goals which included organising the overthrow of 
the Sanusi regime. English language was, therefore, not seen as a threat to Libyan identity, 
merely a tool that could be used by Gaddafi and no doubt other Libyans. In this sense English 
language was used as a foreign language that helped to transform Libyan society rather than 
it being a second language that threatened the culture of the Libyan people.  
 
3.9 The September 1st Revolution     
In 1969, the Revolutionary coup which was led by Colonel Gaddafi took place. Gaddafi 
subsequently ruled according to what became known as the “Third Universal Theory”, a 
system of governance of his own invention” (Simpkins, 2008:02). The revolution was caused 
by some of the factors already mentioned: most of the oil wealth was in the hands of the 
country's elites, the ill-treatment of the Libyan people by the state, the suppression of the 
Libyan student movement, the existence of foreign military bases and the flourishing of Arab 
nationalism, all of which combined to lead to the end of King Idris‟ reign (St John, 2008; 
Simpkins, 2008; First, 1974). In short these conditions reflected Libya‟s subordinate and 
dependent relationship to the core in the MOWS. The social basis of the Third Universal 
Theory is cited in Gaddafi‟s Green Book. The Green Book aims to provide the main solutions 
to the problems of democracy and socioeconomic development in Libya (Al-Gathafi, 2005). 
According to St John (2008) Gaddafi‟s theory has clear goals and policies emphasized on 
social welfare programs like housing, health care, education, the satisfaction of basic needs. 
In terms of democracy the Green Book establishes the right (in theory) of all Libyan people to 
participate directly in discussion of their social, political, economic and cultural issues at the 
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“Basic People‟s Congresses” (Simpkins 2008). The Program on governance in the Arab 
region “POGAR” presents that: 
  
“Gaddafi developed his vision of the Libyan political system, which meant the 
construction of a "state of the masses."  To achieve this political system meant to 
establish a decentralized system fully and at all levels to become decision-making 
process in the hands of citizens themselves through direct democracy.  Gaddafi shows 
in a series of articles collected in the "Green Book" vision of what he called "Third 
Way", or alternative to capitalism and socialism.  The Libyan regime has repeatedly 
sought to revive life in the revolution through the transfer of power from the 
government body to another” (POGAR, cited in UNDP, on 05/06/2008). 16  
 
In practice these structures remained largely dormant and the Libyan people have possessed 
no democratic right to replace the ruling revolutionary government with another. The transfer 
from the Sanusi regime to the revolutionary system represents (domestically) a 
transformation from an elite-led and largely unaccountable monarchical system to a form of 
military-nationalist dictatorship, often but not always paternalistic in its relationship to the 
Libyan people. As we will see later, the nature of the revolutionary regime in Libya has been 
quite different to post-colonial regimes elsewhere in the Middle-East and North Africa 
(MENA), in significant part because of the actors involved, most obviously Gaddafi himself. 
 
Via the Third Universal Theory (which was partly based on The Quran), Gaddafi sought to 
show that this theory was unprecedented and distinct from both capitalism and communism. 
The claim was that it provides the only alternative, as it is against the class exploitation of 
capitalism and the class warfare of communism. The Third Universal Theory asserted that 
both ideologies of capitalism and communism were exclusive and driven by the interests of 
ruling elites at the expense of the people. This populist appeal to the masses above and 
beyond elites has always been a powerful part of the ideology of the post-revolutionary 
governments under Gaddafi (Vandewalle, 2006; Martinez, 2007). The Third Universal 
                                                          
16  http://www.pogar.org/arabic/countries/localgov.asp?cid=18 last viewed February 3rd 2009. 
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Theory claims to eliminate class differences by establishing a nation-wide network of 
consultative councils in accord with the Islamic idea of “Shura” (Harris, 1986; St John, 
2008). The system of Shura varies in practice in different Islamic countries and in accord 
with contrasting Shia and Sunni interpretations of what it means (an-Nabahani, 2002). This 
system, in theory, legitimises the legislation of the society by allowing for consultation with 
the people. Thus, in Gaddafi‟s Green Book, he argued that, 
 “Natural legislation in any society is grounded in either religion or customs and any attempt 
to make legislation for a given society derived from sources other than these two is invalid 
and illogical. Constitutions cannot be considered as the legislation of society. A constitution 
is a man-made law which needs to be ascribed to particular sources for its vindication it does 
not have a natural source. Codes of man-made laws derived from man-made measures. 
Customs call for spiritual non-physical, but deserving punitive measures. These customs are 
inherent in religion in which most physical punishments are postponed punishments and most 
judgments are passed as exhortations guiding instructions and answers to questions making 
them the most appropriate legislation which is respectful of human beings. In religion 
immediate punitive measures are taken only in extreme cases for the benefit of society. 
Religion embraces customs and customs are an expression of the natural life of the people. 
Therefore religion is an affirmation of natural legislation. In the Third Universal Theory, in a 
democracy no one group can claim the right to do this on behalf of society as society is its 
own overseer. Any such claim by an individual or group is dictatorial because democratically 
this is the responsibility of the society as a whole. Democracy means all society overseeing 
its own progress. This can be achieved through the democratic instrument of government 
which results from the self-organisation of society into basic people conferences and from the 
government of these people through people‟s conferences and people‟s committees then the 
general people‟s conference (the national conferences).” (See the Green Book, part one, „The 
Authority of the People‟, p. 32). 
 
According to this theory the people are part of government and as such they are their own 
overseer. In this manner society thus becomes by itself the overseer of its legislation. By this 
“Shura” consultation system, society and nationals would be involved in consultation with 
their views towards political, economical or social matters. Thus, this mutual consultation 
was manifested later in Libyan society through the system of people‟s committees and 
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popular congresses (Vandewalle, 2006, and Metz, 2004, El-Hawat, 2003). Nonetheless in 
practice these councils and consultative committees did not establish a democratic 
mechanism for the Libyan people if by that we mean that it gave them the power to replace 
the revolutionary government in a peaceful manner. As a consequence the state retained an 
unaccountable level of authority and power over society. 
 
The Revolutionary Government came to power saying that it wanted to overcome the 
mistakes of the Sanusi‟s regime which was totally loyal to the Western powers and upon the 
core of the MOWS (Ahmida, 1994, Ahmida, 2005). King Sanusi left the main issues of 
government to the British administration and involved himself only in resolving small 
problems. Since Libyan independence the English administration had sought to re-establish 
itself in a different form. It was not to be an exercise in military power, but cultural, through 
the establishment of new educational institutions such as schools and colleges and the 
establishment of elite level cultural links with the new rulers of Libya. In this way the British 
administration could claim to be helping to satisfy the needs of Libyan people whilst at the 
same time trying to shape their cultural beliefs and practices through control of access to 
education (Ahmida, 2005). Gaddafi, influenced by Fanon, has described this situation as "a 
cultural attack" on the culture and identity of societies who were colonised by those foreign 
nations (Martinez, 2007). This led eventually to the decision by the Libyan government to 
end cultural exchanges with the West. Gaddafi believed that Arabic symbolised the identity, 
values and culture of not only Libya, but all the other Arabic countries as well, and argued 
that all Arab societies should protect their identities from that cultural attack (Decart, cited in 
Leclerc, 1990, and Vandewalle, 1998). Therefore, language was to be the unifying force 
“people are only in harmony with their own arts and heritage” (Gaddafi, cited in Ashorax, 
1985: 47). The Arabic language was one of the central elements in Gaddafi‟s Green Book, 
not just for the Libyan people but for all the Arab nations, because it is seen as a symbol of 
trust and loyalty for them. However, attempts by Gaddafi to broaden this Arab unity largely 
floundered in the face of indifference and hostility amongst other Arab rulers. This led 
Gaddafi to switch his focus to Pan-Africanism, something he still espouses (Ahmida, 2005; 
and Otman and Karlberg, 2007). 
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More to the point, the physical removal of colonialism was not a complete end to colonial 
rule. Fanon (1965), an important influence upon Gaddafi, highlighted that the elimination of 
colonialism is not only about transforming the leadership from the bourgeoisie of imperialist 
rule to the bourgeoisie of nationals, as Libyans had experienced during the Sanusi regime. It 
is also about the actual physical and ideological removal of colonisation. In the physical 
sense, colonisation was largely removed. However, culturally colonisation remained as a part 
of Libyan culture and identity till the early stage of Gaddafi‟s revolution 1969. This 
incomplete removal of colonialism and the perpetuation of neo-colonial rule were 
exemplified in several parts of the world, with the pretexts for intervention being the need for 
those countries to modernise and civilise their way of life (Clark, 1990). For example, in 
Algeria, the development model was based on France‟s strategies “to industrialise the 
country by setting up powerful modern units, both in the base sector (industrialisation 
industries‘ was the official term) and in the consumer sector, However, as these installations 
progressed, thanks to capital derived from oil, new forms of dependence emerged to replace 
the old colonial forms” (Amin, 1978: 77).  As result, after their formal independence in the 
1950s, the entire Arabic world received a new form of colonialism and dependence, which 
used different mechanisms of power and control, most importantly through control of the 
global economy and the domination of global culture. As Fanon noted, this was of particular 
importance as the power of culture to displace indigenous beliefs and identity, led to the 
normalising and acceptance of the belief that Arabic barbarism had to be replaced by Western 
civilisation (Fanon, 1965). Thus Libya‟s incorporation into the MOWS was established 
during the period of colonisation by the European powers which established the social, 
political and cultural relations that continued after formal independence and which helped to 
secure Libya‟s dependence upon the core and its subordination to the orientalist assumptions 
of the MOWS. This remains a central issue now as the new vision policies re-engage Libyan 
economy and society with the global economy and the core of the MOWS. The consequences 
of this are likely to prove problematic for the revolutionary government as it attempts to 
liberalise its economy but at the same time maintain political and social control. 
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3.9.1 The Libyan Education System During and Since the September 1st 
Revolution  
According to St John (2008) the education sector at the early stage of the September 1
st
 
revolution received less attention than the other socioeconomic programs such as providing 
houses and improving health care. However, during the years of 1970-1973 attention to the 
education sector in Libya became greater as the government saw it as a tool for widespread 
social engineering. St John (2008:149) described Gaddafi‟s perspective as, “the revolutionary 
government aimed to create a new man supportive of the new regime” where the 
governmental socioeconomic programs planned to profit directly all Libyans in terms of their 
social development. This led to a series of radical populist policies aimed at improving the 
general quality of life for Libyans, a fact reflected in its relatively high ranking in UN Human 
Development Reports. Since the September 1
st
 revolution, for example, the figure of illiteracy 
fell from more than 81% in 1963 to 21.3% in 1995” (Arabshebani & Manfor, 2000: 5). The 
Green Book has given a considerable attention to the education sector where it ruled that 
Arabic should be the sole language to be used in all Libyan educational institutions. While 
English language was initiated from the seventh grade at the secondary schools (Al Hawat, 
2002 & 2003). The educational programs were funded by the revenues earned by the 
hydrocarbon industries (Arabshebani and Manfor 2000-5). Otman and Karlberg (2007:107) 
agreed that the government expenditure for education has reflected the priority and the 
importance afford to this sector in Libya. The noted, however, that: 
 
 “From 1986 to 1999, annual expenditure on education was significantly reduced, 
averaging 72 million LD, reflecting a lower oil price in the mid-1980s. It fell to a low of 
17.8 million in 1993, the same level as 20 years earlier, before rising significantly 
again to 72.5, 62.5, 308.1 million LD for the years 1992, 195, 2000, and 2002 
respectively. In 2004 it increased to LD 603 million, before falling again to a budgeted 
LD 230 million in 2006” (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:107).   
 
Moreover, the education system in Libya provides free education to all levels for all citizens. 
This system follows a 6-3-3 pattern - six years for the primary stage, followed by three years 
of elementary schooling and then Secondary school follows. After three years a successful 
applicant gets a general secondary school Certificate (Lagga et al., 2004, & Arabshebani & 
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Manfor, 2000-5). Technical institutes (skills-acquisition) were provided till recently. Thus 
according to Al Hawat (2002 & 2003) in 1980 the Libyan government created its “New 
Education Structure” where curriculums at all educational levels were restructured in favor of 
technical and humanities subjects. Currently higher education in Libya has 84 tertiary 
institutions, 12
17
 state universities where the main universities in Libya are: Al-Fateh 
University in Tripoli (1957), and Gar-Yunis in Benghazi (1955), polytechnics, and employees 
and teachers training institutes providing free education to all citizens (Lagga et al., 2004). 
The free education in Libya has encouraged students (males and females) to be enrolled in 
the following stages of the undergraduate studies, unless they decided to start their 
employment/business life. It is therefore clear that the Libyan government has accomplished 
valuable achievements in terms of education development over more 30 years.  
  
Fig: 3.6 the Libyan Education System
18
  
 
 
                                                          
17http://www.virtualcampuses.eu/index.php/Libya#Libya_education_policy  
18 National Economic Strategy Report, 2006: 123. 
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The free education, according to Al-Hawat (2002 and 2003), has led to increasing enrolments 
at all levels of higher education and thus the number of institutions of higher education. The 
university (the University of Libya) was divided into two universities: the university of 
Tripoli and university of Benghazi which renamed later to the university of Al Fateh and 
university of Gar-Yunis. As in many other countries there has been an increasing government 
led emphasis upon the idea of a knowledge economy where educational qualification is seen 
as the key factor in determining a successful career. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP, 2009) in its Human Development Indicators (HDI) places adult literacy 
in Libya at about 86.8% and in its 2010 report it sees Libya as having high levels of human 
development, currently 53
rd
 out of 169 countries (UNDP, 2010; Rauch, 2009). Although the 
UNDP has limited information about many quality of life indicators in Libya in placing it in 
the high development category it suggests that Libya has distinct social and economic 
advantages over its Maghreb neighbours, all of whom fall some way behind it: Tunisia is in 
83
rd
 place, Morocco in 114
th
, Egypt in 101
st
 and Algeria 84
th
 (UNDP, 2010). This has 
provided Libya with some of the required pool of human resources for its political, social, 
and economic development. It also reflects the important qualitative differences of states in 
the periphery and semi-periphery of the MOWS. The authoritarian populism of the 
revolutionary government generated material progress for Libyan‟s that was superior to that 
experienced elsewhere in the Maghreb. 
 
Al-Nouri (1995) has however observed a conflict between traditional and modernistic forces 
affecting Libyan educational patterns, particularly between the state and Libyan traditional 
tribal culture. He believes that students and their families have an enormous interest in 
college education and the degrees accruing from it, as is happening in most of the Arab world 
(Al-Nouri, 1995). Yet the old and young within the family tend to perceive higher education 
goals and practical benefits quite differently. In particular, these differences seem to be 
prompted by normative and religious questions, such that medicine, engineering, pharmacy, 
and, to a lesser degree, natural sciences appear to be far more appreciated locally than 
humanities and liberal arts (Al-Nouri, 1995). This discrepancy, perhaps, might stem from the 
value-laden nature of the latter disciplines due to their closer linkage with peoples ideological 
traditions (Al-Nouri, 1995). The lack of intellectual openness in Libyan higher educational 
culture is quite marked when compared with that found in even more authoritarian regimes 
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such as Iran, for example. It is a familiar trend in the periphery and semi-periphery of the 
MOWS that the state should seek to control education and limit free speech and inquiry. 
3.10 The Decision to Stop Teaching English Language in 1986           
By 1986 the revolutionary Libyan government had sought to build a number of alliances in 
the Arab world and then in Africa with a view to challenging the power of the Western states 
that dominated the core of the MOWS. This, in turn, saw a well-studied propaganda battle 
being waged by Western states against Libya of a kind that Said and Hitchens chronicle in 
their book Blaming the Victim. In supporting Third World independence movements from 
Iran to South Africa the Libyan government was also inviting attacks from the Western states 
as they sought to restore their authority over the MOWS. Thus Gaddafi became a „mad-dog‟ 
in the Western media and a sponsor of terrorism rather than Third World independence 
movements (Said and Hitchens, 2001). Thus the continuing relationship between Libya and 
the states of the core was driven by a global geopolitical agenda and the desire of former 
colonial rulers to continue to control access to and the price of natural resources, among 
which oil continues to be the most important (Amin, 1978; Amin and Kenz, 2005; Ahmida, 
2005). Although former colonial powers no longer rule directly they have a variety of 
mechanisms that enable them to co-opt elites in postcolonial countries: Funding and training 
of military and police forces; cultural ties with elites including educational ones in prestigious 
Western Universities and schools; diplomatic and financial support for pro-Western 
governments, punishment for those who are not; and increasingly the spread of what Leslie 
Sklair describes as a global cultural-ideological market place where ideas, images, symbols 
and meanings are overwhelmingly reflections of the interests of the key core states and in 
particular, the USA (Ahmida, 2005). Out of this emerges the Orientalist framework that Said 
describes in his work and which has its correlates in the idea of „Eurocentrism‟ as articulated 
by a number of world-systems analysts (Amin, Frank, and Wallerstein, 1997). As Said makes 
clear it is the capacity to construct the historical stories that shape a peoples sense of who 
they are that is at the heart of the Orientalist project, and he describes how this 
power/knowledge basis is constructed over a historical period when Western colonial powers 
ruled their subaltern populations directly (Said, 1979). Western colonial powers believed and 
continue to believe that they have a firm and scientific understanding of the culture, language, 
historical evolution and capabilities of their former subjects. These colonies are unable to 
articulate their own views and therefore need to be guided by the West to evolve and develop 
into a civilized nation.  
61 
 
 
“We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other 
country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it. 
It goes far beyond the petty span of history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric 
period time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed prime” (Marx, cited in 
Said, 1978:33)  
 
The scientific credentials of Western knowledge gave its scholars the ability to provide the 
world with „legitimate‟ accounts of the orient, its peoples and their way of life (Said, 1978). 
This Orientalist view has been supported by Gaddafi who was deeply influenced by the work 
of Fanon, the Algerian writer who was of great importance for the work of both Said and 
Wallerstein. Following Fanon, Gaddafi argued that the colonial powers tend to deprive 
people of their own social tools of understanding and analysis through their ability to impose 
their own knowledge, culture and languages. Colonial powers also barbarise the „Other‟s‟ (in 
Said‟s sense of the term, the non-Western subaltern population) language, and believe that 
these “Third World countries” cannot understand or explain their own history in the objective 
way that Western Orientalist's can (Said 1978 & Morthialo, 1980). For example, according to 
Okolo, (2005), the English language as a representative of colonial languages, has reshaped 
word associations and their meaning in colonized countries, which in turn serves to validate 
the necessity for colonialism itself by placing the colonized at a lower stage in the level of 
human development. More specifically, “the dictionary still lists words like bad-tempered, 
angry, horrible, dirty, malignant and so on as appropriate replacements for black and the 
black man as ‗an evil spirit‘, ‗the evil one‘, ‗the devil‟” (Okolo, 2005:86). Hence, this kind of 
representation embedded in colonial language has revealed an awareness of the extent to 
which colonial language distorted and “continues to disjoin the African man from his reality” 
(Okolo, 2005: 86). Language, then, is never neutral or simply an instrument for 
communication but carries with it also important cultural meanings and symbols that in the 
context of colonialism are inherently about power. Thus the colonial language is valorised as 
aesthetically and intellectually superior. 
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Chiswick (2000) states that most of the population groups of the African countries do not 
speak any of the main indigenous languages of their country, that “the designation of country 
boundaries by the European colonial powers with little or no regard for ethnic or language 
groups, combined with the migration of indigenous ethnic groups, has resulted in linguistic 
heterogeneity within individual countries” (Chiswick, 2000:349). When most countries 
gained independence they found they had to continue to use the colonial language for 
different reasons. Education cannot easily be changed over to local languages, because these 
languages have never been used for the construction of educational curriculum in different 
subject matters. As a consequence “some of these countries who gained their independence 
from England either kept the English language as an official language or recognized its 
utility” (Fishman, 2001:26). But, the situation in Libya regarding such foreign “colonial” 
languages was different. In fact, one of the Libyan revolutions goals was to reject these 
languages of colonialism, in favour of Arabic as the national and official language on the 
basis that language has a broader role to play in society than that of communication alone (St 
John, 2008, and Walsh, 2006). In 1980, Gaddafi expressed his great concern at the time of the 
„Africa Day‟, when he stated that keeping the colonial languages in some of the African 
countries meant protecting the colonial interests in these countries. Gaddafi added that the 
usage of colonial languages in African countries could hinder nation-building and social 
progress in these societies as the role of language is a potentially unifying factor in nation-
state building projects (Vandewalle, 2006; An-Bardi, cited in Morthialo, 1980). Thus not only 
did the Libyan government promote its own independence but tried directly to support that of 
other Third World countries, inviting the wrath of the Western states.  
 
It was six years later that US planes bombed Tripoli as a military action after the Berlin 
attack on US troops was blamed upon the Libyan Government. Consequently, in the same 
year the (1986) the decision was made to stop learning foreign languages at all levels of the 
Libyan education system. The decision came as reaction to the attack of the US on Libya and 
was symbolic act of resistance against Western imperialism. This reaction towards foreign 
languages did not face any resistance by the Libyans then to the extent that they had burned 
all the books which related to those languages (especially English and French) in most of the 
Libyan universities, schools and public areas (Kramer, 1986). The US attack served to unite 
Libyans behind the government and against the Western states. According to Black‟s report 
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in 2007
19
 this situation continued until the mid-1990s where English language learning was to 
be resumed in a number of Libyan universities‟ scientific faculties for technical reasons 
(Black, 2007). It has only been since the rapprochement between Libya and the West under 
the Bush Presidency (in 2004) that English language learning has resumed in Libyan 
educational system. On this point Dr. Abughania, the director of the curricula of education 
research centre in Libya, said of this decision that:  
 
“English is considered as a second language in the Libyan education system. In 2005 
English was implemented in basic education starting from grade 1 where the student 
can learn English for 5 years. During 2006 the number of years was reduced to 3 years 
in secondary education and there are 6 specializations in the secondary school which 
are: basic sciences; engineering; life sciences; economics; social sciences and 
language and communication.  During 2005-2007 we had designed two English 
courses, one general course for all the specializations except the specialized English 
majors, and the second course for the specialised English majors. In 2008 we had 
designed 5 different courses for the non majors. We are using text books  for every year 
and we have prepared CDs for audio-learning in every unit. The student has 4 lectures 
per week for the non majors and 19 lectures for the major student”20. 
 
One notable feature of Dr Abughania‟s response was the absence of any discussion of the ban 
on learning English. The subject itself, directed by the government, was striking as a subject 
in that many Libyans I interviewed were unable to discuss it. The reason for this is perhaps 
two-fold: First, at the time of the ban the decision was an understandable reaction to the US 
assault on Tripoli that left 45 soldiers and 15 civilians dead. In the wake of this most Libyans 
welcomed the ban as a sign of defiance against Western imperialism. Second, a significant 
section of Libya‟s educated classes were disappointed by the ban as they saw learning 
English as being increasingly important for Libyan citizens. The possibility of effectively 
                                                          
19
 Ian Black report (2007), “After years when foreign language teaching was banned, Libyans are now queuing up to learn 
English”... Tuesday 10 April 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/apr/10/internationaleducationnews.tefl  
20 An interview was made with Dr, Abughania in 25/03/2009.  
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opposing government policy was extremely limited and potentially a risky strategy to pursue. 
For many the decision came as a shock as reflected in the comments of the Libyan Higher 
Education Committee
21
 members themselves who told me that:  
 
“At the time of that decision we used to have frequent meetings, but sadly at the time we 
were discussing the possibility of introducing English language from earlier stages, we 
were surprised by the decision to stop it completely”.  
 
Dr, Haney
22
 explained that what happened was as a result of a suggestion at a public 
conference made by the Libyan educational minister to involve the educated people regarding 
the attack of the USA on Tripoli in the same year (1986). But, in a press conference in Tripoli 
2008 regarding this issue, Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim
23
 when he was asked about the decision and 
about the state of the education system in Libya, replied that it was very poor and old 
fashioned and he mentioned that he tried to turn that system into producing the productive 
educational outputs:   
 
“I succeeded in building a productive education system then, and I found that it‘s 
important to teach our society the educational things that could help them to build their 
social identity and economic development where the technical skills‘ learning was my 
target. Therefore, there was no need to learn skills like foreign languages at the time‖. 
 
He added that: 
 
                                                          
21 Focus group discussion is made with the Libyan Higher Education Committee in 10/05/2009  
22 The leader of the Libyan Higher Education Committee and he is one of the focus group participations which was made in 
22/4/2009. 
23 (The previous Libyan educational minister), the person who is considered in Libya as the decision maker of stop teaching 
English language in the Libyan education system 
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―There are some who criticised my view but I found that to be unreasonable because I 
wasn‘t the one who took the decision, it was taken by the higher general committee. 
Besides I dedicated my time into a scientific study together with a group of specialists 
from the United Nations institute to assess the importance of teaching English language 
in Libya. My conclusion was that we did need to learn English and eventually the study 
led to the re-introduction of English language into our education system. However, I am 
seeing all this criticism, but no one has mentioned what have I brought into this sector, 
as I was the one who was instrumental in establishing 19 universities in Libya which 
introduced different foreign languages. Yet, I have also approved the proposal of 
increasing the hours of teaching English language in the universities, Furthermore, I 
have prepared a team of (3500 members) educational experts to offer their time in 
setting up the national educational curriculums, which was described by educational 
expertise from the United Nation institute as the best of its type in the region” 
 
Whilst this was a governmental decision it also received support throughout the educational 
sector. For other sectors of higher education such as engineering and the natural sciences the 
decision to ban the learning of English language created technical problems that persist to this 
day. Dr. Osama,
24
 as one of the Libyan higher education committee‟s members, declared that  
 
“We should separate the stage of higher education from secondary education as the 
English language was never stopped from being taught in technical disciplines such as 
engineering and medical science. Hence, I believe that graduates in technical fields 
from Libyan universities mostly don‘t face problems with English language‖.  
 
Most Libyan university graduates who have been interviewed in 2009 confirmed their lack of 
English language skills. Indeed those from the human and social sciences faculties and who 
had specifically sought to re-train themselves in order to meet their academic and practical 
needs especially in terms of their research or their job opportunities. One case in point, 
                                                          
24
 Focus group was made22/4/2009 with the Libyan Higher Education Committee and Dr, Osama one of its 
participations   
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Nagwa
25
 is one of the Libyan postgraduate students at al-Fateh University who has stated 
that: 
 
“Though students in technical fields such as engineering have got some of the basic 
knowledge of English language, still the case is different with us in human/social 
sciences, where we don‘t have the same experience. Considering the fact that we have 
not studied any foreign languages till recent times, as postgraduate students we are 
now required to acquire the English language skills at this very late stage in order to 
finish our studies. However, the gap is still greater for us in the human/social sciences, 
whereas, it is easier for the technical sciences students who are at least able to search 
on the internet for relevant information‖.   
 
On this issue I returned to question the Director of the Curricula of Education Research 
centre in Libya and asked specifically about the 1986 decision. Strikingly again he tried to 
avoid the subject by saying that the decision was only for a short time (two years). Further 
probing revealed that:  
 
“I think every phase has its philosophy and circumstances. As in 1986 there were 
political circumstances. Libya is now opening itself to the world, either the African or 
European world. Why do you all consider stopping teaching English language as an 
unjust reaction? Is the Arabic language being taught in Britain? Nowadays, the Arabic 
language has become important even in Europe and America especially after the events 
of 9/11, because they have curiosity about Arabs and Islam. Even though I have 
mentioned earlier that English language is a tool of communication and sciences, we 
are now adopting at school level the teaching of African languages such as Hausa and 
Swahili, to facilitate communication with the whole world” 
 
                                                          
25
  Focus group method was made with the postgraduate female students at Al-Fateh University in21/04 2009.  
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This is the central dilemma of this thesis: to what extent can Libya improve its social and 
economic position in the MOWS by promoting the acquisition of English language? What are 
the potential risks and benefits of pursuing such a developmental strategy? Shaheena,
26
 as one 
of the British council members in Libya, believes that such an idea of the dominance of the 
colonial language on most of their colonies does not exist anymore. For example, regarding 
the quality of Libyan education and the importance of the English language learning in Libya 
she said that: 
 
“Libyan curriculums need to be re-evaluated, and there has to be consultation. I am not 
saying that British curriculum would be beneficial in Libya, but there needs to be an 
examination of bi-lingual schools, as Libya and other North African countries are 
moving away from French and other languages, because English is not any more a 
colonial language, and all international businesses and academic studies are conducted 
in English language.” 
 
Shaheena adopted a pragmatic view in response to these issues which says that in a 
globalised economy it is increasingly difficult for countries such as Libya to integrate with 
businesses without a strong commitment to the use of the English language as it is the 
language of global trade and business. Interestingly, since 2004 this perspective is largely 
being accepted among Libyans, especially amongst the educated class (Otman and Karlberg, 
2007). For instance, regarding the decision to stop teaching English language in Libyan 
education sector for 18 years, Manal
27
 was one who experienced this decision at Al-Fateh 
University and she stated that: 
 
“I believe that it was a big mistake to stop teaching foreign languages, especially 
English. However, I consider that decision was an understandable one at the time as it 
came in political situation where it was attached to our national identity. Moreover, I 
                                                          
26
 In 21/4/2009 an interview was made with Shaheena as one of the main members in the British Council in 
Libya. 
27
  Manal is a postgraduate student and teacher assistance at the Language centre at Al- Fateh University in 
Libya and was participating in the focus group that made in 21/4/ 2009.   
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would have been prouder if all other Arab countries followed the same action, then the 
outside world would have had to learn Arabic, because they needed to deal with us, but 
today reality says that English is the language of science and technology, hence, we 
have to accept this fact”. 
 
Manal considered that at the time the decision was a reasonable response by the Libyan 
government where English was seen as one of the neo-colonialism's forms (a cultural attack). 
In truth, the commitment in Libya to the teaching and learning of the languages of the 
colonial powers has been uneven since the September 1st Revolution.  The dilemma facing 
Libya and other former colonies is described by Okolo (2005) who notes that Africa has been 
caught on the wrong side of the colonial language, because Africa cannot make meaningful 
progress in its spiritual, material civilization and socio-cultural life in its own languages, it 
must use the languages of its colonial rulers. Such a situation where the ―linguistic 
imbalances that demean the black man must be reviewed and righted” (Okolo, 2005:03) 
remains of deep importance for the future of African peoples.  
This point about a new pragmatic view of language learning amongst former colonial 
countries is also taken up by Emmanuel Kwofie (1972) (cited in Okolo, 2005:15) who notes 
that “the adoption of English and French as official national languages in West Africa have 
moved them from their old status as an imposed ‗foreign‘ language to a new status as a 
second language”. He further predicts that “both languages have great chances of becoming 
mother tongues, especially since educated opinion considers it advantageous for children to 
use the official language in family life even to the exclusion of indigenous languages” 
(Kwofie, 1972 cited in Okolo, 2005:15). To demonstrate this he says that “in the Oxford 
Companion of the English language (1996), puts the contemporary situation of English as the 
official language of 16 African countries” (ibid, 1972 cited in Okolo, 2005: 16). Moreover, 
Hill stated that India has fourteen official languages, with Hindi scheduled to become the 
national language. Yet English, the language of India‟s former colonial masters, is still the 
most widely used in official communication (Hill, 1969). The British colonial regime laid the 
foundation of higher education in India through establishing universities and colleges so that 
the English language became the general means of communication between staff and 
students. More specifically, Alan and Shahid (2007:17) stated that “the most dynamic export 
sector in India is information technology (IT) enabled services for global companies 
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including call centers and software application, design, and maintenance. Such activities 
require qualified English-speaking labor and India has an abundant low-cost supply”. As 
Wallerstein notes (2006) the English language being an alternate tongue in India does not 
determine that economic development will be evenly spread amongst the population. On the 
contrary, the distribution of wealth remains highly unequal and a political issue, not one of 
language skills. While Alan and Shahid (2007:17) showed that India along with China 
recently have been concentrating significant resources into the learning of English language 
skills as a tool for attracting foreign (mainly form the Core states) investment for economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  
 
Although some scholars argue that neo-liberal economic globalization creates further poverty 
(Chossudovsky, 2005; Wilkin, 1996), China has dealt with this process by  using ELA (ELA) 
as a means of training a section of its population to take part in a global capitalist economy 
whilst retaining strong state control over the economy and development (Friedman, 1999).  
For the Chinese government globalisation heightened the problems for economic growth 
generated by a lack of access to information (primarily in English) along with the lack of 
educated and skilled people who could take advantage of new technological developments. In 
this context of Chinese and Indian resent economic development, Alan and Shahid (2007:33-
34) have revealed that: 
 
 ―The current data suggest that those two countries are maintaining their positions in 
skill-intensive components and that the trend for skill intensity is on the rise. Thus, 
preparedness would require a focus on human capital, facilities for high-tech 
production, and a welcoming attitude toward FDI, even from China. Similar 
comparisons between China and Latin America suggest that, so far, the direct ―threat‖ 
from China is muted. This situation may not persist, however, unless Latin Americans 
invest heavily in the skills and technological capability of firms. They might draw 
lessons from Korea or Taiwan (China), which are less likely to be hurt by Chinese and 
Indian competition because they are far enough ahead in technology and human 
resources—and are making sustained efforts to stay ahead”.  
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Yet, in contrast to the perspective of the Chinese government the negative side of 
globalisation is presented by Barber (1995 cited in Friedman, 1999) who stated that: 
 
―Globalisation forces threaten to undermine centuries of tradition, local autonomy, and 
cultural integrity. The internet, for example, is overwhelmingly an English language 
medium, and those who want to participate fully with all it has to offer had best read 
English (Barber, 1995). In fact, a high level government panel recently recommended 
that Japan consider adopting English as an official language in the future (English 
'imperialism,' 2000). Moreover, globalization establishes a global economic system in 
which those with the most capital are best able to capitalize on the global market, 
setting up what Friedman calls a "winner take all" system (1999, p. 245). Although 
technology levels the playing field, it does nothing to diminish the size of the 
competitors. The US, for example, overwhelmingly benefits from the rise of information 
technology, as it is the US that dominates almost all commercial sites and many, if not 
most, of the most profitable technology manufacturers. In addition, Westerners have 
clear advantages in telecommunications, as illustrated by the fact that there are more 
internet connections in Manhattan than in the entire African continent (World Bank 
statement on technology, 2000).  The same access to information made possible by the 
internet also empowers those with devious ends, such as international terrorism or even 
garden variety hackers, with greater powers at their disposal to exploit or attack 
others.‖  
 
Clearly some governments and peoples still view globalisation as a threat to their culture, 
religion and national traditions and languages (Beyer, 1994). In the next two chapters the 
attention will turn more specifically to the idea of language as a factor of human capital and 
the implications of the forces of global economic system on Libya and its governmental 
strategies. 
 
A further observation has been made by Amin (1978) who noted that after most of the Arab 
countries gained their independence, the Arabic language became the most important symbol 
for all Arab countries. Such a language potentially illustrated the Pan-Arabic nationalism of 
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the Islamic and Arabic nation. Amin argued that over time since independence Arab countries 
have become different, and they have lost the unifying social beliefs that were prevalent in 
the post-independence period. He added that all the Arab countries have suffered the same 
circumstances of European imperialism during this period. Even though they speak the same 
language, live with the same culture and history, they are Arab nations and they keep their 
countries as their nationality. Pan-Arab national unity only appears now in exceptional cases 
such as justice for the Palestinians (Amin, 1978). Some of the Arabic and African countries 
still retain not just the languages of the colonialism, but even more the strategies of 
colonialism, such as dependency in economical and educational sectors. For example, in 
Algeria: 
 
 “The Algerian state inherited the strategic position which France had taken over 
during the years preceding independence. The French state had even controlled the oil 
sector, which it had developed as a means of reinforcing its autonomy vis-à-vis the 
American companies which dominated the Cartel” (Amin, 1978: 77). 
 
Amin‟s argument that although Algeria is one of the biggest Arab oil producers worldwide 
which supposedly established Algeria as one of the most powerful post-colonial countries 
still relies on the foreign colonial strategies and languages such as French and English 
language in its oil sector and French in its cultural/educational sector. This view has been 
supported by Mr. Tawfik
28
 who is one of the training department members at the Libyan Oil 
National Corporation (LNOC) who noticed the lack of the Arabic in Algeria while the 
colonial French language is the language of communication among the nationals. He said: 
 
“From my experience in this institution I enjoyed many job trips to other Arab 
countries. For example, in Algeria I had some language communication problems. 
Although people I met were working in Government ministries their language was 
unclear. Despite being Algerian one of the ministers hoped I could speak French in 
order to communicate more easily.  The problem here is the impact of French 
                                                          
28
  Focus group method was made in 22/4/2009, with the National Oil Corporation in Libya. 
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colonialism whose influence on Algerian culture and educational systems has been 
immense.‟” 
 
Regarding the oil industry in the region of Africa, Algeria is not the only country that still 
follows the American strategies in terms of this field. In a discussion with the training 
department members at the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) in 2009 in Libya Mr. 
Haney
29
 stated that:  
 
“The oil sector is an industry that is strongly connected to America, because it is mostly 
an American industry. Therefore, any technical or informational changes or 
improvements to this field will be made by America even though we are producers of 
the raw material. On the other hand, in other sectors Libya is effected by the 
globalization and introducing the new information technologies which rely on ELA”. 
 
Another explanation was given by Mr. Jamal
30
 when he said that:  
 
“In the oil exploration department, we use American made machines with all parts 
written in English language, and even machines made in Russia come with English 
writings. That is why we give great attention to the English language more than other 
languages. Also, in the import and export department we have strict schedules that 
written in English to follow the international standards which if we did not go behind 
schedule we will be charged. Therefore, it is vital for our staff at custom department in 
our institution to acquire good level of English language”. 
 
He continued to touch another vital point regarding the Libyan university graduates when he 
said that: 
                                                          
29 Focus group method was made in 22/4/2009, with the Oil National Corporation in Libya. 
30 Focus group method was made in 22/4/2009, with the Oil National Corporation in Libya 
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“In the oil sector we don‘t require higher educational levels as it might be the case in 
research centers or academic fields at universities. However, it is only important for 
graduates to be specialized and we provide them with training and improvement of 
skills they would need to do their jobs.  Thus, we only focus on the practical side of 
those graduates rather than the academic side. Hence the key thing we need is that they 
can use the English language as it is the language of the oil sector, which is a largely 
American dominated industry. They need those skills to enable us to communicate 
effectively with the outside world‖. 
 
These views expressed by members of the important LNOC raise a vital point; to integrate 
into the global economy it is crucial for Libyans to learn English (Coleman, 2004), 
particularly when one considers the dominance of the hydrocarbon industry in Libyan 
society, and that it is, as was made clear, an American dominated industry. As a consequence 
Libya, like far more powerful countries in the semi-periphery such as China and Russia, are 
dependent in part for their economic and social development upon acquiring English 
language skills. This point is supported by Dr, Suliman
31
 as one of the Libyan higher 
education committee where he stated that: 
 
 ―There is no doubt that we need English language especially in technical academic 
fields such as: engineering and geology. Also, in some cases we receive books which 
are poorly translated from English to Arabic language. Thus, it is better to discover the 
original copy which was written in the English language in order to understand 
subjects correctly. Therefore, it is important for students to have a good knowledge of 
English language during their studies, so they can improve their knowledge in their 
fields and thus meet the requirements of job market,”  
 
One could say that Libyan society has achieved a high protection of its culture and its 
language in contrast to the other North African countries such as Algeria, but most Libyans 
                                                          
31 Focus group method is made in 10/5/2009, with the Libyan Higher Education Committee  
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wish today that they could speak or deal with the English language for different economic 
and educational reasons. Since Libya has re-engaged with the West in 2004, the foreign 
investments in Libya have rapidly increased and consequently, Libyan university graduates 
expect to capture their job opportunities with high paid careers, yet their lack of such skill 
(English) not only affects their opportunities both within the Libyan job market and in the 
wider global economic system (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). In response to this the Libyan 
government has sought to develop its human capital of which English language skills are 
regarded as perhaps the most important.  
 
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the history of languages in Libya during and since colonialism.   It 
showed the significance of language as a symbol of the nations‟ identity and continuing 
issues that it raises with regard to Libya‟s relations with the West and its integration in the 
MOWS.  Libya is a Muslim country and the language of the Koran is Arabic, this persuaded 
Libya and other Arabic countries to maintain the Arabic language as the main and official 
language. Although, most of the foreign colonial rulers tried hard to impose their own 
languages, particularly through the education system, Libya was one of the few states who 
successfully resisted those languages of colonialism. Libya kept its own language. Echoing 
Fanon, Gaddafi further asserted that the independence of a country is related to the 
independence of its language, in particular the language and knowledge of colonialism, a 
view about which he now appears to have changed his mind. The pragmatic view that is 
emerging in Libya now is that learning languages allows people to become knowledgeable 
and discover what‟s going on around them worldwide. In short it is an instrumental and 
pragmatic view of language.  At the same time the view also persists in Libya that language is 
intrinsically related to colonialism and the themes of orientalism and identity that Fanon and 
Said raise, that it is not merely a tool for development. The thesis will show that these two 
views continue to exist side by side in contemporary Libya. 
 
In theoretical terms this chapter has illustrated the way in which language has, in fact, always 
been at the centre of debates about colonialism and neo-colonialism, as set out in the work of 
Fanon, Said and Wallerstein. In particular the relationship between language and identity has 
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been seen as a site of social struggle for those nations looking to cast off the legacy of 
colonial rule. Although Libya has a long history of resisting colonial languages, to the point 
of ending the learning of English under the Gaddafi regime, this is now changing in a 
dramatic fashion, largely driven by the government‟s embrace of neo-liberal economic 
policies. The consequences of this for Libyan national identity are controversial as my 
interviews have indicated. But it seems that there is right now to be no retreat for such a 
policy.  
76 
 
Chapter4: Human Capital and Libyan Development: English Language Skills in the 
Modern Orientalist World-System 
 
4.1 Introduction     
The concept of human capital is broad and is an important one in current debates about 
development (Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam, 2010; Galor and Moa, 2004; 
Hendricks, 2002; Eicher, 2001). Equally the more recent concept of social capital has also 
emerged in both policy discourse and academic literature as a way of describing factors of 
individual development (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2001; Fine, 2001). Hence, this chapter will 
explore the concept of human capital and its importance for ideas of development in the 
Libyan government‟s new vision strategy. It will proceed by examining the relationship 
between human capital and social capital and their implications for ideas of social 
development. Both of these terms have emerged as part of the so-called Post-Washington 
consensus which has seen global developmental policies allowing more sensitivity to social 
needs and the recognition of market failure, in theory at least (Fine, 2002; Fine, Lapavitsas 
and Pincus, 2001). In addition, it shows the ways in which these ideas have profound 
implications for understanding the recent government developmental strategies in Libya. 
This, in turn, raises a fundamental question for the Libyan government. Simply put: to what 
extent is the promotion of human capital useful as a way of achieving the developmental 
goals of its new vision programme? Second, to what extent is human capital part of an 
Orientalist discourse that helps to structure the MOWS? As the chapter will also illustrate, the 
concept of human capital, like that of social capital, is one that can best be understood as 
situated into the Orientalist analysis of Said and Fanon, as well as the structural analysis of 
world-systems analysis (Wallerstein, 2010). If one accepts that human capital is a Eurocentric 
concept that reflects the dominant economic ideology of the core states in the MOWS, to 
what extent can it still enable Libya to develop its economy and society? Or in other words, 
to what extent do the discourses and the practices that go with it both constrain and enable 
Libyan institutions and actors to pursue and achieve their developmental goals? Thus this 
chapter develops the theoretical concern found in MOWS with the relationship between 
language, power and identity.  
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In order to examine this and develop the argument, the chapter will look at examples 
including the experiences and perceptions of Libyan postgraduate students regarding ELA. 
Can the pragmatic view of language (and by extension of theories and concepts) as a tool or 
instrument for social change, as advocated by numerous interviewees in the previous chapter; 
provide a way for Libyans to use their English language skills to their advantage in the 
MOWS? The alternative scenario that the thesis explores in the final chapter is that in fact 
this represents a significant problem for Libya in terms of its development. As so many 
developing countries are now promoting ELA, including many who are well ahead of Libya 
in this goal, will the ability to speak English lose its exclusive value? In short, will any 
advantage to be gained by this or will it be lost in the great rush of people in the periphery 
and semi-periphery, not to mention parts of the core, to acquire the same skills? As we will 
see my conclusion is that this is not necessarily the case for Libya because it has the crucial 
strategic advantage of its vast oil resources. As a rentier state it has at least the potential to 
use those resources for wider social ends. To some extent it has done this already, hence 
Libya‟s relatively good ranking in the UN Human Development Report (HDR) quality of life 
tables. But it has attained this without fundamentally altering its economy, leaving it 
dependent on a single, though vast, resource. To what extent might Libya be able to 
strategically situate itself in the MOWS in a way that could benefit its general social 
development?  
  
4.2 What is meant by Human Capital? 
In order to clarify what is meant by this term we need to begin by addressing the question of 
capital itself. If capital is the total amount of money and resources combined are people one 
of those resources or do they simply make use of those resources? In order to answer this 
question we need to consider the origins of the concept of human capital as found in the 
works of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall before subsequently being taken 
up by, amongst others, Mark Blaug and Gary Becker. It has now become firmly established 
as a part of the developmental literature of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
including the World Bank, the IMF and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) (Fine and Milonakis, 2008; Smith, 1994; Sweetland, 1996 & OECD, 
2007).  
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Adam Smith (Smith, 1994 edition) emphasised that the wealth of nations lay in both the 
quantity and the quality of its labour inputs where the abilities of the educated and skilled 
individuals are a primary factor in the generation of a society's wealth and development. As 
Smith observed, the early approaches to development stressed not the role of people and Free 
Trade but the necessity of having a protected market driven by modern machinery (Smith, 
1776 – 1994 edition; Sweetland, 1996). Up until the 18th century many economists stressed 
the importance of physical capital (the quantity) in order to complete any production 
operation, where money, factory and machines were placed alongside land and workers as the 
main factors of production (OECD, 2007). Smith showed how workers or labourers were 
physically needed to complete the production operation, thus they had a quantitative value in 
the production process. As a consequence it did not matter if they had the 
knowledge/experience (the qualitative values) of what they were doing. Smith was aware of 
the possibilities for production that could be generated by joining the individual abilities of 
workers in a division of labour when he stated that “economic activity was fuelled not by 
workers as a collective mass but by the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or 
members of the society” (Smith, 1776, cited in OECD, 2007:28). Smith then suggested that 
individual abilities were to be seen as a kind of (human) capital and therefore a factor of 
production and a means to generate social and economic development for any society 
(OECD, 2007: 28).  
 
Building upon Smith‟s ideas Mill (1848) suggested these abilities were inherently fixed in the 
person and could not be counted as wealth as such. Mill stated that human abilities acted “as 
economic utilities - means to wealth” in society. What, then, is Mill saying at this point? Is he 
indicating that human abilities emerge through the use of capital‟s resources, or that they are 
in fact one of capital‟s resources? It appears to be both, a quantitative and qualitative view. 
Mill sought to build an argument about the importance of human capital as a qualitative 
factor of production that could be developed and refined. However, Mill moved further than 
Adam Smith in emphasising the role that governments can play in developing human capital 
(Mill, 1848 – 1988 edition; Sweetland, 1996; Fine and Milonakis, 2005). Governments can 
affect people and the development of their latent abilities through the delivery of public 
goods including, in particular and importantly for human capital, by providing services such 
as schooling and health-care. Unlike Smith writing in the C18, by the time that Mill wrote his 
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works on political economy the limitations of the free market had been cruelly exposed in a 
British society riven with great wealth and massive poverty and squalor (Sweetland, 1996). 
The State, for Mill, had to assume a role in alleviating this and transforming the lives of 
working class people. In contemporary terms this idea of Mill‟s remains powerful and has 
been developed by Appleton and Francis (1998:23) in a study examining human capital and 
economic development in Africa they concluded that: 
 
"The poor health and education of Africa's workers is one factor explaining its low 
per capita income. Government investment in the social sectors is likely to be 
economically productive and indeed is likely to bring more direct benefits to the people 
than many other forms of government expenditure. Government investment in both 
education and health may be particularly important as there are indirect benefits of 
such investment which individuals may not allow for in their investment decisions". 
 
In this context governmental strategies towards education and health (the two central factors 
of human capital) are a crucial aspect of any society‟s social and economic development. The 
claim being made is that poverty is directly linked to lack of education, a pervasive theme in 
contemporary developmental literature and policy (Appleton and Francis, 1998). Thus the 
World Bank says, ‟the creation of human capital is the creation and distribution of new 
wealth‟ (World Bank, 1995: 27). These ideas have become a common-sense for most 
governments and IFIs, as well as for those who rely upon such public services. For example, 
with regard to the Libyan government‟s strategies towards education, Hakem32, a 
postgraduate student at Al-Fateh University in Tripoli, has reiterated this point: 
 
“I believe that the Libyan government should consider investing in its human 
resources by improving the quality of teaching and learning many different skills, as 
the whole world is turning to such investment in skills, as well as developing our 
infrastructure‖. 
                                                          
32 This statement has obtained by Hakem via using focus group method with the Libyan male postgraduate students at Al-
Fateh University in 2009. 
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Indeed, governmental strategies of investment in human capital are increasingly seen as being 
crucial in social development. For instance, China has developed its strategies towards human 
resources investment and has taken the education sector as being the key for its industrial 
development (Hu, 2006). Such strategies view people as human capital and the development 
of these qualities are fundamental to general social development.  
 
This view raises the question that if human capital is solely for the purpose of increasing 
society‟s wealth, national income and economic development, what are the benefits to the 
people themselves? In an attempt to respond to this concern Jacob Mincer (1958) argued that 
the human abilities developed in training programmes directly affect someone‟s personal 
income. Blaug (1976) endorsed this by arguing that the concept of human capital lends 
support to the idea that the more money people spend on them to become skilled and 
educated, the more they will benefit in terms of their career prospects. For people to achieve 
their optimum financial and social returns they need to invest in themselves first (Blaug, 
1976). Becker in support of that stated “probably the most impressive piece of evidence is 
that more highly educated and skilled persons almost always tend to earn more than others” 
(Becker, 1964). This viewpoint, problematic for many reasons as Fine (2001, and also Fine 
and Milonakis, 2008) suggests, has nonetheless become something of an orthodox view in the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI). In the case of Libya some Libyan postgraduate 
students have turned towards re-training themselves and acquiring more skills so that they 
can take advantage of the recent Libyan job market activities, often at great personal expense. 
Thus this ability to top-up skills through private income adds to the stratification in Libyan 
society between those who can afford it and those who cannot. Hence the key strategic 
question is the extent to which the development of human capital is primarily a task for 
government rather than the individual, or where the balance lies between the two. In short, if 
the additional education, training programmes and skills would improve the development of 
human capital: how should this be paid for? The prevailing developmental orthodoxy of 
recent decades has been neo-liberalism as embedded in the so-called „Washington and Post-
Washington Consensus‟. Ahrens indicated that “The Washington Consensus type of policies 
emphasized essential policy measures in an era of transition (such as stabilization and 
liberalization), but they neglected institution building (except for private property rights). 
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However, especially the failure of IMF-led transition programs in countries such as Russia 
revealed that liberalization-cum-privatization approaches did not automatically bring about 
efficient and sustainable market structures” (Ahrens, 2006:13). This has prioritised the 
market and in particular the related policies of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of 
the economy in order to spur investment, risk and entrepreneurial activity (Ahrens, 2006). 
This has been superseded by the Post-Washington consensus which in theory places emphasis 
upon the idea of market failures and the need for the state to do more in terms of providing 
for basic needs. In practice, Aybar and Lapavitsas suggest, there is little substantive 
difference between the two in that they both accept liberal ideas as their theoretical basis 
(Aybar and Lapavitsas, 2001). The problem for countries such as Libya is that such an 
approach potentially leaves them open to the financial and corporate power of the states in 
the core who whilst happy to take over local industries as we have seen in, for example, 
former Eastern Europe, have no interest in investing in the development of local human 
capital. Indeed, a feature of contemporary neoliberal capitalism is that a new transnational 
managerial class (as Sklair suggests) has emerged and this managerial strata tend to be 
cosmopolitan and mobile and largely from the core states. Rather than corporations seeking 
to employ local graduates as managers they are happy to draw upon managers from the core 
who view living in foreign countries as part of their career development, rather as colonial 
administrators of old (Sklair, 2000). As a consequence the Libyan government, like others in 
a similar situation, has to take responsibility for the development of its human capital if the 
global economy and its potential benefits are not passing them by. Hence its current strategy 
of promoting the development and refinement of its human capital by investing in education 
and global English language acquisition. 
 
This ideological view has, as Fine observes, become a global common-sense in terms of 
development policies (Fine: 2001). Even in a closed society like that of Libya this common-
sense can be found amongst the population. For example, (7) focus groups conducted with 
the Libyan postgraduate students and the Libyan employees in 2009 mostly agreed with the 
argument that there is a strong relationship between the additional educational and skills 
acquisition and the chances of securing better job opportunities with higher incomes. Libyan 
students certainly believe that this is the case. This view supports Mincer (1958) who stressed 
that “as more skill and experience are acquired with the passage of time, earnings rise” 
(Mincer, 1958:287 cited in Sweetland, 1993:345). But can Mincer‟s claim be generalised 
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across time and space of the MOWS as he believes? A central assumption behind human 
capital and development is that indeed it can (Fine and Milonakis, 2008). However, these 
kind of ahistoric models of development are problematic for reasons that have long been 
exposed by world-systems analysis, failing as they do to recognise the historical development 
of the MOWS and the power relations that have and continue to structure and reinforce the 
inequality that is a stark feature of the world-system (Wallerstein, 2006; Janelle, D, Warf, B, 
and Hansen, K, 2004). As Janelle, D, Warf, B, and Hansen, K (2004) argue “today, the 
world-system is enormously unequal. Despite (or, world-system theorists argue, because of) 
several centuries of worldwide economic integration and trade, global inequalities are stark 
and continue to worsen” (Janelle, D, Warf, B, and Hansen, K, 2004:11). By contrast, the 
concept of human capital comes from a modern liberal tradition that eschews history in 
favour of mathematical models that pay no heed to power, history and the nature of actually 
existing societies with all of their social divisions (Fine, 2001).  
So can Libya develop as a state and society by embracing such models of economic progress? 
For Libya to take advantage of its opening to the global economy it will need to be able to 
link its investment in human capital to the resources secured from its oil revenues with a view 
to diversifying the economy unless it simply repeats earlier patterns of dependent 
development (OECD, 2007). The most important skills for Libyan Postgraduates tend to be 
the most generalisable ones, those that connect several different industrial areas, namely: IT; 
and the main foreign languages, particularly English. This helps to explain why the Libyan 
postgraduate students are increasingly motivated to obtain English language skills as they are 
the skill that all sectors of the Libyan economy most require whether from graduates or 
employees today. A case in point is Sami
33
, an employee working at the Libyan Foreign Bank 
(LFB), who stated that: 
 
―In this institution (LFB) there are some employees whose positions have improved 
and reached the highest levels only due to their English language skills, even for 
those who lack the necessary technical or administrative skills to do the job. 
Moreover, because the Libyan foreign bank is an international institution English 
                                                          
33 Sami is one of the focus group participants that made in 2009 at the Libya Foreign Bank. 
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language is the language of global business, whether we are dealing with English, 
Chinese or German investors‖ 
In similar manner Akrem
34
, a Libyan postgraduate students at the Higher Academic Studies 
Janzur Tripoli, has confirmed that: 
 “I am certain that if my ability in English language was good enough, I would have 
been employed at one of the biggest companies in Libya, with a very high salary.‖  
 
These two examples show that there is a perception amongst the Libyan postgraduate 
community that it does not always depend simply on the quantity of skills that people have if 
they are to succeed in the job market. Instead it is about the type and quality of skills that they 
have. This, then, raises the central question that will be addressed in subsequent chapters: to 
what extent does the evidence support the perception that an increase in an individual‟s 
human capital (in particular, their acquisition of English language skills) will indeed enhance 
their chance of securing both (a) a job and (b) a better paid job. 
 
On the other hand, spending on education, training and health care is quite a challenge for 
many people and countries, even in a relatively wealthy country such as Libya, which makes 
it difficult for individuals to find the money that they need to invest in their human capital 
development. For most African countries it is difficult to meet even the most basic needs of 
their citizens. According to the OECD (2007) most developing societies could not update 
their human capital skills without considerable help from their government and the 
international community in the form of aid and grants, reflecting the ideology of the Post-
Washington consensus (Fine and Milonakis, 2008). Although many countries provide free 
primary and secondary education for their children, at the tertiary level it is common for 
students to have to share the cost of their education on the assumption that by obtaining a 
high degree they will gain a high income job enabling them to pay off any debt incurred 
along the way (OECD, 2007). This is where the dilemma over investment in human capital 
arises. The argument in favour of investing in it only holds if the evidence does indeed 
                                                          
34 Focus group was made with Akrem and other postgraduate students at the Academy of graduate studies in 17/04/2009 in 
Janzur-Tripoli  
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support the argument that it leads to better paid jobs. If it does not it merely incurs another 
level of debt on young people who are in all likelihood living in countries that already have 
high debt levels. We will turn to this issue in the final chapter of the thesis.  
 
Since Libya is considered the wealthiest country in the region of North Africa because of its 
natural resources, mainly oil, it has adopted this policy of free education. This policy is not 
only at the first stages of primary and secondary schooling but, also at the tertiary stage. 
Additionally, the issues of education and health care have been adopted by the Libyan 
government as main concerns since Libya obtained its formal independence from neo-
colonial rule in 1969.  However, it is only recently that Libya has committed itself to using 
these resources as a means of pursuing a strategy of investment in its human resources. In 
order to support this point Hanan,
35
 a postgraduate student at Al-Fateh University, said that: 
 
 “Since the late nineties the Libyan government has been greatly preoccupied with how 
to invest in its human capital. For example, English language is the skill mostly taught 
in Libya to both students and labourers, even in small factories.”36.    
 
Postgraduate students in Libya have recently benefitted from the fact that the Libyan 
government has invested more than ever in its human resources. These training programmes 
and centres across the country confirm the direction of government strategy and policy: to 
invest in Libyan human capital. More specifically, in 2009, the Minister of the Libyan 
Educational Curriculum
37
 said of these policies that “nowadays I personally believe it is the 
investment in our human resources (capital) that is the best investment for us. In other words, 
we should not be totally reliant on investing in the oil sector only."  
An issue that arises here for the Libyan government is exactly how to measure the impact of 
human capital on the Libyan economy and by extension, society. The OECD (2007) has 
touched upon this vital point of how countries could evaluate or measure their human capital 
                                                          
35
 Hanan is working at the Language Centre in Al-Fateh University and she‟s one of who participated in focus group method 
that made in 2009. 
36 This statement was obtained from a focus group with the Libyan female postgraduate students at Al-Fateh University in 
2009. 
37 Individual interview method was used with the Libyan educational curriculum Minister in 2009. 
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for a productive participation in society and its development. Fisher (1906) believed that 
human capital could be measured in the same way that is traditionally used for the 
measurement of capital in the form of machinery. This is unpersuasive, however, because the 
measurement of human capital is quite different because we are evaluating people‟s 
individual abilities which will vary significantly from one to the other. The capacity of 
machines is uniform in a way that those of people cannot be. The measurement of human 
capital depends on the skills and qualifications that they have and their performance in the 
job market. Further, an important factor is the way in which people‟s human capital combines 
as part of the production process. An economy is the result of complex social interactions 
through a division of labour and the way in which people combine their efforts to produce the 
outputs that they do is best seen as an emergent property of their interaction and not 
something that can be abstracted, quantified and individualised. As Fine and others note, 
human capital is not open to any serious measurement and remains, at best, an opaque 
concept (Fine and Rose, 2001). 
 
Having said that the OECD also sees that measurement of human capital is problematic for 
any government (OECD, 2007). The OECD has illustrated that for a country to measure its 
human capital would depend on factors such as: the type of qualifications the students have; 
or the length of time the students have spent in education, their capacity to exercise these 
skills consistently, etc. However, the OECD explained that even with this highly 
individualised information it would not give clear figures as to how to measure actual human 
capital abilities. Human capabilities and skills are not simply generated in the classroom and 
cannot simply be measured by the certificates a person accrues. Moreover, the OECD pointed 
out that the amount of time devoted to learning varied from school to school. Further, the 
effort required to obtain a diploma of national educational will also vary from country to 
country and from college to college within countries, even where nominal national standards 
operate.  
 
The measurement of human capital, then, presents grave logistical problems for any 
institution. And yet the dominant neo-liberal ideology in the MOWS asserts that it is crucial 
for governments that they can do just this if they are to gauge the efficiency of their 
investments. Human capital could be measured by possibly examining the skills, knowledge, 
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abilities or performance in the job market of individuals. This method faces two problems: 
First, to measure human capital individually by using some interviews or surveys across all 
the country would take too much time and resources. In addition, such an approach would not 
be able to incorporate productive but non-academic skills easily; second, there are many 
abilities to be measured apart from knowledge in calculating levels of human capital. Factors 
such as gender, personality and health might all affect the productivity of human capital 
(OECD, 2007). 
 
In the past, human capital was seen as a resource which was based on people and machines 
performing a function.  In more recent times, human capital has been seen to possess not only 
economic value but also social value. This raises the question about what is this social value, 
and the relationship between social values expressed as „social capital‟. In order to answer 
these questions the next section discusses the relationship between human capital and social 
capital. 
 
4.3 The Relationship between Human Capital and Social Capital 
4.3.1 The Measurement  
In recent times most mainstream economists, following criticism of the Washington 
Consensus and its mono-focus upon the free and potentially perfect market, have broadened 
their frame of reference by linking economic growth to the ideas of social capital. In so doing 
it is claimed that these economists are taking the social seriously, although many critics have 
argued that the opposite is the case for reasons which I will set out. Importantly social capital 
follows on from the idea of human capital which has much older roots in Liberal political 
economy as shown already.  The argument that has developed, broadly, is that development 
requires investment in both human and social capital (OECD, 2007). These alleged benefits 
could play a crucial role in a society‟s economic activities and thus one could measure human 
capital by measuring the improvement in these activities‟. Interestingly, some of these social 
values which are linked with human capital are also some of the main aspects of social 
capital. Does this mean, therefore, that social capital can also be subject to the same 
measurements and problems of measurement as human capital? From the point of view of the 
MOWS social capital, like human capital, is part of the power/knowledge framework of the 
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world-system, a body of thought that has claimed scientific and therefore unchallengeable 
status as the only way in which an economy and society can be organised if there is to be 
progress that can be measured objectively. Unsurprisingly the economic and developmental 
theory that has become the global norm for the IFIs and development agencies is the product 
of the centres of knowledge and education of the core states of the MOWS, rendering it a 
form of knowledge that serves the interests of these states and corporations of the core. Even 
countries in the semi-periphery that are powerful such as the CRIB group still embrace 
aspects of this ideology, while reserving the right to use the state as a powerful force for 
social change.  Equally the core is currently applying many of these policies to its own 
populations in order to resolve a global financial crisis caused, ironically, by pursuing the 
very same policies (Hudson, 2011).  
 
From the point of view of the OECD, prospective social capital is harder to measure in 
contrast to human capital because, “social capital is seen as deriving from a number of 
sources - networks, norms, values and understandings” (Fukuyama, 1999, Fine, 2001, and 
OECD, 2007:116). A measurement to cover all these factors would be more difficult to 
measure than even those of human capital. The former all depend on people‟s subjective 
feelings about things which vary over time. Hence, although both are difficult to measure, 
human capital is seen by its proponents as possessing objective properties that are more 
measurable than the more elusive emotions, perceptions and subjective aspects of social 
capital.   
 
4.3.2 Values and Utilities 
With regard to human capital there are two important and related elements: first, the levels of 
education and health care for people (individuals/groups); second, how to generate these 
qualities to produce wealth. By these two elements one could achieve what is called a single 
entity and maximizing utility for individuals. This means, in theory, an increase in individual 
income and by extension an increase in national income. That at least, is the simple model 
that human capital posits as part of a development strategy as noted in Mincer‟s comments 
earlier in the chapter. By contrast, social capital offers a variety of different relational factors 
as being at the centre of social development. Coleman states that “social capital is different in 
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contrast to other [forms of] capital in that social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988). As a relational concept it is more 
difficult to put forward a model of social capital that lends itself towards individual 
measurement. In short, one‟s social capital is embedded in social networks and is not a 
discrete quality. Thus, to clarify, human capital, by contrast, is said to focus upon the specific 
measurable competences, skills and knowledge that individuals possess and which can be 
used to produce value through work whilst social capital refers to the complex web of social 
networks (relationships) that sustain individuals in society. The social networks that social 
capital refers to are valued for the normative resources that they provide for individuals. 
These networks vary and are not necessarily open to everyone but might well be restricted in 
terms of such social categories as gender, ethnicity or class.    
 
Clearly one could view human capital and social capital by the functions that are played by 
both social institutions and individuals‟ capabilities, as both of them are concerned with 
creating value and production. For instance, Baker shows that economic activities in societies 
are affected by social capital as well as human capital when he notes that ―how even in the 
highly rational market of the Chicago Options exchange, relations among floor traders 
develop, are maintained and affect their trades” (Baker 1983, cited in Coleman, 1988; 
Fukuyama, 1999). At this point Coleman along with Baker tried to focus on the ways in 
which human capital could be affected by people‟s social capital. For example, the trust 
relationships, that underpin capitalist economic activities depend upon both social capital (the 
networks of contacts established amongst traders) as well as the human capital (the specific 
skills and intelligence of individual traders). As such, Coleman (1988) declared that “a group 
within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much 
more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness” (Coleman, 1988: 101). 
However, Roberts (2008) suggests that building trust itself “requires knowledge and the 
execution of complex transactions that require the input of many parties” (Roberts, 2008:15) 
Roberts‟s statement shows not only that to implement such complex transactions, 
knowledgeable and skilled labours are required, but also that the knowledge of how to 
construct trust relationships among “parties” persons and social institutions, and good 
governmental policies is required. Human capital and social capital are, then, in some senses, 
interdependent.  
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4.3.3 Family and Education Units 
In an attempt to address the above point, David (2001:04) said that social capital “may be 
viewed metaphorically as a species of (glue) holding the constituent members of society 
together, and so permitting them to function more productively in the economic sphere‖. He 
highlighted that social capital is “a form of knowledge‖ that is more a relational benefit than a 
personal characteristic possessed by individual performers: thus it is part of the complex 
networks of peoples social relationships, whereas human capital refers to an individual‟s 
specific competences, knowledge and skills. He also stated that the concept of human capital 
is “defined comprehensively” where it includes personal capacities, information, individual 
actions, and interpersonal transactions. By comparison social capital remains a more 
ambiguous idea around which there has been far less of an intellectual consensus as to its 
meaning or how it can be measured. Nonetheless it is reasonable to construe that there is a 
relationship between the two in that people are never just individuals, they exist in societies 
where they have relationships with others. It is these relationships, their social capital that 
feeds into and helps them develop their human capital (their individual qualities).  
 
In contrast to social capital, Mincer and Polachek (1974) suggest human capital is a vital 
factor “to the extent that earnings in the labour market are a function of the human-capital 
stock accumulated by individuals, a sequence of positive net investments gives rise to 
growing earning power over the life cycle" (Mincer and Polachek, 1974:78). They added that 
“when net investment is negative, that is, when market skills are eroded by It depreciation, 
earning power declines” (Mincer and Polachek, 1974: 78). So, what is the relationship 
between social and human capital in the economics literature? Dasgupta & Serageldin (2001) 
believed that the concept of human capital is by now well accepted and they also argued that 
human capital is developed by its relationship to social capital. Social capital works across 
successive generations through the networks it creates that pass on values, beliefs and 
practices. These, in turn, inform successive generation‟s development of their human capital 
(their individual skills, competences and knowledge). The social relationships of social 
capital are crucial to a properly functioning capitalist market economy. For example, 
Coleman stated that “family relations are as important in the market as is the stability of 
proprietorship‖ (Coleman, 1988: 98).  More than anyone families can affect their children‟s 
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human capital whether positively or negatively. Most families are aware that their children‟s 
future depends upon such factors as the need for a supportive home environment. Hence in 
many countries the emphasis upon the family supporting their children‟s education. For 
example, in Libya “Fadia”38, a postgraduate student at the Academy of graduate studies in 
Tripoli, noted that many Libyan families are registering their children to learn English 
language from an early age. These families believe that the Libyan job market strongly 
requires such language skills if their children are to be successful. By way of contrast, 
“Salwa”39, a postgraduate female student at Al-Fateh University Tripoli, explained that 
although she grew up in an educated family environment, that there were many other factors 
that could limit a family‟s efforts to support and improve their children‟s capabilities and 
skills. One of the most difficult elements is the child‟s desire and self-aspiration. For example 
she said that: 
 
 “My mother is a foreigner and English is our language spoken at home. Therefore, all 
my family speak English well as we started using it when I was a child. However, since 
high school I don‘t really like using the English language because I remember a day 
when my teacher at the high school asked me to read a word, and I read it as I used to 
hear it from my mother, but my teacher told me that was wrong, she corrected it me. 
However, I insisted on saying it in the way that my mother spoke, but she disagreed and 
hit me with a stick. So I have hated speaking and learning English language since that 
time… 
When I entered university I chose to study law, where we did not have a curriculum in 
the English language, and we did not even have English language lessons, so I felt 
comfortable. Nevertheless, our law literatures were dominated by examples using 
English and French terms and at that time I wondered how I could be successful in my 
career when I did not like the English language and dealing with it. In the end I was 
successful to the point I was assigned as research assistant at my university to do my 
postgraduate studies. However, after avoiding this language for a long time the problem 
                                                          
38 Fadia 28 years, one of the postgraduate female students who participating within the focus group that made at the 
Academy of graduate studies Jansue-Tripoli in Tripoli-Libya 17/04/2009 
39 Salwa 30 years, one of the postgraduate students who participating within the focus group that made in Tripoli-Libya 
21/04/2009 
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came up again when I was required to complete my postgraduate course. As I was 
specializing in International Law, which is mainly based on the English language, I had 
to develop my knowledge. I was supposed to finish my research this year, but my lack of 
English language skills has delayed me finishing until I reach the required level. I have 
brought up my experience to explain the fact that not only political decisions or 
financial inability that prevent from learning English language, but it is more about the 
person‘s desire and aspiration towards learning. Thus, in my case my personal 
environment was very suitable for learning English language, but I was not attracted to 
it at that time because of my experiences at school‖ 
 
Salwa‟s experience shows that whilst a family can play a crucial role in their children‟s 
educational life nonetheless it is the education and teaching quality that plays a greater role in 
shaping a child‟s intellectual development. Thus, the education sector is the second vital unit 
in the development of social capital where it is subject to social and governmental strategies 
in society. The assumption here is that a functioning society requires an educated populous. 
In order to illustrate the centrality of educational policies to the promotion of social and 
human capital we can consider the success of a number of Asian countries in recent decades. 
For example, after Singapore achieved its independence in 1965 it was able to transform 
itself by 1990, to become the state with the second highest standard of living in Asia, and six 
years later Singapore had exceeded several small Western countries in gross domestic 
product per capita (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2001, and Tilak, 2002). In the 1980s the Republic 
of Korea was able to achieve a high rate of growth in its GDP of, on average, 9.4 percent per 
year, followed by a rate of growth of 7.2 per cent during the period 1990-95 (Ito 1997, cited 
in Tilak, 2002:03). In 1996 Korea was able to join the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). During 1980 and 1990, had recorded an extraordinary 
rate of growth of 10.2 percent per year on average, followed by a still higher rate of growth of 
12.8 percent. In order to generate this growth these countries concentrated on developing 
their human capital through a strong education system (Ciccantell and Bunker, 2004; OECD, 
2007, and Tilak, 2002).  Hence these countries and their economic performance in terms of 
economic growth, human development and education system, made them a great example for 
many developing and developed countries. The question remains, though, as the extent to 
which their particular experiences can be generalised to other parts of the semi-periphery and 
periphery and indeed the extent to which their development reflected any adherence to liberal 
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theories. Furthermore, Dasgupta and Serageldin believe the high economic level that Asian 
countries have attained is in part because of their investment in human capital.  
“Conventional factors such as investments in human and physical capital and technology 
only partially explain the high growth rates of the East Asian ―miracle‖ economies‖ 
(Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2001:44). The opinion that Asian countries would never be able to 
achieve economic development which had been expressed by numerous economists has been 
shown to be false. What has been shown is also the case with the „Asian tigers‟: South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and also both China and Japan. All have achieved social 
and economic success in part through massive state investment in their educational systems 
in contrast with the anti-statism of neo-liberal theory.  
 
4.3.4 Strategies and Benefits      
Woolcock (2000) pointed out that although the concept of social capital resides in 
relationships whilst that of human capital lies in individuals, the two are highly 
interdependent. The capabilities and skills (human capital) that individuals have can 
significantly affect social institutions and relationships. At the same time social institutions 
play a key role in developing human capital by providing for people‟s needs be they, 
education, health care and social services. Accordingly, the last 30 years has witnessed a 
transformation in many job markets to one where the educated and skilled are more in 
demand than other types of capital such as physical capital. This ties in with the point made 
earlier about the rise of what is often termed a „knowledge economy‟ where educational 
qualifications are seen as the key to career success. This point was supported by Dasgupta & 
Serageldin (2001:19) when they said that: 
 
―The idea is that the concept of physical capital as embodied in tools, machines, and 
other productive equipment can be extended to include human capital as well. Just as 
physical capital is created by changes in materials to form tools that facilitate 
production, human capital is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and 
capabilities that make them able to act in new way.” 
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In the new global economic environment people are being encouraged to develop their 
human capital in order to take advantage of job opportunities (OECD, 2007, 2001 & Baker, 
1975). Thus, the argument goes that investing in human capital has become a dominant 
requirement for all states in order to increase their integration in the global economy. This 
integration aims to include other capital types such as social and physical. These forms of 
capital are interdependent and integral to the workings of the global economy. Human 
capital, with its emphasis on the skills and capabilities acquired by individuals, and social 
capital, existing in social systems and relations among persons, are both said to be tangible 
factors. Fine (2001) stated that capital could be in any type but that not every type of capital 
is social. He said that “social capital is bound to be found whenever economic and non-
economic issues are considered together. In contrast, the sense in which capital is social in a 
broad historical sense is that it is attached to a specific socio-economic system, namely, 
capitalism (Fine, 2001:29). Fine argues that historically social capital is a network of a 
society‟s values, norms, understandings and forms along with its relationships amongst 
people and institutions.  But Fine is a critic not a supporter of the concepts, arguing that the 
way in which they are utilised even by critical sociologists such as Bourdieu, is unhelpful and 
distorting on the nature of social life (Fine, 2001). Additionally, Fine argued that the idea of 
social capital has proven so popular amongst governing institutions such as the OECD 
because to a great extent it is a consequence of the power of capital itself. Adam Smith and 
John Stuart Mill were, after all, political economists of capitalism so it is uncontentious to 
note that human capital has its roots as a concept within the milieu of capitalist social 
relations and pro-capitalist theories of economy and society. Social capital serves the interests 
of capital by promoting values and beliefs that empower capital and disempowers workers. 
For example, Fine sees it as a functional ideology for capitalism, an ahistoric account of 
human nature that reifies society and undermines ideas of social change and that it is 
ultimately a disguised attempt to reintroduce rational choice theory into ideas of economic 
development (Fine, 2001). The onus is placed on the responsibility of the individual worker 
for their own improvement and ability to make themselves attractive to a capitalist employer. 
Thus, according to this theory the only strategies that a government needs to pursue are those 
that encourage and support the private sector, capital. These can be either infrastructural 
investment in such factors as transport, communication and energy, or in human capital, with 
examples of these strategies being seen in the recent policies of China and the East Asian 
countries (Fine, 2001; OECD, 2007; Ciccantell and Bunker, 2004; Tilak, 2002; and Coleman, 
1988).  
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In defending the idea of human capital David (2001) divided human capital itself into two 
forms: tangible human capital such as: stature, strength, physical endurance; and intangible 
human capital, including: cognitive ability and procedural capabilities. These are directly 
and indirectly perceptible in the physical characteristics of the individual agent (David, 
2001). Although this point takes us back to the complexity of trying to measure human 
capital David‟s point, contra Fine, is that it is possible to do so. Both forms of human capital 
(tangible and intangible) are connected where both strongly affect human well-being and 
economic growth. David noted that in its current usage by economists the term tends to refer 
only to the second form of human capital (intangible capabilities) that have more experience, 
high standards of education and training, and skills excess. For example, David indicated 
that: 
 
 “In the US intangible human capital (formed by education and training investments) 
represented about three-fourths of the total non-tangible stock; within the remaining 
fourth, the stock of R&D capital in 1990 was only half as large as that formed by 
investments health, safety and human mobility” (David, 2001:02).  
 
Supporting David‟s vision Solomon Fabricant in 1959 was emphasizing the important of 
intangible capital when he stated that:  
 
“In an important sense, society‘s intangible capital includes all the improvements in 
basic sciences, technology, business administration, education and training, that aid in 
production whether these result from deliberate individual or collective investments for 
economic gain or are incidental by-products of efforts to reach other goals ” 
(Fabricant, 1959: 22  
 
What David and Fabricant argue is that investing in this intangible human capital form is the 
primary strategy for governments and for individuals. This is illustrated in developments in 
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Libya that became apparent during a discussion I held with a group of people in charge of the 
training department of the LNOC
40
. In conversation they indicated that the LNOC has been 
preparing so-called „national training programs‟ in order to fill in the skills gap in all its 
companies across Libya. By these programmes Libyan graduates from various fields could 
progress to be trained in order to be made ready for entering their careers. On the other hand 
Mr Adel, the project manager in the training department, stated:  
 
―While recently the Libyan education system has been paying great attention to 
funding technical colleges in order to bridge the skills gap, the graduates weren‘t 
well qualified. This fact led to foreign workers replacing those technicians in places 
such as Jansor textile plant in Tripoli.‖ He added that, ―the students couldn‘t meet 
their required levels because they lacked confidence in their abilities. Without that 
belief, without a culture of success and achievement, they are unemployable.‖ 
 
Such a statement shows not only how individuals can hinder governmental policies because 
of some false beliefs, but also how the social environment was not supportive for those 
individuals to continue their studies. It was not supportive of the development of human 
capital. An example from Fahima,
41
 a Libyan postgraduate student, shows how other barriers 
facing individuals seeking to be trained, includes: finance, time for study and specific social 
circumstances. These matters, „time, money and social issues‟ that individuals face also 
hinder an individual‟s capacity to invest in their own human capital. She added: 
 
 “The Libyan government has solved some problems regarding the skills gap for this 
generation and future generations, but how about our generation who missed the 
chance of learning English language skill? We are really struggling! The biggest 
problem is the time and the money we spend on training ourselves, except for some 
lucky people who get sponsored to study abroad or those with private financial means 
to fund their language training. Additionally, some of us are married and busy with our 
                                                          
40 Focus group method used with the Libyan National Oil Corporation in 22/04/2009.  
41 Fahema studying at The Higher Education Academy in Tripoli was participating in the focus group discussion that was 
carried out in 2009. 
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family commitments, so we don‘t have enough time or energy to involve ourselves in 
such training programs.”.  
 
There is a sense that the generation who missed out on learning English due to the ban placed 
on it from 1986-2004 will be permanently disadvantaged given their age and relative social 
position. Family commitments and existing careers all stand in the way of their ability to 
catch-up whilst for younger generations coming through the opportunity to learn and develop 
their human capital may see them rapidly transcend this older generation in terms of job 
opportunities. Further, as Fahema says it is the wealthier sections of Libyan society who have 
the resources to take advantage of the new opportunities to acquire the English language.  
 
The key conclusion here is that government policies are central to the development of human 
capital but that in the Washington and Post-Washington consensus this means, in practice, 
public funding for private firms to deliver these services, what is sometimes called Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) or Public Private Partnership (PPP). As Heckman, Lochner and Taber 
(1999) argue, national policies could promote human capital formation and could contribute 
to “substantially alter the proportion of the work-force that is skilled” (Heckman & et al, 
1999:25). This point has been supported by Becker (1975), who suggested that people‟s 
abilities are the most important factor and should therefore be central to any government 
economic strategy (Becker, 1975 & OECD, 2007).  
 
China as mentioned in the first chapter is a good example of a successful emerging job 
market driven by its policies towards high investment in its human capital in order to produce 
well educated workers. In some factors China, as with other successful Asian economies, has 
overtaken most of the European countries in terms of its GDP. The  OECD notes that “China 
has overtaken the United States to become the world‘s largest exporter of IT goods, 
computers, network routers and so on  which are helping to create the new knowledge 
economy” (OECD, 2007:23). The shift of production and capital to the East is part of the 
changing balance of power in the MOWS that Libya has to adapt to and unsurprisingly China 
has now become an important investor in Libya and a number of African countries (OECD, 
2007). For example, Zhong Manying, director of the department of West Asia and Africa under the 
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Ministry of Commerce said, „26 Chinese enterprises were involved in businesses in Libya. Their 
businesses, valuing more than $20 billion, were in property, railway, crude oil service, and 
telecommunication‘ (Yan, 2011). There is no doubt  that China is one of those countries, like 
Brazil, India and Russia (the CRIB bloc) who have sought through strategic government 
intervention to adapt to the emergence of knowledge economy in the MOWS. When 
considering the CRIB, the OECD note that as they are reshaping the world‟s economy they 
suffer from a shortage of well qualified graduates and suitably qualified staff where “India‘s 
population has much lower level of education than China‘s, as the OECD stated “Only 61% 
of Indian adults can read; in China the figure is more than 90%” all these factors might limit 
Indian society in its social and economic growth (UNESCO cited in OECD, 2007:32). 
Investing in human capital would seem to make sense for developing countries if the OECD 
is correct in their analysis. But this investment also becomes a way of shifting public wealth 
into private educational corporations, a subsidy for these companies that appears to go against 
the ideology of neo-liberalism. 
 
There is no doubt that people cannot live without both agriculture and manufacturing, where 
they still rely on raw materials like cotton, plant seeds, iron and oil. Physical capital remains 
central to any society. However, proponents of the idea of a global knowledge economy now 
argue that knowledge has become the most important factor in social and economic 
development (World Bank, 2003). By embracing the means of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) and computing power China and India have achieved 
rapid improvements in their economic development, however unevenly this has been spread. 
China, in particular, has been highly active in investing in information and communication 
technology (World Bank, 2003). Consequently, Libya has amended its decisions towards the 
quality of its education system and its direction of the investment policies/programmes to its 
human capital so that in 2009 the Libyan higher education committee members
42
 argued: 
 
“Any investment in human resources and capital usually starts with the educational 
system where unfortunately we are lacking the high quality teaching staff needed. Thus 
we have been adopting a strategy of sponsoring students for overseas studies in places 
                                                          
42
 Focus group was made with the Libyan higher education committee in 10/05/2009 in Tripoli 
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such as the USA and Europe, as part of investing in human capital in order to avoid 
totally relying on oil sector for graduate employment.‖  
 
Such a statement reflects the belief that there is a strong relationship between human capital 
and social capital and how to achieve the optimal use of the country's natural and human 
resources, its human capital, in order to meet the country's job market requirements. And this, 
in turn, connects with the latest development in the MOWS, the rise of the global knowledge 
economy. Again, when one examines the meaning of this concept with its emphasis on 
learning, education, new high tech industries, they tend to be areas where those states in the 
core have dominance, either directly or through investment and indirect control of companies 
based around the world. 
Table 4.1 the Relationship between Human Capital and Social Capital: 
An overarching category Social Capital 
(Social relations/skills) 
Human Capital 
(Education and Health) 
The 
relationship 
Actors Society‟s units  Individuals   Interdependent 
All actors and actions 
describe in social context   
Actors and actions describe 
as individual context for 
independent goals 
 Interdependent 
Depends on  
relationships/understandin
gs/values 
Depends on skills and 
knowledge 
Interdependent 
Within the social context 
can account not only for 
the actions of individuals 
but also for the 
development of social 
organisation  
Within individual context 
can only account for 
individuals their actions and 
benefits  
 Interdependent 
Specifications Affect society‟s social-
economic development 
Affect society‟s social-
economic development 
Similar  
Maximizing utility 
principle 
Maximizing utility principle Similar 
Variety of different 
entities 
Individual entity Different 
Social capital Facilitates 
productive activity 
 human capital facilitates Interdependent 
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indirectly productive activity directly 
Difficult to measure Difficult to measure Similar 
Less tangible Less tangible Similar 
 Unit
s 
 
Strategie
s 
The human value of 
social capital is  in the 
generation of social trust  
The social value of human 
capital is in the building of 
trust. Is this different? 
 Interdependent 
Governmental strategies 
are affected by  already 
existing social capital  
 Governmental strategies 
support the development of 
human capital  
 
Interdependent 
Social capital comes 
through changes in the 
relations among persons 
and institutions that 
facilitate action for all 
society 
Human capital comes 
through changes in 
individuals their abilities 
that facilitate their personal 
benefits first 
Interdependent 
Education and family are 
the important units for 
social capital formation 
Education and skills are the 
main requirements for 
human capital and affect 
their productivity in job 
market 
Interdependent 
The effect of social 
capital is within the 
family and society‟s 
structures in Society 
The effect of human capital 
is within the individuals‟ 
abilities in society 
Interdependent 
Social capital affects the 
functioning of economic 
system/activities. 
The existence of economic 
institutions is often 
explained by the functions 
of human capital‟s performs 
for/in the economic 
system/activities 
Interdependent 
 
 
This leads us to a very important question flagged earlier by Ben Fine: who is empowered by 
the promotion of human capital? And who benefits from it?  In order to address this question 
I want to step outside the framework of orthodox ideas about development and draw upon the 
ideas of such figures as the post-colonial writer, Edward Said.  
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4.4 Human Capital as a Question of Power: Human Capital and the Geoculture 
of the World-System 
Human capital raises questions about the relationship between knowledge and power in the 
MOWS that have to be considered here. Power is a complex concept and embraces numerous 
factors. For the Oxford English Dictionary it is “the ability to do something” (Oxford 
dictionary, 1999:576). This power has several types such as, the strength to defend 
something; to control someone (a person or organization or country); the capacity to do 
something, including such activities as reading and writing. Dahl (1957) suggested power is 
an action between any two parts (whether between people or countries) that enables one to 
make the other do something that otherwise it would not have.  Max Weber too, had made a 
similar point when he defined power “as the probability that someone in a social relationship 
will be able to achieve his or her will, i.e., whatever is desired, despite resistance” (Weber, 
1947 cited in Uphoff, 2003:02; and Weber, 1947
43
). These ideas of power address not only 
power in its constructive or creative form, the power to produce something, for example, but 
also power as force or control of another, In short, to impose one‟s ideas, beliefs and values 
on another person or country. Human capital seems to embrace both the constructive and 
coercive aspects of power in terms of Libya‟s embrace of the concept in a global economy 
whose rules, trade flows and capital exchanges are neither under its control nor of its own 
making. Instead it is something that Libya is essentially subject to. So when it comes to 
Libya‟s strategic policy of promoting investment in human capital, how should we think 
about the issue of power? 
 
Central to this is the history of colonialism for non-Western countries such as Libya, which 
has left a complicated legacy that manifests itself institutionally and culturally. Following 
world-system analysis it is apparent that historically it has been the major Western states that 
have had the power not only to shape the world-system through military force and trade, but 
also, and crucially, through the production of knowledge about the world, hence the idea of 
the MOWS.  Power can be viewed in different ways, then, and central to the organisation of 
the world-system has been the power to produce forms of knowledge that are seen as being 
legitimate and therefore acceptable and necessary for state‟s and individuals to follow. As 
                                                          
43
 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A M Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 1947, 
The Free Press and the Falcon's Bring Press, http://taodesigns.tripod.com/weber/weber47.html  
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Wallerstein (2006: 71) says, “the realities of power in the modern world-system are a series 
of legitimating ideas which made it possible for those who have power to maintain it‖. This is 
what he referred to in an earlier work as the „Geoculture‟ or ideological battleground of the 
world-system (Wallerstein, 1991). Human capital and social capital can both be seen as 
concepts that have their roots in this historic power relationship between the West and the 
non-Western world. It is Western countries (in MOWS terms, European imperialist states and 
the USA in the core) that have generated these ideas and promoted them as being central to 
universal social and economic development, but they carry with them assumptions about the 
world that also serve the interests of states in the core  (Wallerstein, 2006). Most important, 
the forms of knowledge generated to produce economic theories of the kind that dominate the 
world-system have the status of being scientific, the highest form of knowledge in the 
MOWS. It is, after all, the non-Western world, the periphery and semi-periphery where Libya 
is situated, that must change itself in order to satisfy the conditions laid down by the core 
powers (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). The core‟s power here is precisely due to the 
vulnerability to financial, political and military pressure of many non-core countries, even 
relatively wealthy ones such as Libya. One of the implications of the development of the 
MOWS suggests that it is not possible for countries such as Libya to develop without 
Western support and investment and in order to attract this it is necessary to accept changes 
to the national economy that embrace ideas that reinforce the dominance of the core over the 
rest. Hence the dependent nature of this relationship. In this respect ideas such as human and 
social capital operate, as Fine suggests, by reinforcing capitalist ideology (Fine, 2001).  
 
As mentioned the issue of the relationship between power and knowledge has been explored 
by both Fanon (1965) and Edward Said (1978) who argued that what passes for legitimate 
knowledge, particularly in issues pertaining to general social and economic development, 
have been laden with Western conceptions of progress and civilisation, to the detriment of the 
colonised peoples (Wallerstein, 2006). Said‟s Orientalism provides a better understanding of 
this category of power when he states that ideas, knowledge and culture were central to the 
colonial project. His argument was that the Orientalist's, the intellectuals and artists whose 
work acted to underpin colonialism and justified it for the colonial powers and their 
populations. The main power/knowledge stemmed from Orientalist‟s who in their knowledge 
of the Orient, its religion, culture, language and „mindset‟, constructed histories and cultural 
representations that helped reinforce the idea of a natural Western superiority over the 
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colonised world. In essence, they knew the „Orientals‟ better than they knew themselves, "To 
be a European in the Orient, and to be one knowledgeably, one must see and know the Orient 
as a domain ruled over by Europe‖ (Said, 1994a: 197). The knowledge gained via the 
Orientalist‟s “scientific” studies about the orient leads to control and power over the orient, 
then. This idea of a „natural‟ Western superiority is still manifest today (Dixon, 2001; and 
Wallerstein, 2006). For example, Karima
44
 one of the Libyan postgraduate students at Al-
Fateh University, has touched upon this issue when the discussion was about the importance 
of the English language for the Libyan university students: 
 
―I don‘t really understand the idea behind misrepresenting the picture of Arabs by the 
Western media showing Arab men wearing scarves on their heads and that all Arab men 
are concerned about protecting or repressing their women‖…―I think it is great 
opportunity for someone to study abroad in some European countries, in order to learn 
their languages and express our culture and identity in the right way, because I think we 
have been misunderstood. Therefore, I think that clarifying concepts, especially issues 
related to Islam is the duty of every student who has a chance to study overseas.‖  
 
Thus for Karima learning a language such as English provides the opportunity for her to 
actually challenge Orientalist discourses in Western culture, not to succumb to them (Said, 
1994a; and Coleman, 2004). In a way this both reinforces Said‟s claim about Orientalism and 
power/knowledge whilst at the same time challenging it by suggesting that the non-Western 
world can take back its own identity regardless of the language its people speak. In short, by 
acquiring English non-Western people can assert their own identity and culture and in so 
doing challenge Orientalist assumptions (Coleman, 2004). In a way, this is precisely what 
Said‟s own work has done. Social and human capital may be Western concepts that reflect 
the power of the core over much of the non-Western world, but it doesn‟t mean that people in 
countries like Libya are without power or the capacity to use them for their own ends. 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Karima was one of the focus group participations at Al-Fateh University in 21/04/2009. 
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4.5 Human Capital as Orientalist Discourse 
In fact, the work of those such as Fanon, Said and Wallerstein make clear that knowledge has 
always been intimately related to power and a part of colonialism. For example, two empires: 
the British and the French were both rivals and allies who generated knowledge about the 
world that justified their dominant positions within it (Dixon, 2001; and Chase-Dunn and 
Grimes, 1995). They encountered each other and the orient with the greatest intensity, 
familiarity and complexity, to either monopolize or share it. What they shared by military 
force was not only land, goals, profit or rules it was the kind of intellectual power 
„knowledge/information‟ over the subaltern populations and their sense of identity. The 
strong desire for colonial expansion in Britain and France was intimately related to the ideas 
and information that Orientalist‟s had produced. Orientalist‟s and their writing played a vital 
role in the construction of the desire amongst European peoples to colonise the orient. These 
writings were the only helpful way to achieve extensive desire of colonialism such as the 
press campaigns that happened in Paris in France 1914, or the several commissions that 
happened in England, and the famous Committee which was chaired by Mark Sykes and 
George Picot in 1927. As a result, the Orient was geographically divided between the two 
parties by "mutual force" of the world at that time (Said, 1987).  
 
Since the First World War, America (USA) has replaced Britain and France as the most 
powerful nation both militarily and in terms of the production of Orientalist discourses 
through its vast university and think-tank infrastructure (Said, 1994a; Wallerstein, 2001). 
Thus, the USA “successfully” took the place of the European powers by the use of military 
force, technology, information, the production of knowledge and ultimately through its 
hegemonic place in the expanding capitalist world (Said, 1994a, Wallerstein, 2001 and 2006). 
This is an important point because, as Wallerstein noted, there are three main ideas that 
corroborate this idea of the superiority of Western knowledge over that of the non-Western 
world. These are: “the right of those who believe they hold universal values to intervene 
against the barbarians; the essentialist particularism of Orientalism; and scientific 
universalism‖ (Wallerstein, 2006: 71). Human capital is a part of this Western process of 
exercising power through the dissemination of developmental policy-based knowledge, 
which places significant constraints upon the autonomy of those in the periphery and semi-
periphery. Wallerstein (2006:72) added that:  
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“If one looks at the arguments encrusted in the various doctrines that were put forth, they 
always ended up by seeking to demonstrate the inherent superiority of the powerful. And 
from this inherent superiority, these doctrines derived not merely the capacity to 
dominate but the moral justification of their domination”.  
 
So, there is a problem for any states and peoples in the semi-periphery and periphery of the 
world-system adopting such concepts and strategic goals as the promotion of human capital 
because they are not simply neutral scientific concepts but part of a broader Orientalist 
discourse that helps to underpin the power of the core states in the MOWS. For example, I 
asked Dr, Husain Al Ajeli
45
 the coordinator of learning English language project at Libyan 
universities, if he thinks that Libyan government changes its position on ELA amongst its 
students because of Western power. He answered:  
 
“The demand for English language skills nowadays hasn‘t left any authority or 
autonomy for us as government. We have no choice now but to prioritise English 
language training and skills. Whatever we thought before about the dangers of colonial 
languages has been overturned and English is simply a tool by which we can develop 
our country‖ 
 
The acquisition of English language skills raises both advantages and disadvantages for the 
Libyan people; it is not simply one thing or the other. The power/knowledge relationship that 
it entails is there and cannot be ignored as it is more insidious than older forms of 
colonialism. This factor, the acceptance of the legitimacy of such ideas as human and social 
capital, never happened within the old form of Western power and its brutal military 
colonialism (Said, 1987; Boulding, 1999; Stoler;
46
 2002; & Wallerstein, 2006). Nonetheless 
given the interdependent nature of the advantages and disadvantages that ELA in particular 
and human capital development in general can potentially bring to a country such as Libya it 
                                                          
45 Interview with Mr, Husain Al Ajeli the coordinator of learning English language project at Libyan universities at the 
language centre in Al-Fateh University in 04/05/2009.   
46 Stoler insists on “knowledge is power and that colonial regimes were masterful at acquiring both” (Stoler, 2002:206) 
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means that there are always strategic and relational possibilities for the Libyan government 
and people to try to use these ideas to their own advantage. 
 
The promotion of policies advocating the development of human capital, then, have become a 
means by which the core has been able to exert new forms of control over the periphery and 
semi-periphery and in the process this has tended to help drain the non-Western world of its 
skilled population whilst marginalising its unskilled. For instance, Germany has changed its 
immigration policies in order to achieve its high level of its investment in human capital, by 
stipulating that only skilled migrants will be allowed to enter the country on a permanent 
basis (Desai, et al, 2001). Thus human capital becomes a form of power/knowledge in line 
with Said and Wallerstein‟s ideas, allowing the states of the core to use the peoples of the 
periphery and semi-periphery as a source of cheap, skilled, migrant labour. This usage of 
migrants as skilled (and also unskilled) workers provided expertise and helped the developed 
nations for example to succeed in its IT sector in 1990s. For example the success of the 
United States IT sector during the 1990s and till now is due to its implementation of the 
H1B
47
 program towards the developing countries immigrants and workers (Saxenian, 1999 
cited in Desai, 2001). Desai (2001) stated that the H1B program has led European countries 
like Germany to change their immigration policies where the Germany's Interior Minister 
Otto Schily argued that, “There‘s competition among the industrialized countries for the best 
minds. That's why we have to direct our immigration law more strongly toward our own 
economic interests". Desai (2001: 08) assured that “countries are becoming more skill-
focused as they compete in the market for migrants‖. It appears that it does not matter from 
where those "migrants” human resources come, as long as they are well educated and skilled, 
as long as they possess the necessary „human capital‟. What human capital promotes is the 
capacity of people to work and produce wealth for capitalists, not to control it for themselves. 
The measure of one‟s human capital, in practice, helps to categorise and regulate the job 
market in any country. It becomes a means of evaluating the worth of an individual, not in 
moral terms but in terms of their capacity to produce wealth primarily for capitalists. 
                                                          
47 H1B visas are indented for “professionals” in a “specialty occupation”. This means also an IMC intending to pursue a 
residency program in the United States with an H1B visa needs to clear all three USMLE Steps before becoming eligible for 
the H1B.  
 
106 
 
   
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has concentrated on the concept of human capital, its origins and problematic 
place in Libyan developmental strategies since 2004. In so doing it also examined its 
relationship to social capital in order to differentiate it where possible.  The Libyan 
governments‟ planned education systems and policies aspire to play a significant role in 
creating and developing these skills and to enable Libyan society to achieve rapid social-
economic growth. As has been shown, however, this is not a risk-free strategy as the concept 
of human capital is inherently bound up with what Said and Wallerstein have called 
Orientalist discourses, knowledge that is embedded in the MOWS. In particular, examples 
have been given from the experiences of Libyan institutions, postgraduate students and 
employees in order to set out the kind of problems and opportunities that Libya faces in 
embracing these ideas. The Libyan Postgraduate students mostly agreed that they are in dire 
need of English language skills in order to enhance Libyan development and their own job 
prospects. Globally, investing in human capital („skilled people‟) itself a form of 
power/knowledge has become the dominant requirement for those in the periphery and semi-
periphery in their developmental strategies, in particular, to attract investment from the Core 
and powerful parts of the semi-periphery such as the CRIB bloc and ultimately to deepen 
integration into the global economy. In this context, the Libyan government has introduced 
strategies to develop its human capital as to integrate itself in the global economic system. A 
dilemma remains, however, that it may not be possible for Libya to simply catch-up with 
these major states in the semi-periphery, that Libya‟s specific historical position in the world-
system and its economic dependency and vulnerability mean that it lacks the qualities that 
have enabled the CRIB countries to grow rapidly (large domestic population and demand for 
goods and services, diverse supply of resources). Indeed this point has been made by Alan 
and Shahid (2007:12) who confirmed that:  
 
 "The prodigious growth in the number of graduates in China and India presages a 
significant increase in the giants‘ shares of world skills and, hence, changes in their 
comparative advantages".  
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The comparative advantage of the CRIB economies far outreaches that of Libya, however. 
That said, given its strategic goals, the Libyan government is committed to believing that this 
is not necessarily the case, of making use of its resources to achieve its developmental goals.  
 
In theoretical terms this chapter has set out the ideas behind human capital, a prominent 
concept within contemporary neo-liberal discourse. It has argued that Libya‟s embrace of 
neo-liberalism and abandonment of an authoritarian state-led model of development is part of 
this cultural process of opening up to the West and to the global economy. The consequences 
of this are that the Libyan state will lose much of its direct control over the economy, further 
undermining its ability to act in the manner of a developmental state. More broadly though it 
also opens up the opportunity for generations of Libyans to engage with and travel to 
Western countries in order to learn English and perhaps to work. This will have profound 
effects on the legitimacy of the Libyan government as the development of a bourgeoisie, as 
Barrington Moore famously noted, tends to lead to democracy as a bourgeois class asserts 
their social political and economic rights (Moore, 1968). The extent to which the current 
Libyan regime can adapt to and accept this remains to be seen but it is a direct consequence 
of its new policies of cultural (global English) and economic integration in the MOWS.  
The next three chapters will discuss how and evaluate these strategies.  
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Chapter 5: Libya in the MOWS: Promoting Human Capital as a part of the „New 
Vision Strategy‟ for Development 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Since 2004 Libya has sought to re-position itself in the MOWS, in part through the promotion 
of ELA amongst Libyan graduates. This liberalising approach to the English language is 
reflected in such things as allowing the use of foreign languages in addition to Arabic in 
forms intended for tourists, information on archaeological and tourist sites, administrative 
formalities at ports of entry, on roadside billboards, names of cities, and on commercial 
notice boards (PANA Press, 2007). Thus, this chapter examines whether there is evidence to 
suggest that the new vision strategy currently underpinning Libyan governmental 
development policy formalisation of ELA at the level of tertiary education will enhance the 
job prospects of Libyan university graduates. As mentioned in the previous chapter, investing 
in human capital in the periphery and semi-periphery (following Fanon and Said, a form of 
power/knowledge) has become the dominant requirement for developmental strategies of the 
Washington and Post-Washington consensus, in particular, to attract investment and 
integration into the global economy. Therefore, this chapter will present two sections which 
evaluate the Libyan government‟s new vision strategies to develop its human capital: (1) The 
first section examines the Libyan state, economy and society since the revolution in order to 
provide an account of the context in which Libya has evolved as a state in the MOWS and in 
particular its resistance to the policies of the dominant states of the core; (2) The second 
section will examine the new vision policies of the Libyan government and its attempts to 
integrate Libya more fully in the MOWS. In so doing I will trace the pivotal role that the 
Libyan state has played in social development and ultimately the failure of its policy of 
resisting integration into the MOWS, reflected in its new vision policies which have led to a 
dramatic reversal of the revolutionary government‟s original ideological basis. 
 
Theoretically this chapter examines the transformation in the nature of the policies pursued 
by the Libyan state. As mentioned in chapter one this has led it form a form of developmental 
state policy, though always mitigated by its status as a rentier state, to one where it embraces 
neo-liberal developmental policies such as investing in human capital. The broader goal is to 
109 
 
turn the state into an enabling state that supports Libya‟s integration into the MOWS. 
Ironically, perhaps, for all of the failures of previous Libyan government policies in terms of 
political freedom and diversifying the economy it did at least have a capacity to act 
differently to other rentier states. By this I mean that the post01969 Libyan governments 
embraced a political ideology that however flawed saw it trying to assert an independent 
place and policies in the MOWS. Of course this was always constrained by its structural 
dependence on the core and the semi-periphery as noted in chapter one, but at least there was 
always an espoused commitment to Libyan independence, in keeping with the Fanonist 
background of the Gaddafi governments. This is now being replaced by an embrace of neo-
liberalism with a view to modernising Libya which in reality also serves to intensify the 
nature of its dependence on the core. 
  
5.2 Libyan State and Society since the Revolution 
The Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969 was the turning point of the Libyan state and 
society in the MOWS. The Sanusi monarchy (1951-1969) started a mixture of programs 
mainly regarding health, housing and education that led to the creation of a new social class 
in the country; this was mainly in the eastern region. Only Tripoli in the west developed in 
similar fashion and the majority of rural Libyans stayed firmly „poor‟. During this period the 
biggest universities in Libya were established in 1955 under the name of the University of Al 
Fateh in Tripoli and University of Gar-Yunis in Benghazi.  
 
Prior to the revolution Ahmida (2005) notes that Libyan society had been largely unchanged 
in terms of its social structure since the middle of the nineteenth century. Libya remained 
geographically divided into three regions under Ottoman rule and it was only with the 
occupation of Libya by Italy and then France and Britain that it became a nation-state under 
centralised rule. These three regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) were dominated by 
different social groups and were in political competition with each other, a problem and 
legacy that were to affect Libya right through the post-colonial period (Vandewalle, 1998; 
Otman and Karlberg, 2007). Therefore in terms of social and cultural changes/structures 
Libya possessed three main classes of workers,  
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“peasants (tribesmen) who had settled on small plots of land as sharecroppers; wage 
labourers from British and Italian companies; and a bourgeois class that was 
composed of urban notables who were either salaried bureaucrats or comprador 
merchants who traded with Europe” (Ahmida, 2005:09).  
 
In addition Libya had its ruling elites that were connected to the Monarchy. In this period 
Libya as a modern nation-state barely existed and it was only after the Sanusi regime came to 
power in 1951 that Libya became a state. By the time of the Sanusi monarchy Libya could be 
viewed socially as follows: The country was divided into the following social classes - elites 
who were connected to the monarchy; the dominant loyal tribes leaders; a middle class 
(mainly from students and intellectuals); small working class; lower-middle classes 
containing educated people who came from poor and minor tribes; and a large poor class, 
mainly rural, who were the largest social strata of the country (Vandewalle, 1998; Harris, 
1986;  Ahmida, 2005). The state itself began to evolve in this period and according to 
Vandewalle (1998: 53-54)  
 
“The five most important ministries which allocated roughly 80% of the budget were: 
housing and state property, public works, planning and development, communications, 
and industry were headed initially by tribal supporters of the king and by two 
Tripolitania technocrats. These ministries as well as the development funds, became the 
most important formal mechanisms for distributing the growing wealth.”  
 
Thus, Libya remained a highly underdeveloped country which was dominated by poverty, 
particularly rural. The Sanusi regime attempted to modernise aspects of Libyan society but 
this was a process dominated by corruption and the continued links between Libyan elites and 
the former colonial powers. The power of the core over post-colonial Libya was firmly 
entrenched in this period of the MOWS as the regime established close relations with both 
the USA and the UK which included establishing military bases on the country. The political 
system was a limited kind of democracy but power overwhelmingly resided with King Idris 
who appointed ministers and dominated decision-making (Harris, 1986).  Even after the 
discovery of oil in 1959 and the establishment of Libya‟s first 5-year plan for development 
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(1963-1968) progress towards general social development was poor, as reflected in the high 
rates of illiteracy at the time of the revolution (St John, 2008; Vandewalle, 2006).  
 
The revolution itself was driven by a number of factors but socially gained greatest support 
from the majority of poor tribes in the country (Ahmida, 2005). The Free Officers Movement, 
led by a twelve member directorate which called itself the Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC), claimed to have organised the coup and proclaimed the country to be the Libyan Arab 
Republic. In the initial period up until 1973 there were many threats of counter-coups against 
the revolution which saw the military-led state begin to adopt more overtly authoritarian 
measures such as taking control of the media and Trade Unions. The idea of civil society, so 
powerful in Western democracies, never really took hold in post-colonial Libya, but then, this 
was also the case throughout most of the region and the periphery and semi-periphery of the 
MWOS (Nonneman, 2001; Abootalebi, 1998). In that sense Libya‟s path was unexceptional 
and reflected the pattern whereby, as Fanon feared and Said and Wallerstein documented, 
newly installed national elites replaced colonial elites and established networks of power and 
support with the former colonial powers. This corruption of post-colonial regimes was to be a 
familiar pattern in the MOWS. 
 
1973 represents a turning point for the revolutionary regime, now firmly dominated by 
Gaddafi and his loyal supporters. The consensus in the academic literature is to portray post-
colonial Libya as a rentier state and an example of authoritarian populism and there is little 
reason to doubt this (Nonneman, 2001; Chaudry, 1994; Schwarz, 2008). Libya has always 
remained dependent upon its vast oil reserves which have enabled the post-revolutionary 
governments to fund its ambitious foreign and domestic policies. One of the consequences of 
Libya‟s rentier outlook has, of course, been the emergence of a monopolistic economy and a 
state that has lacked the complex bureaucratic structure associated with modern nation-states. 
Rather, the ruling regime has been able to use its vast wealth as a form of clientelism to buy 
support rather than trying to govern through what Weber famously described as the modern 
bureaucratic rational state and not by imposing taxes upon the population to fund public 
services (Anderson, 1987; Otman and Karlberg, 2007; Martinez, 2007). In this sense and like 
other rentier states it leaves the governing regime potentially vulnerable to domestic dissent 
as it does not possess the state infrastructure needed to unify and coordinate national policies 
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and crucially to embed the population in a mutual relationship with the state. Hence the 
division of Libya into three regions remains a political issue for the populations of those 
territories to this day. The populism of the revolutionary government was reflected in a 
number of policies including removal of foreign military bases and a move to guarantee 
welfare for ordinary Libyans. It was this kind of appeal that marked the direction of the 
Libyan state rather than the move to construct a fully functioning state system. 
 
However, in 1973 after the failure of the Arab Socialist Union with Egypt and Syria, Gaddafi 
announced the establishment of the Jamahiriya state (meaning, of the masses), a populist 
cultural and political transformation of Libya‟s governing system (Otman and Karlberg, 
2007; Vandewalle, 2006; Harris, 1986; Ahmida, 2005). According to Ahmida (2005:72) 
“Gaddafi destroyed institutions of the old monarchy and, at the same time created the 
Jamahiriya institutions legitimizing a strong state acceptable to most Libyans in the 
hinterland”. Under the Jamahiriya state a network of „people‟s committee‟ were established 
which for Gaddafi represented a Libyan version of direct democracy as they were the 
mechanisms through which policy would be implemented and also, in theory, through which 
the mass or the people could make decisions about policy (Vandewalle, 1998; Ahmida, 2005; 
Otman and Karlberg, 2007). In reality the latter did not take place. Committee members were 
elected and with the rise of a powerful authoritarian state over Libyan society it was decreed 
that there was no need for political parties as Libyan society was unified in its support of 
Gaddafi‟s „Third International Theory‟, a programme for development that he saw as 
applicable to the whole of the Third World (St. John, 2008).  At the same time as this 
apparent move to decentralise power was taking place in reality the ruling regime under 
Gaddafi‟s leadership very quickly moved in the opposite direction to take power more firmly 
into the hands of the state with Gaddafi himself becoming officially leader of the revolution 
in 1979 (Harris, 1986; Metz, 2004).  
 
Libya became a testing ground for political experiments in the 1970s with a series of councils 
and committees established in support of the idea that Libya was governed by a form of direct 
democracy (Fathaly and Abusedra, 1980). The most important of these were the 
Revolutionary Committees which, in theory, existed to help raise people‟s political 
consciousness but in reality acted as a mechanism by which the government could monitor 
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and survey the population for signs of dissent (Martinez, 2007). Again, when one considers 
the authoritarian nature of Libyan state and society it is important to situate this in the context 
of political trends throughout the periphery and semi-periphery which were generally, in this 
period, prone towards authoritarian and military governments. Libya became distinct in the 
eyes of the West because its ruling governments authoritarian populism embraced an anti-
imperialist rhetoric and material support for those Third World movements resisting Western 
imperialism. This is not to excuse the nature of the regime but to recognise that again, in the 
MOWS, the way in which governments in the periphery and semi-periphery are described in 
a media and academic discourse dominated by the core is also part of the structure of 
power/knowledge at the heart of the MOWS.  This desire for political independence by the 
governing regime and its populist support and policies for the Libyan population have been 
significant factors in differentiating it from other rentier states in the region which were 
firmly in the Western camp and highly dependent on Western political and military support 
(such as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) (Delacrois, 1980; Schwarz, 2008). If the 
Libyan government sought to control its domestic population and opposition in ways which 
were an affront to human rights then they were in keeping with and often lagging behind 
other states in the region such as Algeria. The main difference between Algeria and Libya in 
this respect is the vast scale of human rights abuses carried out by the military junta in 
Algeria when compared with the Libyan governments own abuses (Whitley, 1994). The fact 
that Algeria was a part of the pro-Western bloc of Arab countries explains a great deal about 
its comparative sympathetic coverage in Western media and political circles. That said it 
must be acknowledged that the Libyan government carried out its own share of wide-spread 
abuses, particularly of opponents in exile, many of whom were assassinated in the 1970s 
(Sturman, 2003; Otman and Karlberg, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Further, its 
support for war against states in the core went back to the early years of the revolution when 
Gaddafi warned the French in 1971 not to oppose Libya‟s military intervention in Chad or 
suffer the consequences (Vandewalle, 1998). These overt warnings to states in the core 
helped to fuel the picture that was built up by the Reagan administration that Libya was one 
of the world‟s foremost sponsors of terrorists, not freedom fighters. Given that President 
Reagan viewed the ANC as a terrorist organisation the denunciation of Libya needs to be 
viewed in the context of the geo-political environment of the time which was framed in a 
familiar East-West Cold War narrative. This narrative decreed that all states were either 
friends or enemies of the USA or the USSR with no room for non-alignment. Nonetheless 
Gaddafi‟s support for independence movements throughout the Third World, including the 
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Palestinians, saw him easily portrayed as a „mad-dog‟ and all the other features of Western 
propaganda (Hitchens and Said, 2001), an image which he embraced and presented as proof 
of his successful defiance of the West. 
 
At the same time these early state-society models has some resonance with the ideas of a 
developmental state as mentioned in chapter one. The Gaddafi led governments sought to use 
the state to cement their power over Libyan society but unlike their East Asian developmental 
state counterparts and in keeping with rentier states more generally, the easy flow of money 
was too tempting of the state apparatchiks and political leadership. Without having to 
produce anything Libya like other rentier states became cash rich and this flow of money was 
sufficient o fuel the grandiose political projects of the Libyan governments. It meant that the 
emphasis on state-building witnessed in East Asian states was generally lacking, replaced 
instead by a form of patron-client relationship which did little to diversify the economy. Thus 
there are some links with the developmental state model but fundamentally Libya‟s rentier 
state status was the key factor in undermining its overall development. Ironically as the 
country became cash rich it at the same time became developmentally only moderate. 
Certainly the social quality if life indicators for Libya were stronger than most of their 
immediate neighbours, as we will see in chapter four. 
 
5.3 Libya and its Economic Development  
Since the revolution Libya‟s economy has followed classic rentier developmental lines with 
the state increasingly coming to dominate economic life, using its vast oil revenues to fund an 
improvement in the general quality of life indicators such as education, health and housing, as 
well as occasional grandiose projects such as the great man-made river project begun in 1984 
(Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 163). Libya has enjoyed the benefits of a small economy and 
high income from its oil revenues which have, at times, raised its per capita income higher 
than countries such as Italy, even allowing for its persistently high levels of unemployment 
(St John, 2008; Metz, 2004). This, in turn, gave it the highest GDP per capita income in 
Africa. Thus since the revolution Libya‟s economy has been centrally planned and directed 
by the governing councils with little room for a private sector (Chaudhry, 1994:18). It is the 
need to transfer economic activity and institutions form state-controlled to private sector that 
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is the most problematic aspect of the government‟s attempts to integrate the country more 
fully into the MOWS as it goes against the grain of decades of protection and planned 
economic activity.  
 
Thus, during the first decade of the revolution one of the Green Book's economic policies was 
to eliminate the private sector's activities in the country. Such a policy caused anger and 
frustration among Libya‟s private sector as they were needed by the citizens in their daily life 
to provide everyday goods and services. However according to Ahmida (2005:72) “the 
Jamahiriya government received wide public support among the lower and middle classes, 
which allowed the government to engage in a major transformation of the economy as well as 
the social and political structures”. This support was despite the fact that the private sector 
would not only contribute to the prosperity of society's job market but would also guarantee 
more job opportunities. But, the Jamahiriya state instead, was empowered to extend the 
public sector to dominate all of its economic activities and businesses. The reason for this 
was revealed in the (1973-1975) plan which declared that its goal was to diversify the 
country's products and exports; liberalize the national economy from the oil sector and reduce 
the reliance on it; and more importantly assure social justice for Libyans (Otman and 
Karlberg, 2007; Vandewalle, 2006; Saif AL-Islam, 2002). To implement this plan over the 
period (1973-1975) a set of laws was established that confirmed the public sector‟s authority 
and its essential function for the country‟s social-economic development. This was followed 
by a plan (1976-1980) which prepared to finalize the framework for both sectors by 
distributing the state's capital assets accordingly. In this respect as Otman and Karlberg have 
shown, the private sector was stunted and highly regulated under the revolutionary 
government (Otman and Karlberg, 2007).     
 
Between the years of 1990-1999 the Libyan economy was opened up to an extension of its 
private sector in such areas as light industries, and fishing activities. This limited 
liberalisation of the economy was framed in law number (242) in 1999 by the General 
People‟s Committee (GPC) which systematized the exports of goods; following on from the 
earlier banking law (1) in 1993 regarding the trade in currency. However, this had limited 
impact in an economy still overwhelmingly dominated by the state. Crucially the problem of 
a lack of quality in consumer goods and services remained. As a result, these policies did 
little to reduce the problems of unemployment, bribery and corruption, all of which had 
grown during the period of Western sanctions against Libya. In addition to this the period 
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also saw an increase in the number of black market activities and growing inequalities 
(Martinez, 2007; NESR, 2006).  
 
During the period 1999-2003 the government began to address these problems by 
undertaking a series of actions that would eventually leading to the „new vision‟ policies. 
Fundamentally an opening to the West depended upon the Libyan government accepting 
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, taking a clear stand with the West against terrorism 
after 9/11 and agreeing to open up the Libyan economy to Western investors which would 
require a massive transformation of Libyan economy and society, something likely to 
generate much upheaval and dissent. Embracing the neo-liberal concept of privatisation was 
always going to be highly controversial in a country where the state had dominated social and 
economic life.  Subsequently, in 2003 the government adjusted the law of the Libyan Foreign 
Investment Broad (LFIB) No: (5) (passed in 1997) which established a series of articles to 
encourage FDI in the country. This meant guaranteeing private property and the profits of 
foreign investors (law (7) 2003) which further opened the door to the international private 
sector. The creation of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB) is one of the major 
policy outcomes of Libya‟s National Economic Strategy (NES) project between the years of 
2003-2007. The LFIB report (2004) says that it is to play a significant role in creating an 
entrepreneurial culture in Libya and providing support to private business (NESR, 2006; Saif 
Al-Islam, 2002). In short, this followed standard neo-liberal policies of the state adopting the 
role of supporting the private sector in either a public-private partnership (PPP) or through 
private finance initiatives (PFI). It is hard to exaggerate the significance of this for Libyan 
society, representing as it does the states retreat from economy and society, with the aim of 
reducing the dependency of the population on the state for welfare. By 2008 the head of the 
IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was able to comment on a visit to Libya that (IMF, 2008), 
 
"Our discussions confirmed that we share many views on Libya's economic 
achievements and key challenges. Ambitious reforms over the past years have yielded 
strong and increasingly broad-based growth and macroeconomic stability. The key 
challenge is to sustain the ongoing reforms, including reducing the size of the 
government. In this regard, the Wealth Distribution Program presents both 
opportunities and risks. If designed and implemented properly, it could promote the 
private sector while minimizing the risks for the delivery of basic public services.  
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This statement would have been inconceivable before the Libyan governments shift to its 
new vision policies and represents an acceptance of increased Western interference in its 
economic life that both stands in stark opposition to the revolutionary governments previous 
populist protectionism and which also symbolically represents Libya‟s acceptance of the need 
to integrate more fully into the MOWS, with all the risks that it entails. 
 
Further, and with regard to Libya‟s human capital,  the report referred to a comment made by 
Rajeev Singh-Molares who leads the Monitor Group‟s project team in Libya that: 
 
 “Over the past two years of the project the Monitor team have come to understand 
something of the Libyan people, and what we have learnt is there is great well of talent 
in the country ready to take advantage of the opportunity that the Libyan Economic 
Development Broad represents” (LFIB report, 2004:72).  
 
Indeed, such a statement shows to great extent not only the importance of the Libyan 
graduates as human capital.  
 
The opening up and integration of the Libyan economy into the MOWS was driven by key 
figures in the government, most notably Dr Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi the secretary of 
General people‟s committee (Prime Minister) and Saif Al-Islam Al- Gaddafi, the chairman of 
the Gaddafi Institution for Development. Since the end of sanctions in 2004 it has been a 
governmental priority for Libya to attempt to catch-up as rapidly as possible with the policies 
of other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). More pointedly and 
remarkably it has actively sought to become a partner to the Western states of the core in the 
War against Terror that it opposed for the duration of the post-revolutionary period 
(Martinez, 2007; O‟Reilly, 2010). Its success in achieving this led noted sociologist Professor 
Anthony Giddens (2007) to observe that, ‗My ideal future for Libya in two or three decades' 
time would be a Norway of North Africa: prosperous, egalitarian and forward-looking. Not 
easy to achieve, but not impossible‘.  
 
5.3.1 Policies for the promotion of English Language   
Since 2004 Libyan decision-makers have reintroduced the teaching and learning of foreign 
languages, mainly English, into the curriculum and it is now being taught from Grade five or 
„10 years old‟ (NESR, 2006). In so doing the state hopes to be able to increase its revenues 
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from foreign investment and to use this as a means to fund programs and projects for Libyan 
economic development. The Libyan Foreign Investment Broad (LFIB) is one of the key 
institutions for achieving these goals as set out as early as 1997 in Law No: (5) which 
stipulated that it aimed for “The transfer of modern technology; develop Libyan human 
resources; diversify sources of income; Contribute to the development of national products in 
order to assist their entry into the global markets”. However, most of those foreign projects 
investing in Libya are based in the oil industry. The oil industry in Libya has three forms of 
businesses: first are Libyan national companies, second are companies shared with foreign 
investors, third are foreign companies.  
 
According to the National Economic Strategy Report (NESR, 2006,) companies in Libya 
have experienced that graduates from Intermediate and tertiary education, usually need 
extensive re-training in order to make them productive as workers. This is now seen as a cost 
for business that should be borne by the state or private individuals, in keeping with the neo-
liberal policies of the new vision strategy. The students graduate with high certificates but at 
the same time lack professional qualifications and most importantly have poor language 
skills. Dr. Suliman,
48
 the director of postgraduate studies, has described that in engineering 
jobs, for example, where both academic qualifications and English language skills are 
needed; the lack of English language skills has proven to be a major problem. Thus, he thinks 
that effective new English language training programs are essential for Libya‟s future. It 
seems to a great extent that the relationship between foreign investments in Libya, the Libyan 
graduates‟ job opportunities, the competitiveness of the Libyan job market, and the Libyan 
government‟s aspiration regarding integration into the global economy, all depend on the 
skills these graduates must acquire.  
 
According to Yahia and Saleh (2008), the economic sanctions (1993-2003-4) strongly 
affected both Libyan and non-Libyan employees. According to the report of the UK/Libya: 
Legislative Framework Committee (LFCR, 2006) once these sanctions were lifted, Libya has 
sought “to re-position herself as one of the leading African nations and as a gateway to 
Africa. Thus, legal reform has become key to creating a stable environment for foreign 
                                                          
48 Focus group method is made with the Libyan Higher Education committee in 10/05/2009. 
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investment (LFCR, 2006:07)”. This report represents the partnership between the Libyan 
general planning council and the law society of England and Wales. In other words, this has 
brought about considerable foreign investment in the country; especially in the oil industry 
(NESR, 2006; Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 247). More specifically, Zaptia (2009): 
 
 “The Board reported that it had successfully promoted a total of 82 investment projects 
across all sectors in Libya between 2003 and 2007, of which 34 projects were under 
execution in the first half of 2008. However, beyond projects directly promoted by the 
Board, there are a total of 153 projects in the execution stage totalling Libyan Dinars 
2.77 billion. Out of these projects there are 34 tourism projects totalling LD 242 
million forecasted to create 10,000 new jobs‖.  
 
Indeed, Zaptia‟s statement emphasises the government‟s enthusiasm for attracting foreign 
investments for promoting Libyan development. However, it has also highlighted the 
communication problems that exist between the influx of foreign companies, especially 
English speaking ones, the Libyan government institutions, companies and people. It is this 
structural supply-side problem that has hindered the job prospects of Libyan graduates who 
thus far have been unable to take advantage of emerging job opportunities. An example of 
that was revealed by the British Council
49
 who said: 
  
“Libya wants to re-position itself within the world, but it can‘t do that in just Arabic, as 
Arabic is not the most widely spoken language, there has to be another language that 
enables Libya to communicate with the world outside, and English is that. Because if 
you look at the global market, and all research documentation, and all international 
journals, they are all produced in English, I am not saying that the idea of choosing the 
English language is correct, but this is the situation now. Now it is time for Libya to 
rebuild, or more specifically to re-establish, and to maximise its potential, because 
there is huge potential here but it cannot be done without widening ELA.” 
 
                                                          
49 An interview was made with the British council in 21/04/2009. 
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Some foreign investors, in order to solve such a problem of skills shortages, have cancelled 
some of their requirements in terms of job specifications such as requiring the range of an 
applicants‟ age to be 25-30 year old, by raising it up to 40. The reason for this extension is 
that younger graduates do not have English language skills, so they need some extra time to 
have English language training courses, while the 40 year olds come ready to work, rather 
than costing investors extra time/money for training those. Dr, Habiba has described this 
situation as follows: it is ―unbelievable that we have graduates in the twenty first century 
who still can‘t use the English language, especially with the noticeable increase of foreign 
investors‘ in Libya‖. Thus, despite the fact that wealth and investment in the country in 
general is increasing the quality of ELA lags behind this by some way (Zaptia, 2008; Otman 
and Karlberg, 2007). Zaptia notes that,   
 
“There has been increased oil production, increased oil income and Libya's general 
non-oil income has increased. There are new and increased income flows from 
investments and portfolios.” He added: “There are huge and increasing annual budgets, 
Libya's GDP for 2006 was about US$68 billion (PPP) and is estimated at US$ 83 
billion plus for 2008. That is a per capita income of over 8,000 for 2006 and estimated 
at over 12,000 for 2008”.  
 
Already, then, as Libya enters the initial phase of securing enhanced FDI into its economy 
and the transformation of its socio-economic conditions, the pressure of the MOWS to 
conform to the standard of global English has become a structural supply-side problem. 
 
5.3.2 Procedure for Promoting its Private Sector    
According to the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) (2010) Libya has a small 
population (6.545.6m) and vast wealth (oil), and has reasonable levels of achievements in its 
education, health care and social-services and self-reliance. In this respect Libya contrasts 
markedly with many other African/Maghreb countries. But, at the same time, Ogunniyi 
(1996) pointed out that “due to various socio-economic factors, African countries have not 
been able to achieve the goal of self-reliance with respect to scientific and technological 
human-power development” (Ogunniyi, 1996: 01). Becker, an early proponent of human 
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capital, went further when he observed that “most countries that have a large supply of oil 
are wasting their resources” (Becker, 1975:03). In order to overcome these problems the 
Libyan government has embraced its twin strategy of opening up to the MOWS and 
developing its human capital resources as a means of making itself an attractive place to 
invest (Otman and Karlberg , 2007; Black, 2007; and NESR, 2006). Nonetheless the existing 
skills gap is particularly acute for the Libyan private sector which often faces the difference 
between the skills required in the job market and the skills that Libyan workers have (NESR, 
2006; Otman and Karlberg, 2007). For example, regarding the job seekers of the university 
graduates and the private sector requirements in Libya, a question was given to Mr Akerm
50
 
as the manager of one of these private companies, 
  
―Nowadays in Libya and more specifically in my company when interviewing 
graduates who have applied for a job, the first thing to be asked about is her/his level 
of English and computer skills, and the English is most important. Moreover, as a 
multi-operational company we must have engineers who are highly qualified in 
English. Because our operations are in English, and most of the terminologies we use 
are in English, and do not have Arabic translations. We therefore rely on the engineer 
and the knowledge and proficiency in English language and to solve such a problem we 
do employ some foreign workers
51
 who are qualified and mainly have English language 
skills‖. 
 
Furthermore, Mr, Akrem went on to explain that many Libyan businessmen and foreign 
investors in the private sector are still hesitant about investment due to their lack of trust in 
the government, fearing that its policies could as easily change back to state control and lose 
them their capital and property. This lack of trust in the Libyan government is a big problem 
for the new vision strategy and reflects long-standing and understandable scepticism about 
the government‟s commitment to policies that have been regarded for a long time as 
anathema to its ideological outlook (Gaddafi, 2005; St. John, 2008). 
                                                          
50 Individual interview with Mr, Akrem was made in 24/03/2009, the manager of Al-Manar Company for Construction in 
Libya  
51He stated “in the civil engineering department we do have foreign employees from different countries such as; 3 German 
engineers, 3 Tunisians, 12 Jordanians, 12 Egyptians, and 1 Nigerian. In fact, the foreign employees we have are much more 
than our employees from Libya”.  
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Although the NES (2006) acknowledges that the private sector in Libya has faced numerous 
problems, most notably, that they do not have the active support of the government, and this 
has been changing. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2006) Libya has 
achieved a notable improvement in its private sector (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). Alafi and de 
Bruijn (2010:12) stated that:   
 
“Notable progress has been made on various structural reforms, tariff rates were 
reduced, resulting in a decline in the simple average tariff to 17.8 percent. This makes 
it far easier for foreign investments and capital to enter the country. The trade regime 
was simplified by cutting half the consumption tax rate on imported goods. The state 
import monopolies were also reduced to petroleum products and weaponry. The list of 
prohibited import (40 items) was scaled down to less than ten products. The 
government intend to keep the import bans only for religious and health reasons.‖ 
They added: ―that private sector can freely import or produce goods that were 
previously under public monopoly. Numerous investment agreements with a number of 
countries have been signed so that to encourage foreign direct investment and 
harmonise taxes. Infrastructure is also being modernised and free zones are planned. 
Certification requirements for trade with Maghreb countries have also been 
simplified‖. 
 
Nonetheless the limited opportunities, so far, for Libyan graduates means that many are 
seeking their opportunities in the public sector or shadow economy. In particular people who 
have graduated from some of the practical sciences faculties such as medicine and 
engineering or who have had a chance to study abroad where their family‟s financial 
circumstances let him/her to. This point is reinforced by the Libyan representative at the 
United Nation Information Centre in Libya as she said that: 
 
“Those Libyan who acquired English language skills are the minority who were able to 
study abroad or who have the financial capability to cover the expenses of English 
language courses in Libya. In other words those are the rich people who manage to 
enrol their kids in foreign schools from the early stages till the higher education. 
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Nevertheless, some of those these rich families can even provide job opportunities for 
their children to work in foreign companies or embassy offices not for money, but, for 
the social prestige as interns. Therefore, lower-middle or middle class Libyan 
graduates who cannot afford to fund these English language courses, would not have 
the opportunity to work in such places, where they can get high salaries. This has built 
a huge gap amongst Libyan graduates‖. 
 
These class divisions in Libya are not surprising and reflect the kind of divisions found 
elsewhere in the MOWS where the wealthy elites use their power to maintain the wealth and 
status by dominating the best jobs and educational opportunities (Vandewalle, 2006). For the 
majority, then, the best prospects for employment remain with the state‟s own companies or 
those in partnership with foreign companies (mainly in the oil sector, embassies, airlines) that 
such graduates find employment. According to Alafi and de Bruijn (2010:12) “Some key 
strategic companies are still earmarked for privatisation, particularly Libyan airlines, public 
telecommunication company, Brega Petroleum Company, and the electricity distribution 
network. The stock exchange was established in 2006 and by the end of 2007; seven 
companies (mostly banks) were listed with a capitalisation of LD1.2 billion”.  For example, 
the national economic strategy report stated that: 
 
“Engineering and technical skills are an exception to the general shortage of skills, 
especially in the energy sector where there are many qualified engineers and 
technicians. This is due to the demand for such technical people from both state-owned 
enterprises like the LNOC, and from foreign oil companies, which increases salaries, 
enabling Libyan oil workers to earn more than the average Libyan” (NESR, 2006:63).  
 
However, the state run companies do not offer the same level of remuneration as that offered 
by foreign companies and so as a consequence Libyan graduates are failing to maximise their 
potential earnings. A good comparison of this was at discussion with some employees at the 
Libyan Foreign Bank where Osama
52
 said that:  
 
                                                          
52
 Focus group with the Libyan foreign bank in 14/04/2009 
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“In the past one of our staff had good English skills but was not good at her job 
technically. Nonetheless, she left the bank to work with the private sector. Now, she 
obtains one of the highest positions at that company with great salary because of her 
English language skills‖.  
 
Accordingly, it seems that the private sector and the foreign companies who deal with the 
private sector in Libya have created their own solutions which are to employ foreign workers 
to solve the problem of the lack of English skills in the Libyan job market. One example of 
this is the Al-Manar company which has employed more than 31 out of 50 
employees/engineers in the department of civil engineering are non-Libyan because of their 
English language skill. Thus, some of the private companies in Libya and some foreign 
investors have adopted this strategy because they know in advance the Libyan graduates lack 
English language skills.  
 
5.3.3 Reforming State Education Policies 
It is the Libyan education system that is the primary focus of this governmental strategy of 
bridging the skills gap in order to enable Libyan graduates to meet the demands of the local 
and global job markets (Porter and Yergin, 2006; Otman and Karlberg, 2007). This view has 
been supported by the NESR (2006:118) that “two important goals of the Libyan education 
system are to contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of Libyan society, 
by improving the skills and abilities of Libyans, and to rapidly raise standards of human 
development in the society”.  
 
For example, in Farrej & Al-Hedary‟s study (2008), on the subject of "the outputs of the 
educational system and the job market requirements in Libya", confirmed that the accounting 
education curriculum is not adequate in terms of preparing Libyan graduates to properly 
manage modern accounting systems, be they with private firms or the state itself. Farrej & 
Al-Hedary divided the types of skills into two groups: the first group was called the general 
and personal skills, where the reading and writing of English comes as the most important 
example; while, the second group was called the Job and professional skills, where the ability 
125 
 
to use ICT was the most important quality. Therefore, Farrej & Al-Hedary have persuasively 
argued that this gap between the skills promoted by the education system and those required 
in the Libyan job market have not been adequately addressed so far by governmental new 
vision strategies.  
 
In 2008 a national conference took place in Libya and titled ―The Planning and Training of 
the Libyan Education Sector: between the Reality and the Job Market‘s Requirements”, 
which was attended by the state decision makers and international private companies and 
stakeholders in Libya. The conference reinforced the points made by Farrej and Al-Hedary 
and focused on Libyan education sector‟s policies and its outputs regarding the issues of: 
unemployment, skills, educational planning and training, workforce strategies, human 
resources, foreign investments, the policies of the governmental economic development and 
the requirements of the Libyan job market.  In this conference there was agreement on the 
lack of skills and the lack of quality of the curriculums being taught in the Libyan education 
system as compared with other MENA countries. Particular attention was paid to the 
following professional skills: good analytic thinking skills and the ability to solve problems; 
all kinds of communication skills mainly foreign languages (listening-conversation-writing); 
and technical information skills. The conference‟s papers concluded that the government‟s 
task was to: develop the Libyan graduates and their skills; bridge the gap between the Libyan 
education sector and the needs of the private and public sectors in the Libyan job market; use 
this as a means to take the advantage of the implementation of the recent local and foreign 
investments which would provide jobs for Libyan graduates. Following on from this in 2009 
I interviewed Mr. Fikery,
53
 the manager of the training department at the Libyan Foreign 
Bank who told me:  
 
“There is an annual progression report which all Libyan foreign bank‘s employees have 
to submit. In this annual progression report even though employees have an excellent 
level of administration skills, they cannot receive an excellent grade unless their 
English language skills are very good”.   
                                                          
53
 Focus group is made with the Libyan foreign bank in 14/04/2009. 
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5.4 The Libyan Government‟s new Strategy: A Vision for Libya 2019 
In 2005 the NESR created a vision for „Libya 2019‟, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of 
the Libyan Revolution and which highlights the economic, social and political opportunities 
for Libya.  The aim of this vision is “to help create a unique model of ‗popular capitalism‘—
that balances market mechanisms with the core values of the Libyan Jamahiriya, to help 
Libya achieve this inspirational vision" see box (1), (NESR, 2006:01-02) all of which is a 
long way from the idea of „Islamic Socialism‟ that was central to the Green Book that had 
previously guided Libyan development. 
 
Box 5-1 A Vision for Libya 2019
54
 
 
1- Egalitarian: Libya is a leader in social welfare, and known as a nation that cares for 
and is highly responsive to its people. All citizens control their economic needs, 
enabling them to enjoy a stable, secure and prosperous environment. 
 
2- Democratic: Libyan direct democracy allows Libyan citizens to efficiently make 
decisions, and benefit from a responsive government. 
 
3- Productive: Libya‟s key resources its people are engaged in highly productive 
activities, with a real employment rate in excess of 90%, and a strong work ethic. 
 
4- International: Libya is an internationally connected nation, with an economy that is 
fully integrated with global markets and a world-class infrastructure. 
 
5- Competitive: Libya has a thriving diversified economy, with the non-oil GDP 
reaching more that LD 50Bn. Libyan companies are globally competitive and foreign 
firms compete to locate their operations in Libya. 
 
6- Entrepreneurial: Libya is a centre of dynamic entrepreneurial activity with one of the 
fastest rates of business formation in the world. 
 
7- Skilled: Libya is a leading centre of education and training developing its own people 
and opening its doors to foreign students. 
                                                          
54 (National Economic Strategy Report, 2006:02) 
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8- Connected: Libya has a state-of-the-art information and communication technology 
(ICT) infrastructure. This gives Libya‟s citizens easy access to information, 
knowledge and education enabling them to take control of their lives. 
 
9- Green: Libya is an environmentally friendly country, protecting its history, heritage 
and culture and investing in its long-term future. It is a world leader I water 
management. 
10- Regional leader: Libya is a role model that other countries seek to emulate. It has a 
leadership role within the region, and contributes to the wealth and stability of 
surrounding nations. 
 
This vision is clearly an optimistic aspiration for Libya and its people. In particular, it has 
highlighted indirectly some significant problems in Libya such as, respectively, the lack of 
productive resources other than oil; the lack of an international communications network; an 
uncompetitive economy; and the fundamental underdevelopment of its human capital. The 
given goal of Libya to become a leader in the region of Africa, for example, gives us a clear 
idea of what the Libyan government aspires to but in itself is a long-standing goal rather than 
a recent initiative (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). To achieve the high quality educational system 
it needs it is very important is that workforce ministry plans are in coordination with those of 
the education ministry, for example, which has in practice run into problems of intra-
bureaucratic rivalry where different parts of the state compete for resources and influence 
(Otman and Karlberg, 2007).  
 
Therefore, the new vision for „Libya 2019‟ emphasises that people need to be more involved 
in terms of the country's economic processes, absorptive capacities and goals. It also stresses 
Libya‟s unique history, culture and natural resources as qualities that can serve to attract 
more foreign investments (see chapter-6) (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010; and NESR, 2006).  
 
However, the underdevelopment of human capital is also seen as one of the main obstacles to 
reaching 2019‟s goal. In this regard Mr. Al-Zilitni the leader of the Libyan foreign 
investments company confirmed the importance of the new vision strategy when he said that:      
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―As the world is currently struggling through a huge economic crisis that isn‘t affecting 
the oil producing countries, therefore we should take advantage of this to reduce the 
gap between our country and the developed countries. The state of Libya shouldn‘t be 
measured by the global financial loss, but rather it should be measured by the chance 
for Libya and its people to catch-up with the world‖. 
 
Historically in the post-colonial period Libyan people have had a low level of direct 
participation in the economy. The long-term structural problem of the Libyan economy, a 
familiar one facing countries in the periphery and semi-periphery (Grugel and Hout, 1999; 
Wallerstein, 2010), is its over-reliance on one or two primary commodities for export-led 
growth (gas and oil), which has helped to create a country that “has been described as a 
‗distributive‘ state in which national and local institutions emerged not to extract wealth, but 
to spend it‖ (NESR, 2006:26). Though the oil and gas sector are the main sources of revenue 
for the Libyan economy they actually only employ around 3% of Libyans while contributing 
60% of Libya‟s GDP. At the same time as the other sectors have 97% of the Libyan workers 
while they only contribute 40% of Libya‟s GDP (NESR, 2006; and Al-Kaber, 2008). This 
imbalance is a major problem and explanatory factor in Libya‟s dependent position in the 
MOWS; thus far it has been unable to use its vast oil resources for diverse national economic 
development. Instead what has emerged is a state-dominated economy where the public 
sector is expected to create jobs for the vast majority of Libyan workers, regardless of the 
utility of those jobs for Libyan society. This, of course, is a familiar pattern in many countries 
in the periphery and the semi-periphery and a feature of comparable MENA countries such as 
Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt (Grugel and Hout, 1999). To this end new vision strategies have 
been directed towards reforming the public sector, especially the industrial and agricultural 
sector, as Alafi and de Bruijn (2010) claimed, in order to, “to achieve more self reliance and 
self sufficiency in food. It is also aimed to contribute to regional development and job 
creation”. Alafi and de Bruijn (2010: 11) added that:  
 
“Throughout the period of 1970 to 2005, about LD6 (almost $5) billion was allocated in 
different development plans for the PIS and LD4 (about $3.2) was actually spent on it (the 
Ministry of Electricity, Industry, & Minerals (MEIM), 2006). As result, the PIS rapidly grew 
as hundreds of industrial projects were established in different regions of the country 
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(Ghanem, 1985). In 2001, it hired 172.1 employees, account for 11.8 percent of total labour 
force (IMF, 2005). Despite the huge investments that are being poured into the PIS, the 
sector still relies heavily on oil revenues, especially in providing foreign currency, for both 
investment and raw inputs (the Ministry of Industry 2000). The contribution of the PIS to the 
GDP did not exceed 8 percent during 1970s, whereas it dropped to 5.9 percent in 2000 and 
eventually dropped again to 3.2 percent in.―  
 
5.4.1 Libya‟s New Vision: Attracting Foreign Investment and Diversifying 
the Workforce 
Al-Kabeer (2008), in his study “workforce development strategy and its impact on foreign 
investment”, indicated that despite the fact that Libya has strategic assets such as its location 
for tourism and natural resources (oil) that could attract foreign investment, that in fact 
foreign investment has remained below expectations. The Libyan government‟s new vision 
policies saw it establish the Economic and Social Development Fund in 2006, the National 
Economic Development Board in 2007, with a remit to overcome the obstacles which impede 
FDI in Libya. The task set them, however, was one that has proven elusive in most other 
countries in the periphery and semi-periphery that have embraced the neo-liberal polices of 
the Washington and post-Washington consensus, namely, to marry social justice with profit 
for private companies. For example, the Fund provides direct investments in all fields of 
investment such as tourism, real estate, industry, services and finance with total value of (14 
billion L.D). Moreover, in 2008 the UNDP for Libya announced that it had signed a 
US$1.86m project with the Board that aimed at supporting the management, coordination, 
and implementation of the National Development Programmes for 2008 to 2012. The 
rhetorical aim of the new vision policies is to enable Libya to move towards a diverse and 
integrated national economic structure (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). To this end these 
agencies have drawn up plans and strategies for the training and development of its national 
workforce.  On the subject of reforming the labour market the Libyan workforce ministry 
now plays a vital role. The ministry is expected to work in cooperation and coordination with 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to enable 
Libya to move beyond accession status to full membership (ADD). During the focus group 
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discussions that was undertaken with postgraduate male students at Al-Fateh University and 
the higher education academy most of them agreed on one point that, as Gamal said
55
: 
 
 “Our generation who are in their thirties are facing huge difficulties with the job 
market in Libya, especially at this time with increasing foreign investments which 
provide higher salaries for those with the required skills.‖ 
Omran emphasized
56
:  
―I am not talking about the young generation who are acquiring English language 
skills just for entertainment or for travelling and tourism. Those generations have 
different perspectives for learning language skills in contrast with our generation.‖    
 
5.4.2 Libya‟s New Vision: Tangible Steps? 
According to the NESR (2006) Libyan policy since 2004-5 is acting in response to the new 
vision agenda which insists that: 
 
“Libya needs to undertake actions in four different areas in order to address its 
competitiveness challenges. First, it needs to establish a governance system that can 
drive the action agenda forward in line with the needs of a competitive Libya. Second, it 
needs to focus on people development building workforce skills through education 
reforms and training, as well as improving quality of life for Libyans through targeted 
interventions in health, housing and social security. Third, it needs to undertake a 
number of actions to upgrade the overall business environment, making it easier for 
local and foreign companies to operate in Libya. And finally, Libya needs to focus on 
developing clusters of industries that can drive competitiveness and growth. Specific 
actions under these areas are discussed below” (NESR, 2006:140). 
 
 
                                                          
55 Gamal male group from Al-Fateh University by focus group was made in 21/04/2009 
56 Omarn male group from the higher education academy by focus group method that used in 17/04/ 2009 
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Since then a number of steps have been rapidly implemented by the government especially 
towards the non-energy sectors like banking, airlines, tourism, construction and human 
resources development. Consequently, educational reforms have started including 
privatisation of the public educational institutions to become the new Participatory Education 
Institutions (PEI) and establishing private training centres for ELA (Otman and Karlberg, 
2007).  
 
The second important step in Libya‟s new vision strategy concerns the banking system. The 
banking system was described by the NES report (2006) as limited in terms of its activities 
such as business information and a functioning financial market. These activities, if reformed 
in accord with neo-liberal principles of deregulation, contribute positively to industrial 
development and support the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
According to the National Economic Strategy the banking sector needs “to increase its access 
to payments systems and financial products that are commonplace in other countries, and 
access to funds for the private sector, especially SMEs‖ (NESR, 2006:54). Consequently, 
tangible reforms have been introduced by the government in the financial sector. Thus, the 
main reform of this sector was passed in 2005 where the Libyan banking sector adopted a 
new banking law (Law No: 18) that mostly is aiming to:  
  
“(1) Emphasizing the independence of the Central Bank in line with international best 
practices; (2) Improving the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks; (3) 
Strengthening the competitiveness of domestic banks, eventually leading to the 
participation of foreign banks in the domestic banking market; (4) Extending the 
domain of Central Bank supervision to include all banks including the three specialized 
banks (Agricultural Bank, Bank for Real Estate Investment and Savings, Development 
Bank), which were previously excluded from its supervisory domain; (5) Adopting 
Basel II principles on effective banking supervision; and (6) improving standards of 
and requirements for supervisory disclosure by the banks‖ (NESR, 2006:55). 
 
To transform this Banking law into established practices is to be followed by the next step 
that separates the Central Bank‟s ownership and supervisory functions regarding commercial 
banks. The Central Bank of Libya is the representative of the banking sector including the monetary 
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authority and is 100% state owned (The Central Bank Report, 2008). However, in order to enhance 
its attractiveness for foreign capital in 2005 the Libyan government started by privatising two 
of its large state-owned banks, the Al-Sahari bank and the Al-Wahda bank (Alafi and de 
Bruijn, 2010).     
 
With regard to FDI in Libya this is also an area where profound reforms have been 
undertaken by the government to help integrate the Libyan economy into the norms of the 
global economy of the MOWS. The private sector in Libya lacks access to foreign capital and 
even the ability to buy the parts it needs to maintain industrial equipment. For example, the 
private sector experienced difficulties in the Libyan job market “not only in terms of the 
expense of spare parts, but also the difficulty of obtaining them” (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010: 
12). In addition foreign capital seeking to invest in Libya has faced numerous problems such 
as: the length of the licensing procedure to operate in Libya and the remaining uncertainty 
about the stability of Libya‟s reforms and their impact on society (NESR, 2006). In 2004 the 
General People‟s Committee for Planning and Commerce amended Law No (5), originally 
passed in 1997, to create the Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB) to encourage and 
promote foreign projects in Libya and to organize and supervise foreign investment in the 
country. For example, article No 6 of this law states: 
 
 “The authority shall work for the encouragement of foreign capital investment and in 
particular it shall: study and propose plans to organize foreign investment and 
supervise foreign investment in the country.‖ and "to receive the applications for 
foreign capital investments to determine whether they satisfy existing legal 
requirements and the feasibility of the project and then submit its recommendations to 
the Secretary of state accordingly” (Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 252).  
 
Thus, the country has made notable progress in terms of structural reforms like reducing the 
tariffs in order to make it far easier for foreign investments and capital to enter the country 
(IMF, 2005 cited in Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). It is worth mentioning that the government 
has also begun to use national investment in the private sector to promote its growth and act 
in accord with practices that have become common elsewhere in the MOWS. The Economic 
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and Social Development Fund mentioned above is one way in which the government is 
seeking to support its newly emerging private sector in areas like tourism, real estate and 
industry. Despite the newness of these policy changes by the Libyan government they have 
their precedents in political rhetoric at least. As far back as 1993, Colonel Gaddafi was 
insisting on pro-capitalist changes to the Libyan economy, ―We have considered how to raise 
the income of Libyan citizens”, but Libyans “have to engage in trade, we have to produce and 
make a profit‖ (Gaddafi, 1993 cited in NESR, 2006:10).  
 
Since the reforms began in the late 1990s and were intensified from 2004 Libya has achieved 
strong GDP growth especially in the last few years (NESR, 2006), as measured by its GDP 
per capita of about USD 11,000 in contrast with the region‟s countries (see figure-1).  
Figure 5.1: GDP (PPP
57
 Adjusted) Performance, 1999–2004, Libya Relative to Peers 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 “Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is an estimate of the exchange rate required to equalize the purchasing power of 
different currencies, given the prices of goods and services in the countries concerned. It is designed to accurately reflect the 
difference in standards of living between countries. Adjusting GDP per capita for PPP is necessary because market 
exchange rates do not accurately measure differences in income and consumption among countries” (NESR, 2006). 
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5.4.2.1 Create a Competitive Market Nationally and Internationally 
In recent years Libya has liberalised many aspects of its economy, opening its markets to 
competition from abroad and from FDI (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010; Porter, 2007) This step is, 
in theory, to ensure well-organized, competitive and open markets, in order to increase the 
local and foreign investments into the country. “The opening of our markets is irreversible,” 
Gaddafi stated to a group of European businessmen in 2004 (Gaddafi, 2004 cited in NESR, 
2006:12). However, huge obstacles to this process remain and take two particular forms: (a) 
national challenges such as resistance to change from those who benefit from the distribution 
of revenues from natural resources such as oil, import licenses and other government-granted 
privileges. Most of those people are working in the governmental sectors, and they are wary 
of economic reforms that would diminish their own power, a familiar Weberian dilemma 
about the nature of bureaucracy. Therefore, the Libyan government has offered the key jobs 
to people who are genuinely qualified in their fields rather than through the traditional 
network of patrons and clients; (b) and international challenges like the ability to create 
economic clusters of investment and production of a kind found throughout the global 
economy. “Clusters affect competitiveness because of their positive impact on company 
productivity, innovative capacity, and new business formation”, and thus reflect their ability 
to link those clusters within global economic chains. Hence, the NES report assured that 
Libya to meet these challenges needs “to move from isolated firms to clusters, and to link 
these clusters to global value chains and markets” (NESR, 2006: 23). 
 
Intriguingly distributing the wealth of Libya more equitably amongst its people remains one 
of the main strategies of the Libyan government. However, this clearly goes against the 
tendency of integration into the MOWS which are producing polarised societies and 
economies in most of the world‟s countries. Without state intervention to rectify this it is 
difficult to see how the Libyan government can prevent this happening. And there is the 
dilemma. If it does do this it will jeopardise the foreign investment flowing into Libya which 
expects to see a lean and neo-liberal state reducing its size and power for the private sector to 
operate freely. Libya, in contrast with much of the MENA, is distinguished with extensive 
provision of social services like the free education, health care, and housing which are the 
key measure of this equitable distribution. If these are under threat because of the pressure to 
integrate into the MOWS it will raise serious problems of legitimacy for the government 
which may be forced to adopt more overt forms of repression to maintain its power over 
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society. According to NES report (2006:129) “Libya‘s per capita income is comparatively 
high as a result of its oil production and it appears to be doing fairly well in distributing this 
income among its population Libya has registered strong growth in prosperity over the last 
few years, as measured by its GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power”. But, the 
report of the national economic strategy still estimated that about one million Libyans are not 
having their basic needs met. So how is the government to achieve this apparently impossible 
task of neo-liberal policies and social equality? 
 
One of the current plans for promoting greater equity of wealth distribution is to adjust the 
law No (15) of 1981, in order to improve/upgrade people‟s wages. This plan was 
implemented in 2006 and aims to provide cost of living adjustments with sensible measures. 
GPC decision No. (277) of 2006 raised minimum salaries in the public and private sectors 
providing the basic government salaries at the following levels: 180 LD for persons without 
dependents, 220 LD for families with two members, and 500 LD for a family of three of 
more members. Furthermore, this law raised minimum salaries for other categories of 
employees, including those with higher qualifications and technical skills and corporations 
not financed by the central government. Thus, although Libyans are provided with relatively 
equitable distribution of wealth amongst its people and as the wealthiest country in North 
Africa, it can only do so through the kind of state subsidies that the new vision policies want 
to curtail. That said, globally accepted data on inequality in Libya is not available so there are 
serious problems in terms of measuring this trend.  
 
5.4.2.2 Promoting Training Strategies Programs/Regarding Skills and ELA  
At the present time and according to the Libyan educational policies of 2005, Libya has been 
encouraging the universities and higher educational institutions to start courses in specialized 
scientific usage of computers, teaching foreign languages, and Information and 
Communication Technologies (NESR, 2006). This has also led to the encouragement of 
faculty members to attend the same courses in order to develop their abilities too. As Walsh 
(2006) has argued “all languages and cultures regardless of their status or numerical size, 
can play a positive role in national development‖. He posits that this “can be done by 
integrating language into processes of socio-economic development and that none is 
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inherently anti-development‖. Echoing the instrumental view of language touched upon in 
chapter two, Walsh‟s point, shared by current Libyan government strategy, is that language 
has a broader role in society than that of communication alone. It is this view that the Libyan 
government are now generally adhering too, with a few dissenting voices. In this regard the 
previous secretary of the workforce committee
58
 illustrated the importance of English 
language by saying that: 
 
 “for Libya as it integrates into the global economy it is clear that acquiring the English 
language has become the main element for all those potential investors in our country 
along with computer skills. Both foreign and local partners are relying entirely on 
these two skills in different fields in Libya”. 
 
5.5 Global English: Globalisation and English Language Skills  
Language skills have become critical ingredients in the context of globalization and all that it 
entails, in particular what Agarwal describes as the “integration of the labour market for 
skilled people‖ (Agarwal, 2006: 1). Though different languages – English, Spanish, French, 
and Chinese - vie for supremacy, English has long been perceived as globally dominant. 
Pattison (1965) posits that English “is now a world language not only because it is much used 
internationally but because it is assisting the development of so much of the world” (Pattison, 
1965: 09). According to Swales (1993) there is indeed a story of the irrepressible march of 
the English language across the face of the earth; of its union with the powerful new 
technologies for disseminating information; of the growth of regional and functional varieties 
of the language; of the personal and functional value of being able to communicate in 
English. He cites a short passage, written in 1985 by the lexicographer of the English 
language, Robert Burchfield (1985) to buttress this point: 
 
―English has also become a lingua franca to the point that any literate, educated 
person on the face of the globe is in a very real sense deprived if he does not know 
English. Poverty, famine and disease are instantly recognized as the crudest and least 
                                                          
58  Individual interview was made the previous secretary of the workforce committee in 02/05/2009 
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excusable forms of deprivation. Linguistic deprivation is a less easily noticed 
condition, but one nevertheless of great significance‖ (Swale, 1993:283-284). 
 
It is this kind of belief, says Swale (1993) that impels many governments, corporations, 
institutions, and educational systems to invest heavily in improving the English skills of their 
citizens, employees, and students. This position seems to be supported by Bleakley and Chin 
(2004) who argue that language is a function of the labour market, an instrument, which 
either determines a low or high return on the language skills of employees, making the 
relationship between language and earnings a key factor in the spread of English. In support 
of that belief Husam,
59
 one of the Libyan postgraduates at Al- Fateh University, stated that: “I 
am learning English language for financial reasons is that if I acquired English, I could find 
a good job opportunity and thus would get a higher salary.” However, the costs of attending 
courses in language training centres are quite expensive, up to 3000 D.L for 3 months. This 
would necessarily exclude many Libyans from attending and illustrates how the impact of the 
neo-liberalisation of the Libyan economy will very quickly sharpen already existing class 
divisions in society. In this context, Mr, Outman
60
 from the Libyan Airline Company 
considered that:  
 
“Nowadays people in Libya believe that by acquiring English language, they might 
have chance to work with any foreign company or embassy, by which salaries would be 
four times higher than they would get with a public institution”.  
 
However, the utility of English as the global language is not an uncontested belief. For 
example, Swale (1993) stated that “those who have investigated the place of English in 
Science, or Agriculture or Medicine find many large claims about its overwhelming 
predominance to be exaggerated, since they are based on biased and pre- selected data”. He 
added for instance:  
 
                                                          
59
 One of the focus group male participants which was made in 12/04/2009 at Al-Fateh University 
60
 Focus group method is used with the Libyan airline in 23/4/2009  
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―The late Peter Strevens could persuasively pile up the evidence for continued 
expansion, while Richard Bailey (1992) can produce evidence of an opposing trend. 
Bailey can point to low rates of population increase in countries where English is 
strong, and high birth rates in countries where English is weak. And in some 
countries with high birth rates and a strong English tradition, evidence of decline is 
patent as, for example, it is in the Philippines. Moreover, in the last decade we have 
witnessed a collapse in the model of economic development that laid stress on 
'missing human capital' in developing countries. 'Invest in training and use English to 
do it' now seems a partial and fragile answer to Africa's many problems. Meanwhile 
John Maher (1986) has convincingly argued that languages rise and fall according to 
the amount of new information they contain. And so he traces the linguistic history of 
medical advance: Sanskrit, Chinese, Greek, Arabic, Latin, German, and now 
English‖ (Swale, 1993: 286).  
 
The dominance of English language in the world today is because it is the language of choice 
in international relations and commerce, and is spoken in many countries which were under 
different geopolitical influences e.g. French, Spanish and Portuguese (Lim, 2004; Fisherman. 
2001). According to Lim (2004) “Many people in the world think English is a global 
language and worth learning either in order to enrich their lives or to advance in their 
careers” (Lim, 2004:17). However, Block (2004:17-18) argued that “Some scholars, most 
notably Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (for example see Phillipson 1992, 
2003; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000), fear that English is becoming the dominant language of 
international communities devoted to political, commercial, cultural and academic 
endeavours, they warn of the death of other languages (what Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Phillipson (2001) have termed ‗linguicide‘) in the wake of globalized and globalizing 
English” that the English language is becoming so dominant that it provides a linguistic 
infrastructure as powerful as any technological system for transmitting ideas and cultures 
(Block, 2004; and Said, 1994a). It is this aspect of global English that makes it such an 
important part of the MOWS, advantaging those in the core at the expense of those in the rest 
of the system. This idea needs to be qualified slightly, though, as Said observes when he said, 
(1994: xxvii) “Western imperialism and Third World nationalism feed each other, but at 
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worst they are neither monolithic nor deterministic” (Said, 1994a). Moreover, Mr, Al-
Zlitini
61
 the head of the Libyan Foreign Investments Institution said of ELA that:  
 
“By the new era of globalization the whole world becomes conditioned to acquire 
English language and this is a matter of power, not choice. ‗ 
 
Additionally, he mentioned that: 
 
―The lack of English language would cause some problems for many institutions. For 
example, we have some of these problems now with the need for reading market 
indicators about supply and demand and measuring efficiency. Since time is very 
crucial in reading and responding to such changeable indicators it is always best to 
have employees who are highly skilled in English language to work in this field‖.  
 
5.6 English Language and Employment in Libya  
Libya has for years battled with unemployment among its graduates as according to Otman 
and Karlberg „the World Bank currently estimates the Libyan unemployment at around 25%‘ 
(Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 328). Many experts have placed the cause of the problem on the 
inability of graduates to compete for top jobs offered by foreign firms in the country as a 
result of poor English skills and the nationals‟ tendency to be exclusively interested in 
administrative posts (Otman and Karlberg, 2007; and PANA Press, 2006). By contrast and 
historically the state offers secure and permanent employment regardless of the needs of the 
Libyan economy, a classic rentier state solution. This is a big issue among most Arabic 
countries in the MENA. For instance Wilkins (2005) noted a problem of rising 
unemployment rates among young people, who are increasingly educated in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and the other Gulf countries. As is the case with Libya, the vast majority of 
UAE nationals are employed in the public sector (Wilkins, 2005; Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). 
Unemployment among the young is a particular problem for authoritarian governments as it 
                                                          
61
  An interview was made with Mr Al-Zlitini the leader of the Libyan foreign investments institution in 12/05/2009 
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is the young who are most likely to protest and raise grievances about their lack of 
opportunities and freedoms as was seen in the Iranian protests of 2009. This provides an 
added incentive for the Libyan government to transform its economy and society but it is, as 
mentioned, a path fraught with danger because of the uncertainty such transformations 
generate. 
 
In an attempt to address the increases in Libyan graduates‟ unemployment, the Libyan 
government is privatising several public corporations and putting into place a policy of 
awarding loans and financial incentives to public sector workers who wish to shift to the 
private sector (Salam and Flanagan, 2005; Porter, 2007; George and Miles, 2010; ). The 
government is also insisting that foreign firms honour their employment quota of Libyan 
nationals. This seems to be almost the same approach that the UAE is pursuing: the priority 
being to secure employment for nationals by replacing expatriate workers with UAE 
nationals (Wilkins, 2005). But this approach by the Libyan government is facing challenges 
because: (1) many nationals come to the labour market with no work experience, a poor 
standard of written English, unsatisfactory IT skills and sometimes inappropriate 
qualifications; (2) according to Otman and Karlberg (2007:142) there is an “amount of laxity 
in enforcing mandatory quotas for Libyan employees which have been violated by many 
foreign companies”; and (3) Most private sector firms are not willing to train unskilled and 
inexperienced nationals and then pay them a high salary, when the business environment that 
attracts them is based on cheap labour and cost minimisation (Wilkins, 2005). So, the 
question then is: who is to pay the costs of human capital development? The logic of the 
current phase of the MOWS suggests that it is the state as an enabling state that subsidises the 
private sector by providing these educational and training programmes to reduce the costs 
upon business. Secondly, it is the responsibility of private individuals to fund their own 
development through education. Mr. Akrem
62
 supports the last point as he is the owner of a 
company which must have engineers highly qualified in English because the operations are in 
English and most of the terminologies they use are in English and do not have Arabic 
translations. Mr. Akrem added:  
  
                                                          
62 Individual interview with Mr, Akrem was made in 24/03/2009, the manager of Al-Manar Company for Construction in 
Libya 
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 “In the civil engineering department we do have foreign employees from different 
countries such as: 3 German engineers, 3 Tunisians, 12 Jordanians, 12 Egyptians, and 
1 Nigerian. In fact, the number of foreign employees we is much more than our 
employees from Libya”. 
 
This argument supports what the spokeswoman
63
 of the United Nation Information Centre 
(UNIC) in Libya‟s says as she claimed that the lack of English language skills is the main 
reason to keep the Libyan graduates out of the job markets.  She further said that: 
 
 “From my personal experience I could see in graduates‘ eyes the deep pain that they 
felt due to their lack of English language skills. Otherwise my director would have been 
a Libyan graduate highly skilled in English language, rather than the Indian national 
that currently is managing my office. I see this as a lost job opportunity for Libyan 
graduates. Although we advertise for such vacancies many times it seems that foreign 
workers are replacing Libyan workers”.   
 
Thus rather than a quota system being enforced by the state it appears that in practice foreign 
companies largely ignore it, with the state‟s connivance. Nevertheless, Mr. Hakeim64 from 
the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) stated that those foreign workers have, in fact, 
helped Libyan national workers to improve their English language skills. He further 
explained that:  
 
“One of our colleagues has been assigned to a department where his major work is with 
foreign workers and he must speak with them in English although he has only a high 
school certificate. He has made excellent progress in his language skills,‘ 
 
                                                          
63 Individual interview was made in 31/03/2009 with the Libyan spokeswoman of the united nation information centre 
64 One of participants that was involved in the focus group discussion in 22/04/2009 at the Libyan National Oil Corporation 
institution. 
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But, Mr. Hakeim indicates that thanks to his institution‟s intensive training programs “we are 
catching up with English language skills in some areas”. Mr. Hakeim has stated that, 
“In the human resource department we follow certain rules when receiving graduates for 
jobs. We set language tests for graduates in order to determine their maximum level of 
knowledge. Then we provide graduates with suitable training program based on their current 
knowledge levels. We used to train each year from 30 to 40 graduates, now the number has 
increased to about 120 or 140 trainees for English language courses. ― 
 With regard to unemployment he revealed that: 
 
“I‘m the information specialist at LNOC and we are allocated about 10 thousand 
graduates per annum to work with as directed by the Manpower Committee. Thus, we 
must adopt a process of differentiation, where some of those graduates will be rejected 
and others are accepted, based on real job needs. However, those graduates who 
combined their professional qualifications with English language skills will be the most 
likely to be accepted. Though the institution might sometimes have to accept some of 
those other graduates because of the insistence of the manpower committee, even where 
there are no vacancies for them such as with graduates from social science or 
geography. This is a consequence of the fact that we suffer from mass unemployment in 
Libya while we employ more than 3 million foreign workers from different countries‖.    
 
This situation of the Libyan graduates and their lack of skills in addition to the estimated 
figure of the foreign workers in Libya have contributed to a high rate of unemployment 
amongst Libyans. Nonetheless there remains an important debate about how to categorise the 
type of unemployment in Libya. This question was developed via several discussions that 
were made with some of the relevant stakeholders and groups such as: the workforce 
Institution, and the LNOC. More specifically, the job market has tended to move towards the 
overproduction of certain types of occupation, such as medical sciences or engineering 
because they have the highest social prestige for families. Practically and as a result of the 
recent LNOC workforce statistics revealed that it “had 1000 engineers for the jobs of 100”, 
thus, the LNOC noticeably condemned the educational system‟s plans rather the 
unemployment itself. 
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At the aforementioned conference held in Tripoli in 2008 on „Educational planning and 
training: between reality and the needs of the job market in Libya‘, a key criticism that 
emerged in the conference was that the Libyan educational strategy was still geared towards 
the quantity of students produced, not the quality, a problem that is increasingly common in 
higher education globally as governments coerce and encourage more people to attend 
university. As a result Libya faced an excess number of students in the faculty of the social 
sciences where it has increased to 53.7% while the practical sciences have declined to 46.7%. 
As a consequence the Libyan Workforce Committee says that this generates more problems 
for the job market with students graduating with qualifications that are not appropriate for 
what is demanded by employers (Al-Kabeer, 2008).  
 
Having said that, Al-Kabeer (2008) suggested five points which could develop the workforce 
and thus improve the quality of Libyan education and training sector: (1) to focus on the 
principle of quality and efficiency; (2) to integrate the policy of the workforce development 
with the strategies of the education sector, and the national economic strategy of Libya; (3) to 
raise the „added value‟ of the Libyan workers through the workforce development programs; 
(4) find a practical means for ensuring a high degree of harmonization of educational and 
training outputs with the needs of the Libyan job market; and finally (5) there is a need to 
establish a system  to measure the skills (human capital) to make the training efforts stronger 
in the country. This is an example of the shift in the state strategy in Libya towards becoming 
an enabling state which supports business by ensuring that the countries human capital 
(education and health) are developed at public, not private, expense. Clearly the Libyan 
government has vast oil revenues to try to attain this. What it lacks is the quality of state 
personnel to make the transformation easily and effectively. 
 
The lack of productivity and efficiency in the Libyan job market has happened for two 
primary reasons: first most jobs have been working for the state and there has been a massive 
overproduction of public sector workers in occupations that are not actually needed. Second, 
many such jobs have been secured on the basis of patrimonial connections rather than due to 
the qualities of a particular candidate. This client-patron relationship has been an important 
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and problematic part of the Libyan economy and job market and is a common form of 
corruption found throughout the MOWS, taking different forms in different places. Thus, 
social relationships very often in Libya contribute in directing graduates to unsuitable 
positions in terms of their careers/specialties because these posts are close to where they live, 
for example, or due to high salaries. This lack of labour mobility is an example of the kind of 
structural problem that the Libyan government is now trying to remedy but it runs up against 
long-standing and deeply entrenched cultural beliefs. The previous Secretary General of the 
Libyan Manpower Committee confirmed this point by saying: 
 
 ―The social relations in Libya are a continuing problem for us in the manpower 
committee. We are not obliged to find graduates jobs according to where they live, but 
according to their specialties‖. 
 
The previous Secretary General of the Libyan Manpower Committee, Mr Abodul-Albaset, re-
stated the importance of the Manpower Committee as an institution which works on 
organizing job opportunities in both administrative and commercial systems within public 
and private institutions. To this end he said: 
 
“In Libya we have a so-called ‗work regulation law‘, which is regulation 58, since 
1970. This law is directed to public and private institutions in Libya which receive 
funds from the public treasury. Our job is to organise work for people each year in 
these institutions. But we have too many people looking for too few jobs.‖ 
 
In response to this statement, Shaban et al (1995:66) regarding the challenge of 
unemployment in the MENA region stated that: "many governments also had to curtail their 
hiring of young university and secondary school graduates, who had hitherto relied primarily 
on the government for employment." Especially if one consider the large flows of migrants 
since the 1990s from labour-sending countries like Egypt and Tunisia into Libya (Shaban et 
al, 1995). Those challenges would contribute not only to increase unemployment rates among 
graduates, but also would affect the job market competitiveness. Thus, Mr Abodul-Albaset 
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emphasised the confusion that some people might face, especially university graduates, who 
have grown up in a world to think that creating job opportunities is the responsibility of the 
Manpower Committee rather than something that emerges in the job market. He explained 
that currently there is another institution which has been introduced to help with organizing 
job opportunities in the Libyan job market, which are the National Centre of Economy and 
Planning (NCEP). This unawareness of how work is allocated in a capitalist market is 
illustrative of the way in which Libya has been shielded from full integration into the 
MOWS. With this centre the Manpower Committee are try to work with the other sectors 
such as education to establish the requirements of the Libyan job market and place graduates 
in the right posts: 
 
“Recently we have worked hard in Libya along with other institutions such as the 
National Centre of Economy and Planning to organize the process of filling job 
opportunities among the private and public sectors. The Libyan government is also 
taking care of its graduates in order to achieve a balance between educational outputs 
and job market requirements in Libya‖.   
 
Very often, the gap between job market requirements and the available specialties or skilled 
graduates lay in the absence of integrated educational and work policies, again reflecting the 
limited and uncoordinated nature of the Libyan state. More to the point the Libyan education 
system has been placing great emphasis upon funding technical colleges despite the fact that 
graduates from these colleges were not well trained or able to secure jobs. This is supported 
by the National Economic Strategy report (2006) since it declares that:  
 
“At present Libya has 15,000 students in medical faculties, compared to just over 9,000 
practicing doctors, and a total population of around 6 million. It simply does not need 
to educate this many doctors. At the same time, there is a major lack of other health 
workers, pharmacists, medical technicians and trained paramedics” (NESR, 2006:115). 
 
This has led to foreign workers replacing those technicians in places such as the medical 
centre in Tripoli. The NES report was laying blame on the Libyan educational and work 
polices when it argued that: 
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―The expensive funding of Libyan doctors pursuing post-graduate specializations 
abroad has also been inefficient, as Libya has not derived a benefit from their skills. 
Faced with low salaries at home, they have chosen to make their careers abroad and 
Libya has been forced to import expensive foreigners to replace them” (NESR, 2006: 
115-116). 
 
In addition to these technical problems in the Libyan educational and job market there has to 
be added the variety of social changes that have been transforming Libyan society over the 
past 30 years. These include: rising female independence, secularism, social mobility and 
professional ambition, declining polygamy and patriarchy, detribalisation, and most 
importantly, a more cosmopolitan global outlook (George and Miles, 2010; Al-Nouri, 1995). 
It is this tension between the demands of the MOWS and Libya‟s long-standing cultural 
traditions, such as its tribal groups that is likely to be the main fault line as the government 
attempts to transform the Libyan economy. In terms of the importance of global skills, Mr. 
Al-Zilitni
65
 the head of the Libyan Foreign Investments Institution (LFII) once more 
emphasised the necessity of English skills for the emerging Libyan financial sector:  
 
“For instance, if we talk of the financial transactions sector, we will find certain rules 
and policies that are being implemented all over the world. No one anywhere can 
operate without understanding these rules and policies, which are written in English”.  
 
Additionally he emphasised that the lack of English language skills results in the following 
problem: investment planning for the company relies on cooperation with other markets 
around the world which depends upon English language as it is the language of global 
financial markets. This point was emphasised by employees that I interviewed at the British 
Arab Commercial Bank in London (2010).  Adel,
66
 assistant manager in treasury marketing 
and sales at the Bank told me that: 
                                                          
65
 Individual interview was made with Mr. Al-Zilitini the boss of the Libyan foreign investments institution in 12/05/2009 
66 One of the focus group‟s participants that was made in 15/01/2010 at the British Arab Commercial 
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 “Acquiring English not only enabled me to get a good job opportunity abroad, it also 
makes possible my career development for when I go back to Libya.”    
 
This is a clear indication of a strong correlation between English language skills and 
employment for some Libyan‟s, then. There is also strong evidence that many believe this 
relationship to be causal. The extent to which this is a plausible view to hold will become 
clearer in the remaining chapters but for Libya, as for many countries in the periphery and 
semi-periphery, it is an article of faith reinforced by ideas about human capital and 
development.  
 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the arguments currently being put forward in Libya for ELA skills as 
a means of promoting employment for graduates. The argument being articulated by the 
Libyan government and various international agencies is that English language is an 
important skill to be obtained because of the recent influx of foreign firms into Libya. This is 
particularly acute as the unemployment rate stands at a relatively high rate of 25-30% per 
cent in a population of 6.5 million, almost 60% of whom are under 25 according to the 
National Information and Documentation Authority. According to Otman and Karlberg 
(2007: 376) “the North African region has the most rapid population growth rates in the 
world with population more than doubling in the last 30 years‖. They suggested that by 2025 
Libya‟s population would have doubled from its current level. 
 
Establishing this relationship between ELA and employment in the Libyan job market is 
therefore seen by the government and international agencies as the first step in finding 
solutions to unemployment. However, the evidence presented on the subject in Libya is not 
conclusive about such a link. Although countries such as India and China appear to have 
benefitted economically by investing heavily in English language skills for their students it is 
far from clear that such experiences can be universalised and extended throughout the 
MOWS. The BRIC countries have particular advantages that most do not, large populations, 
large territory, and big internal consumer markets and so on. The specific social and historical 
context as well as the geography, natural resources, size and breadth of population and 
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country are all factors that have to be taken into account when considering the impact of ELA 
as a factor in any developmental strategy. We shall look at this issue in more detail in the 
fifth and sixth chapter of the thesis.  
 
Theoretically the argument made by the Libyan government is in keeping with the spread of 
global neo-liberalism since the 1980s. After providing something of a fortress for three 
decades against the untrammelled movement of western capital, largely enabled by its vast oil 
reserves, the long-term structural contradictions in the economy had remained unchecked. As 
Libya‟s state expanded and became more inefficient so the reliance on unearned income from 
the export of oil intensified the imbalance in Libya‟s economy. The embrace of neo-
liberalism is a desperate attempt to redress these problems in a manner that will also enable 
the Gaddafi regime to remain in power. Whilst it is not comparable to the shock therapy 
undergone by Russia and other former communist states its cultural, political and economic 
impact is just as profound. For decades Libya had resisted and opposed Western imperialism, 
the very logic of the MOWS. And now the government has had to embrace the very ideology 
that it has opposed for all of this time. 
 
In so doing it has sought to promote the idea that the acquisition of global English will serve 
as a mechanism to enhance the employment prospects for Libyan students, particularly 
graduates. The difficulty in sustaining this argument, as chapter 7 will show, is that the 
market for English speaking employees in the periphery is limited and often limited to work 
that does not require English language skills. Libya is late entering into this particular race 
and has done so only to find that most other states in the periphery, semi-periphery and 
indeed non-English language states in the core have a well established structure for ELA in 
their educational programmes. This leaves the Libyan policy particularly vulnerable in the 
MOWS. What exactly are the jobs that Libyan graduates will apply for? The economy 
remains heavily centred on oil extraction and this remains largely in the hands of a limited 
number of skilled Libyan engineers and foreign workers. Without attending to the need to 
diversify its economy Libya‟s strategy seems destined to generate limited returns when 
measured as increased employment for its graduates. In the next chapter I will look at the 
attempts by the Libyan state to reform the state and private sector in order to make it more 
attractive to foreign capital and as part of its neo-liberalisation of Libyan economy and 
society. 
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Chapter 6:- State Strategies for Promoting ELA in Libya: The „New Vision‟ and 
Promoting Public-Private Partnerships 
6.1 Introduction 
The need to teach and learn English, the global language (or „global English‟), has had a 
profound impact upon the educational institutions and curriculums of many countries in the 
MOWS (Nunan, 2003). This chapter examines the role of the Libyan state regarding this 
matter and its attempt to cultivate a new relationship with Libya‟s small but growing private 
sector. The latter, as part of the new vision strategy, is crucial to the Libyan government if it 
wishes to be accepted as a legitimate and effective part of the MOWS, rather than the 
dissident or critical position that it has previously occupied. The chapter will be divided into 
two sections: the first section of this chapter will focus on the role of the state regarding its 
strategies towards ELA in Libya. This section will address the following questions: What has 
the state done in order to encourage the acquisition of English? What does the Libyan state 
say about human capital as part of its programme to encourage development and how does it 
try to develop this? What does this tell us about the way in which the Libyan state is 
transforming itself in order to fit into the MOWS? To what extent do the policies of the 
Libyan state successfully address the troubling idea that human capital might be a part of an 
Orientalist discourse about development in the MOWS? The second section of the chapter 
offers an analysis of the emerging private sector in English language provision in Libya. 
Theoretically the transformation of the Libyan state and economy reflects the structural 
dependency of the Libyan economy on the MOWS. What is remarkable, in many ways, is 
that the Libyan government have been able for so long to resist full integration into the 
MOWS. This is not simply a fact of Libya being a rentier state. There are many rentier states 
that have vast oil reserves but have been much more clearly integrated into the MOWS. The 
Libyan positing has been shaped by the political-ideological ambitions of the group 
surrounding Gaddafi who came to power in the 1969 revolution. They held to an ideology 
shaped by the work of figures such as Fanon which argued that in order to resist neo-
colonialism the Third World (dependent state) had to literally and psychologically throw off 
the colonial legacy. Thus the expulsion of foreign military bases from Libya was a symbolic 
and material manifestation of this commitment to Third World independence and it is this 
politico-ideological leadership that has given the Gaddafi regimes such prominence and 
support in many Third World countries, not least the support of the ANC who benefitted 
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greatly from financial and political support from the Libyan government during the Apartheid 
era. 
 
All of these factors serve to illustrate how profound is the re-structuring of Libyan society 
being advocated in the new vision policies. The long-term consequence of Libya‟s resistance 
of the pressure of the MOWS has helped to create a seriously uneven economy and society 
within which the public sector has largely served as a form of patronage by the ruling regime. 
Whilst this strategy was workable in the short-term over the period of the revolution there 
have been profound changes in the nature of the MOWS, not least of which the collapse of 
communism and effectively the globalising of the capitalist economy. This has created 
structural conditions (the free flow of capital, the impact of new digital communication 
technologies, the expansion of US-led global militarisation, and the expansion of capitalist 
consumer culture) which have made it very difficult for authoritarian governments to 
maintain control over their populations, let alone their economies. Added to this has been the 
intensification of capitalist crises in the core of the MOWS and Libya‟s dependency upon the 
core becomes much clearer and more volatile. It is no longer possible for the Libyan 
government to direct the economy and society whilst being excluded from important sections 
of the MOWS. Thus the change of policy and new vision strategies represent a capitulation 
by the Libyan government at the ideological level and an embrace of neo-liberal policies that 
means there must be a dramatic transformation of the state and economy. The longer this 
takes the more limited the opportunities for the Libyan economy and society to break free o 
its rentier status. But he quicker the government moves to make these changes the greater the 
political risks it entails by causing social upheaval that will be difficult to contain. 
 
6.2 The Role of the State 
6.2.1 How has the state changed its policies with regard to the teaching of 
English? 
According to the Wilton Park Conference Report (2007) in 1999 after Libya had settled the 
Lockerbie matter, the relationship between Libya and the British government was re-
established at the level of diplomatic relations (WPC‟s Report, 2007). In the same year Libya 
became a complete member of the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (  ةيبورلاا ةكارشلا
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ةيطسوتملا) in the Barcelona 3 conference, which took place in Stuttgart-Germany in 199967. At 
this conference, Libya agreed to abide by the rules of Barcelona 3 and as a result it secured 
new and practical relationships with the European Union member states. In terms of the EU 
Germany, France and Spain are all important reading partners with Libya (Saif AL-Islam, 
2002).   
 
This agreement between the Libyan government and the European Union was further 
enhanced when in 2003 Libya renounced its desire to develop weapons of mass destruction 
(Martinez, 2007). This, in turn, led in 2006 to Libya being removed from the US State 
department‟s official list of sponsors of terrorism (Report on Wilton Park conference, 2007; 
Martinez, 2007). Consequently, the diplomatic relationships between the US and Libya were 
restored in 2004 and enhanced in 2009 for the first time in 30 years (Vandewalle, 2008; 
Zoubir, 2002). Hence, in the last four years, the Libyan government committees have created 
a number of strategies of legalization to facilitate and expand the country‟s economy via 
developing its private sector and human capital. For example, according to Otman and 
Karlberg (2007) in 2004, Libya was provided with an estimated US $35 billion for its 
infrastructure improvement. As part of this process the education system has been re-
organized with a view to enabling Libya to take advantage of these economic opportunities. 
Therefore, development of the Libyan education system is the major function that the 
governmental strategies are still developing. In this regard, Shaheena,
68
 the coordinator of the 
British Council in Libya confirmed that the Libyan education sector is in dire need of 
improvement that will bring it up to international standards. In terms of the MOWS this 
makes sense as Libya moves from being a protectionist rentier state to a rentier state that 
adopts an enabling role, in neo-liberal fashion, using public resources to subsidise the private 
sector rather than expand the public sector itself. This opens up great opportunities for 
corporations and economic elites throughout the core to take advantage of Libya‟s liberalised 
economy, but particularly those based in parts of the EU who have long-standing ties with 
Libya, such as France, Germany and Italy. It also, by extension, opens up the way for a new 
wave of Libyan capitalists to emerge and form a part of the elite sector in Libyan society. 
Again, from the point of view of the ruling government, this is a mixed blessing as 
                                                          
67 The third Europe- Mediterranean conference of the foreign ministers- Barcelona 3 which is took its place in Stuttgart-
Germany in 15/16 4/1999. 
68
 The coordinator of the British Council in Libya was interviewed in 2009 
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autonomous economic elites have tended historically to pursue political power to go with 
their economic strength. Only in a country like China, where the state has very carefully 
sought to control the growing inequalities of wealth and to subordinate the new capitalist 
class to the party-state system has this transition worked so far, but even in China there are 
massive social tensions due to the neo liberal policies introduced and the polarisation of 
Chinese society (Yaozu, 2011). Navigating these fault-lines in economy and society will 
prove testing indeed for Libya‟s own political elites. 
 
The issue that Shaheena attempted to present is that with Libya‟s re-entry into the global 
economy its sectors do not seem equipped to have productive, economic and international 
dialogue. Otman and Karlberg (2007:110) agreed that “the Libyan government must move 
back quickly to an acceptance and recognition of the international importance of the English 
language”. They added regarding the absence of English language years ago “for Libya this 
has proved to be a fundamental and disastrous mistake, which has set back Libya in terms of 
educational quality by two generations”. A useful comparison can be made here. In the 
period between 1969 and 1983 Malaysia suspended the teaching of English in favour of 
promoting the “Malay language” as the medium of teaching in all Malaysian education 
institutions. One implication materialized as result of this strategy: the competence of 
Standard English declined considerably which affected the standards in the Malaysian 
education sector, thus undermining the Malaysian competitiveness in international trade and 
technology. In 1996 however, the Malaysian government fundamentally changed its policies 
towards ELA, re-introducing it as the main medium of instruction in tertiary education. In 
2002, English language was also introduced at the first stages of primary and high school 
levels in sciences and maths in particular. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed‟s said of the 
reintroduction of English language that, 
 
“There is a need for English to be completely mastered because the instructions are no 
longer going to be simple. It is unfortunate perhaps for the language nationalists, but 
that is the reality today. They must not blight future generations by objecting to the 
mastery and usage of the English language. They must not obstruct Malaysia‘s 
progress and development”    (Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 110) 
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Such a statement illustrates the pressure on even the most protectionist of governments in the 
MOWS to accept to dominance of global English or suffer the economic consequences. 
According to the Warschauer‟s report (2000) “at this new stage of global capitalism expands 
and develops new challenges will be posed to the English language teaching profession” 
precisely because it is the language of global capitalism (Ives, 2009; and Warschauer, 2000). 
Therefore, the Libyan state has changed its policies with regard to the teaching of English 
language by attracting international experts in the academic fields to teach in Libya. Thus, in 
2006, the General People‟s Committee for Higher Education (GPCHE) with the British 
Council to establish a new Language centre in Al-Fateh University. In addition, the British 
Council also provides teaching programs as Alia,
69
 a British teacher, explained: “I now teach 
so many lawyers in this centre in Tripoli and they will be dealing with international law so 
that is going to be in the English language‖. The next section will illustrate the actual steps 
of the new governmental educational strategies towards ELA. 
 
6.2.2 State Strategies for ELA at the Primary and Secondary Level 
In 2004-5 new educational strategies were introduced by the General Education Committee 
(GEC) (see Fig-5.1) in Libya towards the teaching of English language. Moreover, Dr 
Abughania, the director of the curricula of the Education Research Centre in Libya said that: 
 
 “During 2005-2007 we had designed two English courses (syllabi), one general course 
for all the specializations except the specialized English majors and the second course 
for the specialised English majors. In 2008 we had designed 5 different courses for the 
non-majors. We are using new textbooks for every year and we have prepared CDs for 
audio-learning in every unit. A student has 4 lectures per week for the non-majors and 
19 lectures for the major student”70. 
 
                                                          
69
 An interview was made in 2009 with two members of the British Council in Libya-Tripoli  
70
 An interview was made with Dr, Abughania in 25/03/2009.  
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Libya has adopted this new strategy towards ELA at the primary and high school level since 
2005, but clearly it is some way behind countries that it is competing with for FDI. For 
example, Tanzania adopted similar policies and strategies in 1995, reintroducing English 
language teaching alongside the national language Swahili at the secondary school level. 
Now the Tanzanian governments has increased further the number of years in which primary 
students study English, beginning in their first year instead of their third (Vavrus, 2002). 
There is for Libyan policy makers a sense in which they are trying to rectify very quickly a 
problem that has been embedded in the system for two decades. But, Libya contrasts 
significantly with the Tanzanian strategy as in the latter country English is treated as an 
„official language‟ equal to the national language Swahili, not simply viewed as a foreign 
language to be used as a tool for certain development Goals (Warschauer‟s report, 2000).  
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Fig 6.1: the Recent Strategies of the Education System Regarding the Acquisition of 
English in Libya 
 
 
Although this new strategy regarding learning English in the Libya education sector is a first 
response, some people have not welcomed the strategy of learning English education stages. 
In a number of interviews I undertook with university educated Libyans in 2009-10, the 
strategy of reintroducing English language amongst students in the previous educational 
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stages was clearly a controversial issue. For example, Dr Al-Zenati
71
 the director of the 
National Committee of the Domestic Education in Libya stated that: 
 
 “Learning English language in the early stages still raises some issues in terms of 
society‘s identity and culture and I think there is no need for English in these early 
stages, while it is very important at the higher educational levels”.  
 
Thus there is an awareness of the kind of cultural issues raised by Fanon, Said and 
Wallerstein, that language is not simply a tool, but carries with it wider ideological issues to 
do with power and knowledge over a subaltern culture. This tension between the long-
established ideology of the revolutionary government drawing on Fanon for inspiration, and 
the new vision strategy which fundamentally overturns all that the government has stood for, 
is not surprising and is one of the sources of potential conflict in Libya as the transition takes 
place.  
 
Figure 6.2: The Recent Strategies of the State‟s Education System Towards the 
Acquisition of English in Libya at the Basic Education Stage 
 
 
                                                          
71
 Dr Najy Al-Zenati the director of the National Committee of the Domestic Education in Libya was 
interviewed in 09/08/2010 
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These are the study plans for basic education for academic year 2009-2010. These study 
plans contain: the division of courses by the months of the year and the names of textbooks 
for basic education. English language was reintroduced from the third grade of the primary 
school till graduation, but now it has been shifted to start from year five. The reason 
according to Dr Habiba
72
 the spokeswoman of the United Nation Information Centre in Libya 
is that some post-colonial countries like Libya still consider that learning English language 
from the early ages, like at the kindergarten stage or even the third grade can support so-
called „linguistic imperialism‟. She believes that if Libya is introducing English language 
from year 5 just to protect its language and culture, then it should provide the high quality 
teaching staff needed along with appropriate methodologies. However, she agreed with Dr 
Abughania who stated that: “It is best to start learning the English language from this early 
stage. This stage is a vital time for learning English language and also for learning in 
general‖. Dr Habiba added that: 
 
―Presently, although many training centres for the English language exist and they are 
spreading rapidly in Libya, still Libyan graduates lack the skills of English language 
learning. The reason behind that I believe, is the fact that Libyan students have not been 
prepared with the basics of English language in the early stages of their educational 
process before they graduated‖. 
 
While Dr Abughania considers the usage of English language today as a supportive tool, he 
also confirmed Dr Habiba‟s point where he stated:  
 
“There is no doubt that Libyan graduates nowadays are behind the expected level of 
English language, which means that they face some difficulties.  But, if Libya continues 
applying its new strategy of reintroducing English language into the education system 
from early stages till graduation, there will be no such barriers facing graduates.  
                                                          
72
 The spokeswoman of the United Nation Information Centre-Libya was interviewed in 2009. 
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Therefore, these new strategies are also included in the second stage at the high school level 
where English language is included for all faculties in this stage of the general curriculum to 
facilitate students‟ tertiary education phase. More specifically, today in the Libyan education 
system, each faculty has subdivisions where the English curriculum varies based on 
specialisms (see Fig-3-1, 2, 3, 4). For example they have social science, engineering science 
and biology, each of them has a different set of English language curriculum. The case is 
different with the English language faculty as they have more time for English language 
lessons. We can see, then, that the strategy must have the medium term goal of raising the 
general level of English skills amongst future generations of Libyan graduates. It cannot 
rectify the situation for the generation that missed out on these opportunities during the 
period of the ban without committing a different level of training. For such people it is the 
private sector that is expected to provide the training that they require, and this costs a 
significant amount of money in terms of the average Libyan income. Again, the way in which 
the Libyan state is trying to prepare its human capital for integration into the global economy 
of the MOWS is already leading to an intensification of class divisions in society between 
those who can afford to pay for superior English language education and those who are 
reliant on the less well funded state provision. For Libyan elites this creates a mechanism 
which they can take advantage of to perpetuate their own advantages over those of ordinary 
Libyans.  
 
The recent strategy of the state‟s education system towards the acquisition of English in 
Libya at the high school stage as following: 
 
Fig 6.3: the Division of Social Sciences in (Yellow) and the Division of Economic 
Sciences in (Red) 
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Fig 6.4: the Division of Engineering Sciences in (Green) and the Division of Life 
Sciences in (Gray) 
   
Fig 6.5: the Division of Basic Sciences in (Purple)  
 
 
The organisation of this school curriculum relies on cooperation between the Education 
Curriculums Committee in Libya and the Teacher Preparation Centre with the latter recently 
responsible for training courses for teachers before or during their jobs starting from 6 to 12 
months. Dr Habiba
73
 commented:    
 
                                                          
73 The spokeswoman of the United Nation Information Centre-Libya was interviewed in 2009. 
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 “Teachers in our schools/universities rely only on a national curriculum. Very often, 
our teaching staff are not good at teaching English language skills themselves, which 
they should be using in class to help students. Sadly, it is not only English language 
teachers who are in shortage of these teaching skills, but also teachers for other science 
subjects. I believe that the value of our teaching staffs is really a vital issue for 
producing high quality educational outputs” 
 
Clearly one of the problems facing the Libyan state strategy is a shortage of qualified and 
competent teachers, which in part is why the new relationship with the private sector has 
emerged. I will turn to this in more detail later in the chapter. Shaheena,
74
  also from the 
British Council in Libya, explained that since 2004 and when English language was re-
introduced, the general education committee has brought back old curriculums to be 
introduced in the system. But unfortunately these curriculums were not of the level expected 
as there were lots of errors within the books and the teaching system itself. As a consequence 
these books had to be removed and re-written after students had already begun to study with 
them. Afterwards, the General Education Committee (GEC) introduced another curriculum 
called „English for Libya‟ which was reliant upon a methodology which was totally 
unfamiliar to the Libyan teachers and students. Thus far the state and its bureaucracy have 
lacked the skills needed to transform the school curriculum in a competent manner creating 
problems for staff and students alike (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). Such a problem reflects 
the lack of trained/qualified people and state.  
 
The NESR (2006) argued that teachers in Libya at most levels and fields need to be re-
educated and re-trained. They stated that “Libya has many more teachers at both primary and 
secondary level compared to benchmark countries, with 3,643 primary teachers and 1,051 
secondary teachers per 100,000 population". The report adds “according to the National 
Centre for Education and Training Planning, at least one-third of the 194,000 basic 
education teachers are inactive".  
 
                                                          
74 The coordinator of the British Council in Libya and was interviewed in 2009 
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Further, the Warschauer report (2000) suggests that English teachers in non-English speaking 
countries need to be conscious and qualified in terms of the relationship between teaching 
English and culture in order to avoid the charge of linguistic imperialism. The report said: 
“English teachers will need to re-conceptualise how they conceive of the link between 
language acquisition and culture” (Warschauer report, 2000). The report suggests that these 
early levels of the education system are so important in terms of cultures considering it as an 
integral part of language learning. The report stated “There is no single formula for how to 
handle issues of culture in teaching. Teachers will need to vary their approach depending on 
the particular audiences being taught and their purposes in learning English”. In response to 
this point Dr. Abughania said of Libya and its recent strategy of re-introducing English that: 
“teachers should teach English language as a supportive tool for students to study and 
understand subjects in science and research written in English, while preserving their Arabic 
culture and history, and that we have tried to achieve by the new curriculum called ‗English 
for Libya'”. Dr. Abughania was aware that teaching English should be conducted in a way 
that enables students to learn to discuss their subjects without the need to discuss the issue of 
linguistic imperialism. Thus the response of the state is in keeping with its authoritarian past, 
control social change by controlling the population and what they say and think about, a 
proposal which is surely difficult to reconcile with the aspiration to liberalise the Libyan 
economy and society.  
 
Fig 6.6: the Division of Languages (Blue) and it contains: Majoring of Arabic language; 
Majoring of English language; and the Division of languages in (Brown) and it contains: 
Majoring of French language; Majoring of Swahili language  
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6.2.2.1 State Strategies for the Acquisition of English in the Higher Education 
System 
The Libyan Government has also begun to introduce new policies for promoting English 
language at the university level. Jobs for graduates have begun to expand since 2004, 
particularly in the areas of tourism and leisure and the services and hospitality industry 
(George and Miles, 2010; Porter, 2007; Zaptia, 2009). To this end in 2006, the General 
People‟s Committee for Higher Education (GPCHE) worked in partnership with the British 
Council to create new strategies for ELA by establishing a new Language centre in Al-Fateh 
University, Tripoli. 
Fig 6.7:
75
 The Organizational Structure of the National Commission for the State‟s 
main Universities 
 
The Organisational Structure of the National Commission for Universities in Libya 
                                                          
75
 Was taken in 11/08/2010 by the Al-Fatah university information centre (contains the main 10 Libyan 
universities) 
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This has become the main centre for the training and organising of staff teaching in Libyan 
universities and it is known as the Libyan English Teaching in Universities Project (LETUP). 
This project for promoting ELA at Libya‟s universities (mainly 10 universities [see fig-5.7]) 
has been given an international award by the British council, a not insignificant prize given 
that the Libyan programme was in competition with similar ones in 13 regions and more than 
100 countries (LETUP, 2010). The award recognised the LETUP programme as the most 
effective of its kind in the world. This project aims to offer high quality advice and to 
promote collaboration in the development of English language educational policy for the 
Libyan university students. In addition and crucially it aims to promote and develop the skills 
and abilities of Libya‟s English language teachers with the establishment of an internationally 
recognised teaching qualification. According to Dr Husain Al-Ejalli
76
 the director of his task, 
this project is active today in more than 10 centres across the country‟s universities. Dr Al-
Ejalli said of this strategy: 
 
―Today the Libyan job market requires highly qualified graduates, with good language 
skills, which enable them to follow up this global development, along with their 
academic and professional requirements. Therefore, our institution is responsible for 
introducing English language to universities in the major cities in Libya such as: 
Tripoli, Benghazi, Elbaidah, Sert, Gerian, Zawia, Musratah, Khums, and Zlitin. 
However, until this moment we have established 10 centres for learning English 
language at Libyan universities, which comes under the control of the General People‘s 
Committee for Higher Education for achieving both the short and long term goals. The 
short-term goal would be achieved by establishing training centres of a very high 
standard. However, we have arranged an extended contract with the British Council in 
Libya until 2011, and after that we will be running it.‖ 
 
Although this new strategy regarding ELA in Libya is greatly welcomed by the Libyan 
students as a major step forward, the current university graduates still blame the Libyan 
government for their lack of English language skills and there appears to be significant 
resentment towards the government. Furthermore, and what makes their situation worse for 
                                                          
76
 The head and director of the Libyan English teaching project in the Libyan universities.  
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recent postgraduate students is the new decision/law of (47) made by the (GHEC) in 2008, a 
new strategy which has been declared at all Libyan universities. This law decrees  that: (1) 
“No resolution for discussing the Masters or PhD thesis shall be issued for any student as of 
the next academic year 2009/2010 unless he/she provides proof of having successfully passed 
the English language test as approved by the language centre of the universities”. (2) 
“Readers or holders of the Masters degree shall not be appointed unless the English language 
test is successfully passed”. (3) “All competent entities are to observe and implement this 
decree”77   The generation of graduate students who were denied the right to learn English 
language now have to face a state imposed obstacle to their ability to graduate.  For many the 
solution to this is to pay for intensive and expensive English classes in the private sector, 
further highlighting their sense of injustice. This is a mechanism introduced by the state as a 
way of filtering out a generation of Libyan who were deprived of their opportunity to acquire 
English language skills by the same state. It is this double mistreatment that is at the heart of 
the anger amongst this generation of graduates.  
 
And Amana added that: 
 
“I have learnt English just in the first year of my undergraduate study, now while I‘m in 
the last stage of the higher education studies I am required to learn English in order to 
receive my qualification. This is a trap that Libyan graduates have fallen into. How are 
we to afford this?” 
 
Such a reaction is quite understandable, especially since Dr Al-Ejalli explained: 
 
“Actually we are still facing the impact of suspending English language from the 
education system in Libya.  Since our downturn in the previous two years 2006 to 2008, 
and until this moment sponsoring Libyan‘s for their postgraduate studies here or 
                                                          
77 This decision translated in 21/7/2010 by Al-Shams Al-Moshrka for Legal Translation.  
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abroad is being used as an alternative solution for filling such a gap. Yet, most evidence 
indicates that those students aren‘t ready for international academic communications‖.  
Dr, Al-Ejalli suggested that one year abroad isn‟t enough to acquire such language skills; it 
needs not less than 2 years. According to the national economic strategy report (2006) “The 
public expenditure from the administrative budget has averaged LYD 1.2-1.6Bn over the past 
5 years, with a further LYD 280MM spent on funding Libyan third-level students studying 
abroad". Therefore, the policy-makers at the Libyan General Committee of Higher Education 
(LGCHE) in recent years have been focusing on funding the training programs to enhance 
those graduates‟ abilities in terms of their postgraduate studies abroad, providing all the 
necessary facilities, especially in the non-Arabic countries. In addition the LGCE have 
established massive training centres all across the country. 
 
We can see then that many of the steps taken by the Libyan state towards ELA have been 
haphazard, poorly thought through and planned. And yet at the same time it is receiving 
encouragement from the states of the core of the MWOS through organisations such as the 
British Council for attempting to transform Libyan higher education. A basic problem is that 
the Libyan state does not function in the way that a modern bureaucratic rational state does in 
the West. It has not evolved in the same way but has been established on the basis of a rentier 
state where patrimonialism and clientelism are the mechanisms by which support for the 
government is maintained. Trying to reform the state in the manner of a modern bureaucracy 
is more than just a matter of making decisions, it means transforming the culture of those that 
work in it and of the government that has used it in largely instrumental fashion. In Libya the 
state and the revolutionary government have become synonymous whereas in a country like 
Britain they have independence and degrees of autonomy from each other. In the UK 
Governments change but the state continues. In Libya it is not clear that such a thing is 
possible. 
 
6.2.2.2 The Role of other State‟ Sectors in ELA 
The other key state institutions involved in promoting the development of ELA are the 
Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), and the 
Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC). For instance, The LNOC‟s centres are operating 
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across the country to develop new graduates and employees‟ skills. The LNOC is considered 
as the director of all local and international oil companies around Libya administratively and 
financially. According to the directorate of the LNOC: 
 
 ―It was established under Law No (24) of 1970, replacing the general Libyan 
Petroleum People‘s Committee Decision No (10) of 1079 to assume additional powers 
and authorizations, making LNOC more flexible to administer the huge and 
accelerating development of oil industry” (LNOCD, 2007:01).  
 
Hence, this Corporation works as a supervisory and controlling body aiming to achieve the 
plans of developing the oil industry (LNOC, 2007:01). The LNOC fully owns many of the oil 
companies operating in Libya as well as participating with other international oil companies. 
Since the workforce in these companies is mixed between Libyan‟s and foreigners, English 
language has become the main language of communication in this working environment. 
Thus, quite distinct to other sectors of the Libyan economy, people who work in the oil sector 
in Libya have had the greatest opportunities to improve their English language. The LNOC 
has been providing intensive programs of language training for employees from their third 
month at work.  For example, since 2005 a training programme for English and IT skills has 
been implemented by the Libyan National Oil Corporation. This strategy “helps in upgrading 
proficiencies and efficiencies of employees, and contributes in preparing the professional 
cadres as per an actual identification of the requirements of training” (NESR, 2006). This 
strategy was made by the Libyan National Oil Corporation regarding ELA as separate from 
other local training programs in Libya. More importantly, this strategy has offered some 
administrative and material incentives for the participants who achieve high scores at the 
English language courses and in the field of IT to obtain internationally validated certificates. 
For example, in terms of English language courses the trainee will obtain after securing first 
level certification of IELTS 605 & above, TOEFL 600 & above, or Cambridge ESOL 
examination FCE a reward of LD 300, to be followed by LD of 800 at the end of the courses 
along with administrative distinction that entitles her/him to secure priority access for 
candidature for international seminars/conferences in her/his field of specialty.  The IT field 
has been the other main source of state investment in education with similar financial 
incentives for the successful students. These IT courses are designed for non-professional 
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computer users to obtain international licenses like International Computer Driving License 
ICDL, European Computer Driving License ECDL, and Cambridge Certificate of IT Skills.     
 
Further, the LNOC also allows employees and graduates from different economic sectors and 
educational institutions to be involved into such programs. For example, The Libyan Oil 
College is an affiliate of LNOC and acts as the most recognized educational centre in Tripoli 
amongst Libyans because of its high competitiveness and excellence in terms of training and 
scientific research programs. More specifically, Sami an employee at the Libyan Foreign 
Bank said of his experience with the Oil College in Tripoli that:  
 
“I am working in the Libyan foreign bank and I have a reasonable level of English 
language competence.  I was trained by the Libyan Foreign Bank at the Oil College in 
Tripoli. This college is one of the best colleges in Libya and when I reached the 
intermediate level then I was sent to the UK to complete my Master studies. As result 
when I went to the UK I did not need long to pass the advanced stage. Further, some of 
the English teachers in the UK admitted that the basic rules of the language I had 
obtained in Libya are excellent. Through my experience I found studying in Libya 
better in contrast with sessions obtained abroad”. 
 
This college alongside with the 2006 strategy illustrate the great task that has been assigned 
to the LNOC to meet the requirements of training programs at different departments in the 
LNOC. Furthermore, the training and development departments in the LNOC have adopted 
the policy of sending their employees abroad to attain their higher education levels in 
different specialties. This is a historically unprecedented development because of its 
flexibility in administering the huge and rapid developments in its industry. In this regard Mr 
Abdu-Al-Hakem the manager of the department of the training and development of human 
resources at the LNOC stated that: 
  
“We should focus more on our revenue streams, not be counting how many employees 
we send abroad, but rather how many of them return with qualifications and practical 
169 
 
skills. If we send abroad 1000 graduates or employees, and 100 of them returned with 
the desired skills and qualifications then I would say that means we were successful in 
our human resource investment. We are still in dire need to increase our human 
resources investments, even with the re-opening of technical colleges and training 
centres around Libya. Yet, such investments require time to achieve their expected 
results. In fact there are no immediate gains to speak of, but these investments often 
take 5 to 10 years to produce the revenue”. 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Libyan state‟s strategy for social change in the 
educational sphere is a medium term one, a point emphasised in the above quote by Al-
Hakem. There will be no immediate transformation of Libyan Graduate students and nor will 
those who have missed out during the period of the ban on language learning catch up easily. 
Libya‟s state strategy is utilitarian in that it will necessarily mean seeking to improve ELA 
amongst the now young majority in the country; the older generations who have missed out 
on ELA will not be a priority and will increasingly have to finance their own studies if they 
are to catch up on what they have lost.  It is future Libyan graduates who are being prepared 
for taking up opportunities in the MWOS rather than those who have already graduated.  
 
6.3 The Libyan State and Human Capital 
As is clear, the Libyan state has identified education as the key mechanism for its plans for 
development and integration in the global economy of the MOWS. In order to support this 
point, the Wilton Park Conference‟s report (WPC‟s report 2007: 01) declared that in Libya 
today: “Education and training are a priority in shifting the country from a culture of 
consumption to one of production”. Significantly it reflects the history of the Libyan state and 
the way in which it has sought to govern in patrimonial-clientelist manner by expanding to 
provide jobs for Libyan graduates as a means of both controlling social change and of 
fulfilling the guarantees of the revolution which were to bring about a decent life for all 
Libyans (Ahmida, 2005; and Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). It is this strategy that is in the 
process of being abandoned in favour of a more orthodox model of development that 
establishes a public-private partnership (PPP) that is a familiar form of state capitalism to be 
found throughout the MOWS. In effect it means that the role of the state becomes an enabling 
one, providing the infrastructure and training for a workforce who will gradually be 
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encouraged to move more towards the private sector (Fine, 2001; Fine, Lapavitsas and 
Pincus, 2001; Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010; and Otman and Karlberg, 2007). At the same time 
and as we have seen in many other countries, it means the socialization of risk for private 
firms with the state acting as the guarantor of profit for private companies through the 
shifting of tax revenues into public subsidies (Waeyenberge, Fine and Bayliss, 2011). This 
can, of course, take very different forms depending upon the type of state involved and its 
location in the MOWS but given the post-revolutionary state-society relations in Libya it is 
hard to imagine the state surrendering more of its power than necessary to the private sector 
without it generating schisms amongst the ruling elites. Nonetheless the Libyan government 
has made significant moves in this direction by privatising a swathe of institutions as a means 
of imposing market discipline on Libyan society, a norm expected of responsible 
governments in the MOWS. For example, the country introduced the „al tamleek‟ program to 
broaden the ownership base of firms by encouraging Libyans to own the public firms with the 
aim of breaking down state ownership (Porter, 2007; George and Miles, 2010; Alfourjani 
2005, cited in Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). Thus, according to Alafi and de Bruijn, (2010:09) 
The private sector‟s programs are developing now and of the „al tamleek‟ program they 
stated: “Initially, the program targeted 360 public firms included 204 industrial firms, 56 
agricultural firms, 82 livestock firms, and 18 marine firms”. They added that: 
 
“Another 80 public industrial firms were privatised by using four different privatisation 
methods. 31 industrial public firms were privatised through management and employee 
buyout. 37 industrial public firms were privatised by using special bidding. 10 
industrial public firms were privatised through direct discussions with investment 
holding organisations. Two industrial public firms were privatised through partnership 
between the employees, domestic investment holding organisations, and the public” 
(Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010:11-12). 
 
Further, the state‟s strategy towards ELA as human capital has been to establish a number of 
training centers throughout the country. The aim of these centers is to professionalize 
language training and bring it in line with internationally recognized standards. In scope it is 
the most ambitious educational program undertaken by the Libyan state in 30 years. The 
main courses these centers concentrate on are the IT and ELA and they are as follows: 
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 International Center for Information Technology-Tripoli 
 New Horizons Libya Training-Tripoli 
 ALTC Language and Training Libya 
 British Libyan Centre for Education and Training Services-Tripoli 
 Al-Resala Company for Education And Training Company 
 Al-Masa Center for Training and Development 
 Al-Nahada Al-Hathita Center for Training And Development 
 Libya for Tomorrow HRD Center-Tripoli  
 Libyan Training Centre-Tripoli 
 American Libyan Education Training Centre-Tripoli 
 Al-Qimma for IT Services-Tripoli 
 Advanced Technology Training Tripoli 
 An Advanced Training Foundation for High Professional and Vocational Training in 
the Various Fields-Alzawia 
 Speah Training Company-Sapaha 
 Mustakbal English Language Teaching Center MELTC-Tripoli 
 
Today, the ICT training programs have become essential for companies and institutions in 
both sectors, easing access to knowledge and scientific information. But, while the internet 
facilities are available for all citizens in Libya, it has been controlled by the government in 
the same way as the postal communications across the country (Martinez, 2007; NESR, 
2006).  Such a situation has created a low level of information communication technology 
(ICT) networks, and thus far has restricted both vital communications and internet usage (see 
Fig-5.8). This is a familiar problem for authoritarian governments in the MOWS who want to 
liberalise the economy but are fearful of also liberalising society. In China, Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia, for example, the state has regularly sought to censor and control the internet or to arrest 
and torture civilians found guilty of accessing forbidden sites. In the short term such measures 
can no doubt be effective but in the long term a state must create the conditions for its own 
legitimacy amongst the population or else rule by power alone, an unstable form of governance. 
This is, of course, a problem for all governments in the MOWS, be they democratic or not.  
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Fig 6.8: Telephone and Internet Usage, 2004
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More specifically, according to the NESR in 2005, ICT in Libya is significantly behind in 
international comparisons (110
th
 of 111 countries). The report says: “Libya‘s fixed line 
telephone and Internet penetration rates were the second lowest in North Africa in 2003, 
while cellular telephone penetration is growing rapidly but still trails Morocco and Tunisia” 
(NESR, 2005:06). In addition, the absence of the strong ICT networks and power supplies 
has affected the country‟s urban plans, especially communication between central 
institutions, committees and other organizations/activities. But what made the situation worse 
was the period of the international sanctions that narrowed the supplies of technology and 
expertise to Libya.  Therefore, since 2005, the government has attempted to upgrade its ICT 
and make the training programs available via several strategies. Hamdy‟s report of “Survey of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Education in Africa: Libya Country 
Report” (2007) stated that new strategies regarding ICT development in Libya have been 
introduced since 2005. The main aim of this strategy has been to enable increased access to 
ICT via the provision of computers and the internet in Libya.  The NESR report (2006:53) 
further referred to the ICT structure itself as another challenge facing this industry in Libya 
(see Fig-5.9) since it claimed that: 
 
 
                                                          
78
 This figure was found in 2011 from the National Economic Strategy report (2006) 
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“There is no separation of roles between the policy maker, regulator and operators. In 
the past, the General Authority for Information and Telecommunication (GAIT) has 
been responsible for all policy, regulation and monitoring activities, whilst the holding 
company LPTIT which reports to GAIT controls all ICT operations through its various 
subsidiaries”. 
 
 
Fig 6.9: the Structure of the Libyan ICT Sector
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To this end in 2005 the GAIT has assigned an agreement with Huawei, a Chinese vendor ―to 
roll out 1.25 million new GSM subscriber lines with guarantees of network performance at 
peak capacity. GPTC has also awarded a USD 68MM contract to Ericsson to provide 
infrastructure capable of supporting 3G mobile voice and data services”, though the report 
suggested that the ICT today has its greatest opportunity for improvement where ELA is seen 
as being synonymous with the intensive investment in ICT training and skills. Thus, 
―investment in human resources is the key to achieve the goals and objectives of the national 
ICT strategy (Hamdy, 2007: 07-08). The rise of China as an investor in Libya and Africa is 
an important development in the MOWS and represents the shifting balance of power from 
West to East that has been taking place for the past 30 years. The extent to which China can 
                                                          
79
 National Economic Strategy Report (2006) 
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replace Western investment is unclear but the fact that it is investing in countries of such 
strategic importance as Libya (oil resources) illustrates the way in which the BRIC countries 
are increasingly able to exert power and influence in the MOWS. 
 
However, while Hamdy‟s report agrees with the National Economic Strategy Report that 
Libya is still at an early stage regarding the implementation of the ICT strategies, he suggests 
that the “collaboration of all government entities, the private sector, and the donor 
community is required to achieve the set policies and ensure proper implementation and 
provision of access for all” (Hamdy, 2007: 07). In 2005 (12th December) Libya signed an 
agreement with UNESCO to establish a National Plan for Information and Communication 
Technologies (NITC) that, “will provide all higher education institutions in Libya with 
internet facilities including digital libraries educational sites, and facilities for distance 
learning‖. They added that it will be used for ―promoting the use of English in schools 
nationally, the government will ensure that scientific and technology websites are also 
accessible to Libyan student and researchers” (Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 383). 
Additionally, the UNDP in its Country Programmed outline for Libya (2006-2009) indicates 
that in order to contribute to the efforts of the modernization for greater competitiveness of its 
economy, Libya needs extra support in ICT through the introduction of open source software 
systems. The Country Programmed for Libya also aims to modernize and upgrade its 
capacities via integrating initiatives in the ICT field with the UNDP‟s mandate to advocate 
for the design and implementation of a national ICT strategy. Consequently such programmes 
and supervision and administration agreements between Libyan institutions and international 
agencies like the UNDP and BC regarding skills acquisition are now considered as crucial for 
the development of human capital investment.  
 
 Dr Al-Ejalli
80
 considers this development of the partnership between the General People‟s 
Committee for the Higher Education (GPCHE), UNESCO and the British Council. He stated 
that:  
 
                                                          
80
 The head and director of the Libyan English teaching project in the Libyan universities 
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“The British council team provides teaching assistance through the comprehensive 
teacher training program. In less than three years this intellectual partnership has 
evolved from its initial aim to set up language centre to meeting the needs of 
postgraduate students‖. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the cultural relationship between the BC and the Libyan 
government was only resumed in 2003 when the diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were restored. Accordingly, the BC in Libya has signed several strategic 
agreements regarding ELA courses with many of the Libyan ministers in health, education, 
and the energy sector enrolling their students/employees. However, in criticising the BC 
programs, Phillipson (2008) argued that such courses/programs have contributed to the 
expansion of British power in the MOWS. More specifically, he claimed: 
 
“The British Council was established in 1935 to promote British interests and English, 
partly in response to the success of the fascist governments of Italy and Germany in 
using language teaching and higher education scholarships to promote their national 
interest”. He added: “English is not merely an instrument for communication it is a 
value one identifies with for the social functions the language is seen as serving, its 
utility in the linguistic market” (Phillipson, 2008:04). 
 
Unsurprisingly the Minister of the Education and Scientific Research, Dr Abdul Al-Kabir Al-
Fakhri, disagrees with this view and emphasises the pragmatic view of ELA when he says: 
 
―This rapid pace of change in Libya has required LETUP to be flexible and responsive 
to discover new ways of working and to further develop the positive relationship 
between Libya and the UK. For the British Council the LETUP demonstrates our place 
as a new World-Class leader in the provision of English language teaching and 
training. And for Libya LETUP is the mark and the cornerstone of the ministry and 
university achievements. It is the single most impressive achievement we‘ve had for 
years‖.  
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However, having set out the strategies of the Libyan state to promote ELA as part of a new 
developmental goal that is rooted in embracing ICT and integrating the Libyan economy into 
global economic processes the question remains, what are the implications of this for Libya‟s 
place in the MOWS? To what extent does it open up advantages to Libya that it will be able 
to use and to what extent does it reinforce Libya‟s dependent position in the MOWS both on 
its own oil resources and the relationship with the states and corporations of the core?  
 
6.4 Embracing Neoliberalism: Libyan State Strategies and Human Capital - an 
Orientalist Project? 
As noted a powerful idea in contemporary developmental discourse is the need to invest in 
human capital as a means of making the national economy attractive to capitalist investment 
(Fine et al, 2001). It has taken on the form of a logical and common sense view of the role of 
the government in a global economy as being that of the enabling state that provides the 
infrastructure that makes a national economy attractive to FDI (Wallerstein, 2006). Rather 
than the state intervening in the economy through the running of public industries it is 
encouraged to withdraw in favour of a more efficient private sector, adopting policies of 
privatisation, deregulation and a general liberalisation of its economy. It is this environment 
that the Libyan state and society is now trying to integrate itself with and in order to do so it 
means adopting a range of policies that historically have had little part to play in the post-
revolutionary Libyan state (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010, NESR, 2006). A key policy for the 
Libyan state as it begins to move down this path has been to invest in human capital through 
reformed educational policies, as we have seen.  The educational system has adopted 
competitive strategies that will help to instil the idea that Libya will become a meritocratic 
society where jobs are allocated in terms of ability rather than due to social pressures or the 
state‟s revolutionary desire to guarantee a certain way of life for all Libyans. Culturally this 
represents a profound change in Libyan state-society relations that will no doubt bring 
diverse and often problematic responses. Opening up an economy and society in this way 
cannot easily be controlled by the state as has been shown in other countries, most 
spectacularly the Eastern European communist states during the late 1980s.  
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In this respect even the teaching of English language might produce unintended and 
unanticipated effects in Libyan culture.  My interviews have revealed quite diverse views on 
this amongst Libyan graduates, state officials and the private sector. Further as Tripasai 
(2004:02) said: “the significance of English is closely related to the power of the English 
speaking countries that were former colonisers”. He added regarding Thailand‟s educational 
strategies towards the teaching of English language since the nineteenth century when it was 
occupied by the British Empire till present that, “the more Thailand contacts the outside 
world, the more Western influences come into the country” (Tripasai, 2004:05). Tripasai‟s 
judgment concerning the political effects of the teaching of English language in the Third 
World societies connects with Pennycook‟s perspective (1994 and 1998 cited in Tripasai, 
2004:02) who stated that, ―English is not free of political values. Having originated from 
colonialism, English and English language teaching are involved in the colonial discourse, in 
which the power relations between the master and the colonial subjects”. Similar to 
Phillipson (2008), Pennycook (1994 and 1998) and Fanon (1965), Tripasai explained that 
using English in Thailand has not only increased the importance of English, it also made Thai 
society more subordinate to the West where Western education, culture and capitalism are 
considered by Thai people as a form of progress that they should imitate. Other studies have 
also supported this idea that ELA is best viewed and understood in Orientalist terms 
regarding its impact on indigenous cultures, including Liddle and Rai‟s study (1998:03). Said 
(1978) in Orientalism had already emphasised that “power or the lack thereof, therefore, lies 
at the heart of the Orientalist discourse and allow the stabilization of the consensus that is 
critical to the maintenance of dominance”. The relationship between power and knowledge in 
the Orientalist discourse survives as political and economic language within the developing 
countries themselves, one which they embrace or have forced upon them in the form of 
developmental policies.  This was supported by Liddle and Ray (1998: 20) when they stated 
that, 
 
 “The power of Orientalist imagination can only be sustained by the continuous 
production and reproduction of practices and discourses. This power is both 
underpinned and helps to maintain the structure inequality between the advanced 
nations of the west and developing post-colonial states”.  
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Hence the argument in contemporary development economics that its prescriptions are 
scientific and politically neutral but rather an ideological tool to control and subordinate the 
Third World. This is a point that world-systems writers such as Wallerstein have examined, 
arguing that the scientific credentials of mainstream liberal economics are bogus, resting as 
they do on a flawed methodology and asocial and ahistoric view of how an economy 
functions. Nonetheless these prescriptions serve as an important ideological underpinning and 
justification of inequality in the MOWS (Wallerstein, 2006). They may work as a form of 
power/knowledge in the MOWS but their power stems precisely from the fact that to flout 
these rules means incurring the wrath of the world‟s major IFIs, public and private. The 
dependent nature of relations between the core and the rest of the MOWS is tellingly 
reflected in comments made in interview with me by the director of the Libyan Foreign 
Investments Company Mr. Ramadan Al-Zilitni who stated that, 
 
―We are indeed a crude oil producer, but technically to distribute and refine it, it has 
been through Western and mainly US companies. Thus, it is they who re-supply it in its 
final stage to consumers worldwide, and thus English language comes as the language 
of the final stage of the distribution of industrial goods. For the US it means that they 
can impose themselves and their language when they supply oil to the world. Thus, 
today we should think reasonably, we are the producer of the oil, but also the 
consumer. When it is refined by Western companies, and has added value, then it is sold 
back to us‖ 
 
Mr. Al-Zilitni makes a point long argued by world-systems analysis that development in the 
periphery and semi-periphery is dependent upon developing countries gaining investment 
from and access to the core, its markets and its capital. Thus growth for most in the semi-
periphery outside of the CRIB (China, Russia, India and Brazil) is always contingent and 
subject to the power of the core and the states located there. Even the Harvard educated 
liberal economist Professor Michael Porter who has been employed by the Libyan 
Government to help it devise its economic strategy concedes that it has a highly dependent 
economy (Porter, 2007). 
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As a country in the semi-periphery of the world-system Libya has certain strategic 
advantages, but these are largely derived from its hydrocarbon industries. This is a pattern 
found in many other countries in the semi-periphery such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Tunisia. Access to a vital commodity allows a state in the semi-periphery more space to make 
strategic-relational decisions about investment and social change than faces those states 
without such a relationship with the core. Nonetheless these advantages can and often are 
easily squandered through corruption, incompetence, military rule and unaccountable 
decision-making by the state, as the situation of Algeria illustrates starkly. Libya‟s 
revolutionary government has been quite different to other regimes in the MENA, combining 
its own brand of authoritarian populism with resistance to the MOWS.  This has not stopped 
it failing to make the strategic-relational decisions it needs to about investment and social 
change in Libyan economy and society. Hence the sudden embrace of neo-liberal policies as 
a quick fix alternative. An unanswerable question for the Libyan government, more 
egalitarian and sensitive to social needs than many of its neighbours, is the extent to which in 
embracing the Orientalist developmental policy discourse of which human capital is a 
significant part it risks creating social inequality and undermining its social goals in favour of 
profit for private companies and global capitalist investors. In a sense it appears to have little 
choice but to adopt these policies and the English language that comes with them in that they 
are now global policies, as Otman and Karlberg (2007) notes: 
 
―Government across the world, from Chile to China, from Malta to Malaysia, have in 
the last few years embarked on ambitious educational reforms which will integrate 
English more deeply into the curriculum. English will cease to be a foreign language 
for many. Perhaps most of the world‘s citizens as it become repositioned as a ―basic 
skill‖, to be learned by primary school children alongside other 21st century skills in 
information technology (Literacy Trust, 2005)‖.   
 The next section will investigate the role of the private sector and its strategies for language 
acquisition, examining its relationship to the state. This section will discuss the following 
questions: How has the private sector been encouraged to promote ELA in Libya? How is 
this viewed by private firms? What is the relationship between the Libyan state and the 
private sector? What does the private sector tell us about human capital in Libya? In so doing 
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this section will consider the significance of this newly formed public-private partnership as a 
model for Libya‟s new developmental strategy. 
 
6.5 What has been the role of the Private Sector in English Language learning in 
the in Libya? 
The year of 2003-04 was the turning point for Libya as started towards privatising its public 
sector and liberalising its economy and obtaining membership with the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). According to George and Miles (2010), 
Gaddafi in 2003 had: 
 
 “Called for the first time for the privatization of the oil industry and other sectors 
making another sign of openness to the outside world including international 
companies, Since then, privatization has progressed slowly and the Libyan government 
has continued to promote entrepreneurship, make credit loans from local banks more 
widely available and encourage foreign companies to provide capital know-how and 
training to local enterprises‖. 
 
Gaddafi‟s statement is reflected in policy-makers recent decisions in Libya to reform the 
country economy in accord with neo-liberal principles by beginning to do such things as 
removing currency controls and improving taxation laws. In interview the previous 
administrator of the Labour Manpower Institution in Libya, Abodu-al Baset, told me that 
laws had been introduced with the aim of helping national capital investments and to attract 
more foreign investments. For example, the Law No. 6 of 2007 which Mr Abodu-al Baset 
was describing that it includes: 
 
 
“Tax and customs benefits and exemptions are aimed at transferring technology and 
expertise to Libya. Foreign investors were allowed to purchase lands, foreign labourers 
were employed and profits were transferred abroad along with several other privileges. 
Libya also issued a law that allows foreign banks to open branches in the country”. 
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Mr Abodu-al Baset states that there has now been the privatisation of more than 360 
enterprises operating in the manufacturing, agricultural and oil industries. The Libyan 
government also issued a decree in 2006 (Resolution No. 134 of 2006) to open the 
headquarters of the Libyan money market and establish a Libyan stock market.  Mr Abodu-al 
Baset added:  
 
“Economic reforms, which were initiated by liberal economist Shokri Ghanem, former 
secretary of the Libyan People‘s Committee (Prime Minister), continue with the aim of 
integrating Libya in the global economy and joining the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Al-Boghdadi Al-Mahmoudi, the current secretary of the People‘s Committee, 
continues to implement these reforms which have yielded improvements in Libyan 
economic performance. Economic indicators are positive and the Libyan economy has 
witnessed growth of about 7% per annum. An economic boom over the coming years is 
expected due to the increase in global oil prices which will realise a surplus in the state 
budget”. 
 
These proposed reforms have come about through international negotiation with the EU and 
the USA and have seen attempts by both to develop improved trade links with Libya. Indeed, 
to this end both the EU and the USA have undertaken extensive diplomatic campaigns to 
transform the image of Libya in the eyes of their own business communities so that they can 
take advantage of a hitherto under exploited region and market. (Martinez, 2007; Porter, 
2007; George and Niles, 2010) To this end the state has already begun to reorganise its 
relationship with society by moving towards the privatisation of state schools. For example, 
at present 140 of the state‟s primary and high schools have become private schools under the 
name of The Participatory Education Institutions
81
. Most of these schools are adopting 
English language teaching as one of their main strategies. Dr Al-Zenati
82
 has stated that the 
number of private schools will be increased until it reaches 396 schools in 2011 and 750 
                                                          
81 The Participatory Education Institutions is the name of the Libyan schools that have transformed from state‟s schools into 
private schools.  
82 Dr Najy Al-Zenati the director of the National Committee of the Domestic Education in Libya was interviewed in 
09/08/2010 
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schools in 2012
83
.  According to the GPC Resolution No (504) of 2009 regarding the 
Participatory Education Institutions (PEI) Dr Al-Zenati added that: 
 
“This strategy of the Participatory Education Institutions has been implemented since 
2009 and the privatization of education in Libya was announced and planned in 2003-
4, in line with Libya‘s recent political and economic strategies to privatize the public 
sector including education, health and social services‖. 
 
This is in order to transform the relationship between the state and the private sector in the 
country. In short, it is an example of the new developmental strategy of public-private 
partnerships that has been adopted by the Libyan state. It also reflects the way in which very 
quickly class divisions in Libya will be intensified as the wealthier groups in society will seek 
to monopolise the private education sector.  In so doing it is hoped that it will improve the 
quality of education offered to students, but there is clearly a limit to how far they can 
innovate. As mentioned earlier, a fundamental issue for the Libyan State is how far it can 
allow the public-private partnership to extend in terms of giving autonomy to the private 
sector without potentially undermining its own power and authority. Libya has already 
implemented its strategy of privatising the public sector including the education sector ahead 
of a possible membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) but as it stands the PEIs 
are not allowed to create their own curriculum, syllabus or study plans that are not also 
approved by the General People‟s Committee for Education & Scientific Research (Otman 
and Karlberg , 2007; Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). Also they are not allowed to amend existing 
curriculums or study subjects except through (GPCE) permission. The GPCE, however, in 
terms of scientific and educational necessities such as books, labs, technological equipment 
and facilities exempts these private institutions (the Participatory Education Institutions) from 
taxes. Consequently, the privatization of the education strategy in Libya is yet to be fully free 
in terms of curriculum, syllabus and study plans but in other ways it is being given significant 
economic advantages.  
                                                          
83  These statistics was given by Dr Najy Al-Zenati the director of the National Committee of the Domestic Education in an 
interview in Libya in 09/08/2010.  
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6.5.1 Libya‟s Emerging Private Sector and Shadow Economy: Education for 
the masses? Part-1 
Since 2004-5, the Libyan government has changed its governmental strategies to promote its 
integration in the global economy of the MOWS. In order to do this it has begun to adopt 
orthodox neo-liberal policies of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of the economy 
and society.  Since 2002 the state has reduced its import controls enabling the private sector 
to freely import or export goods that were previously under the state‟s monopoly (NESR, 
2006). This has opened the door for more competition from private companies and several 
types of businesses including education and training centres, and thus more investment 
agreements/contracts with international companies (George and Miles, 2010; Porter, 2007). 
In an example of that Alafi and de Bruijn (2010:12) stated that:  
 
 
“Numerous investment agreements with a number of countries have been signed so that 
it will encourage foreign direct investment and harmonise taxes. Infrastructure is also 
being modernised and free trade zones are planned. Certification requirements for 
trade with Maghreb countries have also been simplified―.  
 
 
Otman and Karlberg (2007: 383) add that, 
 
 
“On 12 December 2005 Libya and UNESCO signed an agreement that set up a 
national plan for information and communication Technologies (ICT) that will provide 
all higher education institutions in Libya with internet facilities including digital 
libraries, educational sites, and facilities for distance learning. By promoting the use of 
English in schools nationally, the government will ensure that scientific and technology 
websites are also accessible to Libyan students and researchers”.   
 
 
Thus, the new resolution of the GPCE & Scientific Research No (504) of 2009 regarding the 
Participatory Education Institutions came as a result of such agreements and contracts that 
illustrate the government‟s commitment to its newly espoused neo-liberal ideas. But some of 
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these private schools and training centres for English language still await licensing as they are 
said to lack the necessary quality. Critics will argue that it is more a reflection of the Libyan 
bureaucracy trying to hold up the privatisation programme for fear that it will undermine the 
old order and diminish its own power (Ahmida, 2005). Nonneman points out the instability of 
rentier states like Libya and the threat that liberalisation posed to them was recognised as 
long ago as the 1960s (Nonneman, 2001: 145). However, given the emphasis on the learning 
of English language in Libya and the relative slowness of the state to respond to this it is not 
surprising that a shadow economy has emerged where private lessons are offered informally 
and without state approval and therefore technically illegal. In evidence of this, Dr Abudal-
Latif
84
 the director of the private higher education in Libya concerning some of the private 
local and foreign education centres/firms assured that:  
 
“Today wherever one goes you will find different posters and advertisement for the 
teaching of English language by private schools, institutes and training centres, but 
most of them are not approved by the GPCE unfortunately. Therefore, we do not 
monitor these private institutions in terms of their quality”.    
 
He further explained that not only are many private schools, institutes and training centres 
waiting approval but so are a number of private foreign education institutions who are 
proposing to teach entirely in English such as the African International School in Tripoli. 
Arabic is not allowed to be used at these institutions except for serious matters that are related 
to the Libyan religion and culture. Most of these institutions are new to working in Tripoli 
and only 4 of them (see table-5.5.1.1) are approved by the GPCE.  
 
Table: 6.1:- The Approved Foreign Private Education Institutions in Libya 
 
S. 
N. 
Name of Institution Observations No. of 
Students 
No-of -Kindergarten 
Children  
1 International Co. for 
Education 
As per Law of 
Investment 
555 162 
                                                          
84 An interview was made in 10/08/2010 with Dr Abudal-Latif Kushlaf the director of the Private higher education in Libya. 
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2 Dunya Al-Ebdaa' Co. Under procedure (As 
per Law of Investment) 
175 /// 
3 Al-Fawz Partnership Free Education licence 116 135 
4 Aggression Martyrs  Without data /// /// 
 
This slowness to issue licenses is a problem found throughout the periphery and semi-
periphery of the MOWS. For example, Nunan (2003:595) notes of the shadow economy in 
China: 
 
 “The teaching of English is emerging as a private business outside regular schools and 
universities, particularly in big cities such as, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing”. He 
added that “one publishing industry informant told me that her company estimated that 
there were 600,000 new enrolments in private-conversation schools every four to six 
months” (Nunan, 2003:595).  
 
To integrate into the MOWS requires adhering to norms and rules established by the states in 
that core zone. It is these states, primarily under US hegemony, that have had the power to 
construct the rules of trade and the international organisations that oversee it, such as the 
WTO. Unsurprisingly these rules and institutions tend to reflect the interests of the core states 
and produce a consensus around neo-liberal policies that suits the interests of capitalist firms 
and investors from the core. The norms and values underpinning these policies are presented 
as being scientific, neutral and universal in their validity for all countries in the MOWS. 
Echoing Fanon and Said, Wallerstein, Frank and Arrighi have all commented upon the 
Orientalist assumptions at the heart of these knowledge claims, assumptions that have their 
roots into the tradition of political economy itself, shaped by figures such as Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes and Karl Marx (Kanth, 1999; 
Phillipson, 2008; and Ahmida, 2005). Human capital is an idea embedded in this 
power/knowledge framework that is part of the legacy of political economy. As Ahmida 
notes, it constructs a story that views development as taking place in stages through which 
each society must go in search of modernity. Until now Libya has resisted this trend but the 
recent embrace of new vision reforms has been to move towards acceptance of these 
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powerful ideas as now being valid for Libyan development. Nonetheless, as Ahmida says, at 
their heart they are Eurocentric and Orientalist in their assumptions and the policy 
prescriptions that they encourage, be they the development of „human capital‟ or the need to 
acquire English language skills (Ahmida, 2005). These are exercises in power/knowledge that 
reflect prevailing power structures that have brought the MOWS into being and in which 
Libya has played only a subordinate part. Thus to this end Libya is embracing the same 
pressures and norms as China, for example, who have pursued a highly successful strategy of 
engagement with the core of the MOWS. Libya has the ambition, like China, of joining the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and currently holds accession status. This is something 
that has encouraged the private sector to invest in China (Nunan, 2003, and winters and 
Yusuf (2007). More to the point Nunan said (2003) on the topic of China‟s recent educational 
strategy towards ELA that:  
 
“In 2001 English in China was introduced as a compulsory subject in grade 3 in all 
elementary schools that have suitably qualified teachers. This represents a lowering of 
the age of compulsory instruction from 11 to 9. In primary schools there are generally 
two or three 40 minute lessons a week. In secondary school there are five to six 45 
minute lessons. According to the informants the impact of English as a global language 
has been considerable”. 
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Figure 6.10: Nunan‟s Table of his Summary of Findings of the Study about the Impact 
of English as a Global Language on Educational Policies and Practices in Asia-Pacific 
Region  
 
 
6.5.2 Libya‟s Emerging Private Sector and Shadow Economy: Education for 
the masses? Part-2 
The new private higher education institutes have obtained their initial authority from the 
GPCE and they are required to be monitored s by the general institutes at the GPCE for their 
performance and results.  As a result, Libyan families and students (mostly from the middle 
classes and the elites) have been encouraged to use the private education schools/institutions 
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where high quality educational facilities are better resourced while the state‟s universities by 
comparison lag behind (Otman and Karlberg , 2007).  
Table: 6.2: The List of the Approved participatory Higher Education Institutes in Libya 
Obtaining Initial Exercise Permission From the Supreme Committee for Participatory Training 
and General Institutes Commissioned to Supervise Them and Approve Their Results 
S.
N 
Institute Area Specialization Supervising 
Institute 
Area 
1 Yawm Al-Wafa' Tripoli Computer Electronic 
Professions 
 
Tripoli 2 Al-Farouk Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration 
3 Ayat Al-Akhras Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration 
Al-Mihan Ashamila 
2
nd
 March 
 
 
Tripoli 
 
 
4 Ain Shams Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration 
5 2
nd
 March for 
Computer 
Tripoli Computer 
6 Al-Khadra Tripoli Computer Medical Professions  
Tripoli 7 Tripoli Medical 
professions 
Tripoli Labs. 
8 Al-Isra' Tripoli Computer Preparing Trainers Tripoli 
9 Rusol Al-Hadara Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration/Accountancy 
Al-Mihan Ashamila – 
Ashomokh 
 
Tripoli 
10 Al-Dia' Tripoli Computer 
11 Al-Afaq Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration/Accountancy 
Financial & Admin. 
Professions 
Tripoli 
12 Minbar Al-Ma'rifa Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration 
Mechanic Professions  
Tripoli 
13 Zahrat Al-Andalus Tripoli Computer 
14 Moh. Jamal Al-
Durrah 
Tripoli Computer Industrial 
Technologies 
Tripoli 
15 Al-Masar Tripoli Computer/Business 
Administration/Accountancy 
Admin./Financial Tripoli 
16 Ibn Manzour Surman Computer/Business 
Administration/Accountancy 
Al-Mihan Ashamila Surman 
17 Al-Mustaneer Annikat Computer Mechanic Professions Nikat 
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Al-
Khams 
Khams 
18 Al-Ikhlas Nalut Computer/Business 
Administration 
Al-Mihan Ashamila Al-
Hiraba 
19 Computer 
Technologies 
Al-
Mirqib 
Computer/Business 
Administration/Accountancy 
Al-Mihan Ashamila  
Tarhona 
20 Administrative 
Financial 
Tarhona Business Administration 
/Accountancy 
21 Al-Motafawiq Sirte Computer Al-Mihan Ashamila Sirte 
22 Al-Bayann Ajdabia Computer/Business 
Administration 
Al-Mihan Ashamila Ajdabia 
23 Al-Bayyena Benghazi Computer  
Computer 
Technologies 
 
Benghazi 24 The Higher & 
Medium 
Benghazi Computer 
25 10
th
 March Benghazi Computer 
26 Ain Shams Benghazi Computer/Business 
Administration 
 
 
Preparing Trainers 
 
Benghazi 
27 Saqar Benghazi Computer/Financial 
Management 
28 Al-Murshid Benghazi Computer/Financial 
Management 
29 Al-Ali for 
Technology & 
Modern Admin. 
Sciences 
 
Benghazi 
 
Financial Management 
 
Al-Mihan Ashamila 
 
Benghazi 
30 Al-Kitab Al-
Butnan 
Computer/Business 
Administration / 
countancy/Civil 
Financial & Admin. 
Professions 
Butnan 
 
Table: 6.3: The Names of the Approved Universities Belonging to Private Sector in Libya and 
Allowed to Teach English Language and  the No of Students studying there (Fall 2009/2010)
85  
S.N University Department No. of Students 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Administration  
434 
Accountancy 107 
                                                          
85
 Total of Students at the academic semester Fall 2009/2010 (2924) Student 
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1 Arrifaq 
(Tripoli) 
Law 181 
Computer 189 
Architecture Eng.  163 
 All Approved 
Departments  
1074 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
United Africa 
(Zawia) 
Law 459 
English Language 190 
History 19 
Business 
Administration 
250 
Arabic Language 53 
All Approved 
Departments 
971 
 
 
3 
 
 
Africa 
(Benghazi) 
Law 192 
English Language 66 
Business 
Administration 
102 
All Approved 
Departments 
360 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
Allibiya Al-Dawlia for Medical 
Sciences (Benghazi) 
Basic Medical 
Sciences 
16 
Medicine 257 
Oral surgery 
medicine  
173 
Pharmacy 53 
Medical Technology None 
Nursing None 
All Approved 
Departments 
499 
 
Free education in Libya through the state or the private sector is compulsory till the end of 
the grade 9 where the high school and tertiary education are not obligatory for students, yet it 
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is strongly promoted by the government. Fees for the private education sector for the primary 
and secondary stages at the PEIs are shared between the families and the state, while at the 
private higher education institutions the situation is quite different. For example, although the 
Higher Education Studies Academy in Tripoli is a semi-private higher education institution 
students have to pay fees in order to complete their postgraduate studies and to enjoy this 
academy‟s facilities. The ideal of free education in Libya as a means to promote social 
equality, an old ideal of the revolution, is now effectively abandoned.   
 
6.5.3 Private Sector view on Libya‟s „New Vision‟ Strategy 
Reorganising the relationship between the private sector and the public sector in Libya was 
one of the main new vision governmental strategies adopted in the period 2003-4 (Porter, 
2007; Martinez, 2007; George and Miles, 2010, Vandewalle, 2008). This recent strategy 
towards the private sector in Libya has encouraged new and different projects, companies, 
firms and private education institutions to be established in the country. For the emerging 
private sector a number of structural problems have to be dealt with urgently if they are to 
build their confidence in the new Libyan economy. As Simon and Teal (1998:17) have 
indicated most of the developing countries of Africa are working hard to develop their human 
resources and invest in their human capital by sending their graduates to study in Europe and 
America. Yet, unfortunately the expected benefits of those graduates are mostly not for the 
benefit of the sending states, but for the benefit of receiving states. Because the developed 
countries offer them higher salaries and a good standard of working environment which could 
turn them into skilled labour for the benefit of the developed countries. Simon and Teal have 
quoted Jaycox‟s observation when he stated that “There has been an amazing brain drain 
from Africa. The rest of the world has benefited from this, but it has not been to the benefit of 
Africa” (Jaycox, 1993:73 cited in Simon and Teal, 1998:17). They added that:  
 
 “It has been estimated that about 100,000 foreign experts work in Africa, whilst some 
100,000 skilled African work in Europe and North America. These skilled Africans are 
typically doctors, research scientists and university teachers. Such an exchange of 
labour has positive aspects, but in general the emigration of many of highly educated 
from is of concern given the scarcity of such people in the continent. Although 
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government pay for most of the cost of higher education, the emigration of graduates 
means that their countries do not benefit from these investments. Often these graduates 
are replaced by hiring in expatriates at great cost (typically, higher wages are 
necessary induce people to work in foreign countries)” (Williams, 1994 cited in Simon 
and Teal, 1998:17). 
Thus far the private sector are at best sceptical about the extent to which the Libyan 
government can embrace its reform programme without undergoing profound social and 
political changes, which in themselves might present problems for the governing classes. 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter‟s has examined the Libyan government‟s new vision strategies for modernising 
the Libyan state, economy and society in order to ease its integration in the MOWS. What is 
has shown is the problematic nature of these developments for the Libyan government and 
the obstacles that stand in the way of Libya embracing neo-liberal policies. Despite the fact 
that the Libyan state has immense power over society it lacks the infrastructure of a classic 
modern bureaucratic state and therefore it is having to do two things at the same time: build 
such a state which is bound by coherent rules and regulations rather than by patrimonial-
clientelism relations, and make the transition to a neo-liberal economy in accord with the 
demands of the MOWS. The structural obstacles to this are rooted in the culture and ideology 
of the Libyan revolution and its material practices since the revolution occurred as well as the 
powerful tribal culture that still dominates large sections of Libyan society. Thus it is proving 
very difficult to transform Libya quickly and easily as it lacks the state infrastructure needed 
to undertake such a task in a way that enables the state to retain its legitimacy. The big 
question here is with regard to the consequences for Libyan state, economy and society of 
these policies. As the private sector grows and frees itself from state control it is not just 
providing an alternate source of economic development but also of political power. To what 
extent can the authoritarian-populist Libyan revolutionary state co-exist with alternate sites of 
power in Libya? And yet if it wants to attract FDI these moves towards privatisation of the 
economy would appear to be essential, presenting the government with a major political 
dilemma. Underneath this is the as yet unanswered question, will these policies, the 
development of ELA as central to Libya‟s human capital and the integration into the global 
economy of the MOWS, aid Libyan development? The next chapter will offer an answer to 
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this by comparing Libya‟s position with those of other states it he MOWS who have already 
gone down this path. 
 
In the context of world-systems analysis Libya‟s position is a classic example of the 
incorporation of the periphery by the core. Having used its vast oil resources to resist this 
process since the revolution the structural dynamics of the MOWS (economic, political-
military and cultural) have created an environment in which the radicalism of the Libyan 
governments ideology of 1969 looks increasingly reactionary by the C21. Espousing national 
independence (cultural and political) seems out of touch with the globalising tendencies that 
have emerged since the end of communism. When even vast countries and economies such as 
China and India are compelled to embrace neo-liberal capitalism then it is hardly surprising 
that a small country in the periphery such as Libya is eventually driven to do the same. But 
the policies adopted by the Libyan government represent a compromise between neo-
liberalism and the need to retain a strong state, top protect the regime itself as much as the 
population subjected to free markets and their social consequences. Whilst India and China 
have the political-military, economic and cultural power to take a strong directing role in the 
integration of their economies in the MOWS, the comparative weakness of the Libyan 
regime, stripped of its Third Worldist rhetoric and alliances, is apparent. 
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  Chapter 7: Evaluating the Evidence: Libya, ELA and the Global Economy 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a comparison between Libya and its new vision policies and what has 
been achieved by other countries that have pursued ELA as a developmental strategy in the 
MOWS. Given Libya‟s commitment to integrating itself into the global economy is there 
evidence to support the view that investing in its human capital will make a significant 
difference to Libya‟s ability to attract foreign capital? More to the point, will it help to reduce 
Libya‟s unemployment rate which currently stands at around 25-30 % (Alafi and de Bruijn, 
2010; NESR, 2006) In order to assess the utility of these policies I will draw upon data 
published by the major financial and developmental institutions: the World Bank (WB), the 
United Nation Human Development Reports (UNHDR), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Nation Economic Strategy Report (NESR). Are 
language skills a key factor in attracting investment? Are they more important than other 
factors such as the kind of raw materials a country possesses, location, size of domestic 
market, and size of population and so on? What has happened in Libya so far since the new 
vision programme was introduced? In answering these questions it also offers a way of 
addressing the problems raised by Fanon, Said and world-systems writers such as Amin, 
Frank and Wallerstein: to what extent do these policies merely serve to reinforce Libya‟s 
economic and cultural dependency on the core? To what extent can Libya progress within the 
MOWS? In order to answer these questions I will consider the experiences of India, Malaysia 
and Tunisia with regard to the role of ELA in their social and economic development. 
 
World-systems analysis is often compared with and seen as being in opposition to 
comparative models of sociology or political science, the latter construct models of the 
international that take nation-states as the building bloc of the international system. By 
contrast WSA works on the basis of the system as a whole (see chapter 2) and therefore 
comparisons are made both between nation-states as fixed entities but are more complex. 
Nation-states are units of a world-system shaped by a range of processes (economic, political-
military, cultural, social) that at any given time divide the system into zones (core, periphery 
and semi-periphery). To abstract nation-states from the system is to both reify them and 
present a form of methodological nationalism (see chapter two) that treats nations and states 
as fixed entities rather than tracing their long-term historical and structural evolution within 
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the world-system. Thus the purpose of comparison in this chapter is not to treat Libya, 
Malaysia, China and India, for example, as discrete nation-states establishing inter-state 
relations, rather it is to situate their emergence and development in relation to their spatio-
temporal relation to the MOWS. When were the incorporated into the MOWS? Under what 
circumstances? What are their relative strengths and weaknesses in relation to the power of 
the states in the core of the MOWS? These are the key questions for WSA. And what is clear 
is that in comparison to most other Third World countries that have been incorporated into 
the MOWS Libya‟s full incorporation have come very late and much to its disadvantage. 
Libya lacks the resources (ironically), population density, military and economic power to 
exercise much leverage in the shaping of the MOWS. The emphasis on policies of human 
capital and in particular ELA is perfectly understandable under these circumstances and 
reflects the Libyan stats relative weakness and lack of options. What this chapter shows is 
that these policies are unlikely to generate the kind of modernising changes that the Libyan 
government desires. Overturning long-term structural problems of economy and society have 
proven to be intractable problems for many rentier states that have been integrated fully into 
the MOWS much earlier than Libya.  
 
7.2 Globalisation and English Language Acquisition 
In 2009 Dr Habiba
86
 the spokeswoman for the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in 
Libya told me that: “Libya currently is in dire need of English language skills as it is the 
language of development whether people (the policy-makers) agree or disagree”. Her claim 
was that there were many examples around the world that illustrated the importance of 
English language for development. She added:   
 
 “Pakistan and India are rapidly developing in science, especially in technological 
science. Their development processes success is due to their excellent human resources 
and their knowledge in English language. Beside other factors, English language is the 
key factor for development wherever we are”. 
                                                          
86
 The spokeswoman of the United Nation Information Centre-Libya was interviewed in 2009. 
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This view is not a universally held though. There are important questions about the extent to 
which English is an „added value‟ for development in terms of materials and economic 
resources, in other words, of educational value. According to Canagarajah (2003) the 
teaching of English language has become a controversial activity worldwide. Phillipson 
(2001) suggested that the spread of English in those countries and many countries of the 
MOWS today represents both the strong socio-economic desire of those former colonies to 
integrate themselves with the MOWS, and the indirect expansion that serves the territorial, 
political and cultural interests of the Core nations over the rest. For Phillipson this “means a 
western-dominated globalisation agenda set by the transnational corporations and the IMF, 
and the US military intervening, with or without a mandate from the United Nations, 
whenever ‗vital interests‘ are at risk” (Phillipson, 2001:192). However, apart from the fact of 
the political-economic interests of the Western nations via the spread of English languages in 
its „spheres of influence‟, Coleman (2004:17) claimed: 
 
 “Even in France, where foreign policy for so long fought to maintain French as an 
alternative lingua franca before adopting a protective multilingualist stance, there is 
now acceptance of the need for more English-medium university courses, and even 
acceptance of English as lingua franca” 
 
Coleman suggests that the reason behind the dominance of the English language today is due 
to it being inseparable from globalization (Hüppauf 2004 cited in Coleman, 2004:02). This 
drive towards the acquisition of English is reflected in the OECD‟s report on globalisation 
which says that OECD (2006:13):  
 
“National borders no longer matter as much as they used to. Signs of globalisation can 
be seen everywhere from the rapid worldwide spread of technology to the increasing 
tendency of students and academics to go overseas to study and work”.  
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In effect, it is not only the former colonies such as India which are using English for their 
economic development; it is a trend throughout the MOWS and a structural development 
within it. For example, countries from Asia such as China, Japan, and Taiwan, and countries 
that represent a part of Europe such as the Ukraine, are highly concerned to develop ELA 
(Nunan, 2003 and Tarnopolsky, 2000). Similar to Libya, the Ukrainian government now puts 
the ELA as a key factor for achieving its goal of integration into the MOWS. This is in part a 
response to the impact of the current global economic crisis on the Ukrainian economy. 
Tarnopolsky (2000:616) corroborated this:  
 
―The Ukrainian authorities set the integration of the country into the world community 
and international economy as one of their primary tasks in protecting and developing 
an independent Ukraine. Such goal is impossible without many people who have a good 
mastery of foreign languages (FLs), especially English”. 
 
Skills development programs have become the major aspect for national growth and global 
economic integration for countries worldwide where IT and English language skills come as 
the most important factors. How, then, have other countries in the MOWS fared in pursuing 
ELA as a factor of development and what are the implications of this for Libya‟s new vision 
strategies? 
7.2.1 India: ELA as a Means of Promoting Development 
In terms of history, the English language was certainly not used as a foreign language for 
development in India. The reasons for that lay in its experience with British colonialism 
where English was the language of the government and recognised as a symbol of political 
power. According to Hohenthal (2003) English remains the official language in India with 
equal status in practice to Hindi. Regarding the Hindi language Hohenthal tried to explain the 
problems that made it quite untenable in the country since he said that: 
 
 ―There were, however, several problems with selecting Hindi, and since the protests 
were often violent (e.g. the riots in Tamil Nadu in May 1963, protesting against the 
imposition of Hindi), the government wanted to adapt a policy which would help to 
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maintain the status quo. Firstly, Hindi is not evenly distributed throughout the country; 
e.g. in Tamil Nadu, in the south, only 0.0002 per cent of the people claimed knowledge 
of Hindi or Urdu, whereas in the northern states this figure can rise up to 96.7 per cent. 
Secondly, it was thought that the speakers of other languages would be offended by its 
selection; other Indian languages, for example Tamil and Bengali, had as much right to 
be national languages as Hindi. The other Indian communities felt they would be 
professionally, politically and socially disadvantaged were Hindi given the central role. 
Thirdly, Hindi was thought to need vocabulary development before it could be used 
efficiently as a language of government. In spite of these problems, Hindi was chosen 
as the national language in the constitution, and English was to be replaced by Hindi in 
fifteen years' time. However, due to the continuous opposition in the south, this 
replacement was not politically possible. In 1967 a law was passed which allowed the 
use of both Hindi and English for all official purposes - and that situation still exists‖ 
(Fasold 1984: 24 cited in Hohenthal, 2003, chapter3).  
 
Although many political and nationalistic pressures support Hindi as the national language, it 
is English, in practice that enables different groups In India to communicate and coordinate 
their activities (Hill, 1969; and Alan and Shahid, 2007). Unlike Libya, India was directly 
integrated into the MOWS by British colonialism which had a profound effect on its 
development since the C16 and rendering it subordinate to the interests of the British Empire 
for that period. Strong cultural, political and economic links were established, primarily to 
Britain‟s advantage but which now have been used by India‟s burgeoning economic elites for 
their own interests. As one of the BRIC countries of the semi-periphery India has several 
distinct strategic advantages as it assumes a more prominent role in the MOWS, advantages 
that are found in the other BRIC countries: A large population, vast capital and human 
resources, vast natural resources, a strong military and significant domestic market. Thus 
India serves as a contrast with Libya in the MOWS, possessing many crucial factors that 
Libya does not. To what extent are these other factors the key to India‟s success rather than 
its ELA? 
 
According to Hohenthal (2003) before India was colonised by the British Empire there were 
several reasons that contributed to the spreading of English to the extent whereby it became 
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the official language of the country. He divided those reasons into two phases which are: (1) 
the Missionary phase in the 18th century by the Christian missionaries; (2) the Indian‟s 
demand to learn English where Indian scholars mostly were encouraging this trend as a 
movement towards modernity. There was a belief that by learning English people would 
achieve scientific western development. Certainly, the Orientalist‟s were one of the main 
proponents of this phase that contributed to establishing English in India. According to 
Hohenthal (2003) this gradually developed since a letter was sent from Raja Rammohun to 
Lord Amherst in 1823 which was presented as an evidence of the local demand for English. 
Raja believed that English in India would provide Indians with the key to all knowledge. He 
was also keen on using government funds to adopt employees from Europe that were talented 
and educated so that they, in turn, would educate the people of India in mathematics, natural 
philosophy, chemistry, anatomy and other sciences.  
 
English became the dominant language of government and administration in India during the 
phase of the British Empire, establishing strong cultural links between Indian and British 
elites. Three factors, in particular, contributed to the spread of English: (1) the different local 
languages and cultures in the Indian society which paved the way for Orientalist‟s 
(intellectual power) were a hindrance to government and administration. English could 
transcend these differences; (2) British colonialism governed India using both military and 
intellectual means. (3) English began to be viewed as synonymous with development, 
modernity and progress, a theme that Sklair notes persists today in countries like Jamaica 
(Sklair; 1994) Gradually, this factor was enhanced by both Indian scholars and the 
Orientalist‟s who played a great role in legitimising British rule. For example, Lord Macaulay 
was the one of the main figures in this regard of being in favour of the spread of English. He 
contributed to enhancing bilingualism in India with the idea that Indian languages would be 
enriched by English, learning scientific and literary expression. To emphasise his Orientalist 
credentials Lord Macauley added: “I have never found one amongst them who could deny 
that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India 
and Arabia” (Kachru 1986: 07 cited in Phllipson, 2001:189). Phillipson (2001:189) observes 
of this that:  
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“The colonial exercise was not merely about conquering territory and economies, but 
also about conquering minds. For Macaulay and generations of colonialists the 
purpose of British education for Indian leaders was to produce a class of persons, 
Indians in blood and colour, English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.” 
 
On the British Empire‟s Orientalist strategies Pennycook (1994), following Said and 
Phillipson, said that Orientalism was not “somehow a good and innocent project that only 
had the right of colonised people at heart” he added: 
 
 “although Orientalism is usually considered more sympathetic towards the local 
languages and cultures than Anglicism, it acknowledged the superiority of Western 
literature and learning, and it was a means to exercise social control over the people, 
and imposing of western ideas” (Pennycook, 1994:102).   
 
Further, he notes that: 
 ―although Macaulay is credited the most influential individual on the language 
question, the issue is more complex than simply Macaulay arriving in India, writing the 
minute on education, and then heading off back to England with having English firmly 
transplanted in the colony. In his view, then, it is important to understand that 
Macaulay just articulated a position which had been discussed for a long time already 
(Pennycook 1994: 77).  
 
He added that “the Indian bourgeoisie was demanding English-language education as much 
as the missionaries and educators, seeing knowledge of English as an essential tool in 
gaining social and economic prestige‖ (Hohenthal, 2003). But English today economically 
and socially spreads itself as language worldwide, a process fuelled by what is usually termed 
globalisation, the elimination of barriers between nations (Tornroos, 2002; OECD, 2006). 
However this remains an unequal exchange as the spread of global English is supported by 
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the cultural, political and economic power of the states in the core of the MOWS and in 
particular by the USA as the hegemonic state. For countries in the periphery and semi-
periphery and even for non-English language speaking countries in the core of the MOWS, 
the process of ELA appears to be ineluctable. But this process is not necessarily of benefit to 
all citizens in the core countries, even in the UK itself. A recent report by the British Council 
suggests that as more people globally acquire English language the advantage that its 
exclusivity confers on the UK citizens begins to disappear, for example. The report‟s author 
David Graddol notes as around 2 billion people now speak English globally that:  
 
―This trend has major implications for the UK where many people do not speak 
another language with any great proficiency. When we are in competition 
economically, educationally or culturally, conversing in English alone is no longer 
enough." The report found that English is not taught as a foreign language in many 
countries, including China and India. Instead it is seen as a "basic universal skill." In 
China, 60% of primary school children learn English and more people in India and 
China speak the language fluently than anywhere else in the world” (Taylor, 2006).   
 
However, Phillipson (2001) says that English language succeeded in India as a result of the 
dependency relations between British and its colonies where the education system was the 
keystone of so-called „professional imperialism‟. Phillipson added that: ―Professional 
imperialism triumphs even where political and economic domination has been broken. The 
knowledge-capitalism of professional imperialism subjugates people more imperceptibly than 
and as effectively as international finance and weaponry. The possibility of a convivial 
society depends therefore on a new consensus about the destructiveness of imperialism at 
three levels: the pernicious spread of one nation beyond its boundaries; the omnipresent 
influence of multinational corporations; and the mushrooming of professional monopolies 
over production. Politics for convivial reconstruction of society must especially face 
imperialism on this third level, where it takes the form of professionalism‖ (Illich 1973: 56–
57 cited in Phillipson, 2001:194). Phillipson noted that:   
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“The connection between higher education in India and the western academy 
undeniably exists – it is not only historical and paradigmatic but is also a continuing 
relation of dependence and support in matters of scholarship and expertise, material 
aid, the training of personnel, the framing of syllabi, and pedagogical methods” (Rajan 
1992b: 141 cited in Phillipson, 2001: 194). 
 
Phillipson has commented on Rajan‟s statement that it “fits the pattern of professional 
imperialism that Ivan Illich warned against thirty years ago” which legitimises the linguistic 
and cultural universe of „English‟ in the post-colonial countries and their educational 
institutions as a tool of development. Based on that, English today is the most spoken 
language in India, especially at the field of education and business. Since India today is 
“ranked the third largest English speaking population in the world besides US and UK” in 
terms of density of population speaking the language(Rajesh, 2009). But the question is how 
has the English language affected India‟s development in the MOWS? In response to this 
question Phillipson (1992) emphasised that English “failed to help former colonies” in terms 
of their development, especially in places like Africa and India, because of the structural 
relationship of dependency between the core nations and the periphery and semi-periphery 
countries, 
 
“the export of English to formerly colonized countries has not paved the way to 
modernity and prosperity, as was foreseen by at least some planners in the post World 
War II era. Far from being a neutral medium allowing for international communication 
and access to the technology of developed countries, English has served the political, 
cultural, and economic interests of the principal colonial powers, Great Britain and the 
U.S., at the expense of local and national development in third world countries” 
(Phillipson, 1992 quoted in Moritoshi 2001:3-4) 
 
 
He believed English would be successful in helping the periphery countries‟ development 
only when the core shares its technological and scientific advances with its former colonies, 
and not to extend the economic and technical gap between both of them (Moritoshi, 2001). 
But in the context of the dependent relations that structure the MOWS between core, 
periphery and semi-periphery, this is unlikely to be easy for the dependent countries to attain. 
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The states and corporations of the core have no interest in surrendering their intellectual 
patents freely to the states in the rest of the MOWS. The whole nature of so-called trade 
related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) has arisen precisely to prevent this happening 
(Shiva, 2001). The control of technology and the knowledge that underpins its development 
and ownership is a central power relation in the MOWS that can only be wrested from the 
core by countries like India over time and through a strong state seeking to build up its 
domestic technology and research infrastructure. Given its vast size and wealth India has the 
resources to do this in a way that Libya does not (Dreze and Sen, 2002). While Phillipson and 
Moritoshi hold this point of view, Patibandla and Petersen (2002) agreed that global English 
has contributed to India‟s economic industries like its emerging software industry which 
represents itself as one of the biggest international competitive high-tech sectors in the 
MOWS. They attributed the high growth and competitiveness of this industry to “the low cost 
of scientific and engineering manpower with English language skills widespread (Hanna, 
1994; Heeks, 1996)” (Patibandla and Petersen, 2002:1561). Patibandla and Petersen (2002: 
1562) added that: 
 
 
“At present, India‘s educational institutions annually generate between 75,000 and 
80,000 software professionals of varying technical skills with proficiency in the English 
language. About 16,500 engineering graduates are produced by the formal institutions 
and the rest by the private training institutes. This pool of skilled labour is supported by 
some of the world class research institutions such as the Indian Institute of Science in 
Bangalore, the public sector firm the Bharat Heavy Electronics, and a half dozen 
Indian Institutes of Technology”.   
 
Moreover, Rajesh (2009) suggested that English language has contributed also in the 
flourishing of Indian literature and generating well-known writers in India like: 
 
 Arundhati Roy, Vikram Seth and Salman Rushdie were able to make a strong foothold 
in international arena. Arundhati Roy won the Booker Prize for her novel ―The God of 
Small Things‖. Salman Rushdie won the Booker Prize for ―Midnight Children‖. It is 
good to see many new Indian authors bringing out books on Indian culture and 
literature”. 
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Thus India has benefited in a number of ways through its ability to use the widespread 
knowledge of global English as a means to attract investment into the country and through 
having a strong state to direct investment into new high-tech industries which with India‟s 
relatively low-cost wages means that they can more than compete with states in the core. So 
the picture is complicated. To some extent global English in India has given the country a 
definite advantage at this phase of the MOWS by enabling India to produce goods and 
services in the global economy that are both essential to the core and produced in the English 
language 
  
7.2.2 Malaysia: ELA as Means of Promoting Development 
Like India, Malaysia is a former British colony and its experience with the English language 
has not stopped since then (Hanapiah, 2002).  Malaysian society contains more than one 
community: Malay, Chinese, and Tamil with Chinese as the biggest. These three different 
communities give the cultural diversity to the country where language is one of its aspects. 
By 1950 educational facilities were provided by British colonialism for different types of 
schools that were to be established to reflect the three communities. Hence, the education 
system in Malaysia was the starting point at which British colonisation began and helped the 
spread of English language across the country. 
 
Thus, like India, Malaysia was incorporated into the MOWS directly through British colonial 
occupation from the C18 onwards which again has bought it advantages and disadvantages 
over time in terms of its ability to control its own development. According to Hanapiah 
(2002) the number of Malaysian students enrolling in English schools during the colonial 
period was very low because of the high fees that were required in order to attend those 
schools, a problem reinforced by the fact that most schools were based in the capital while 
most people still lived in the countryside.  This colonial experience was shared by Libyan‟s 
too during the Italian occupation as learning the Italian language was mainly available for the 
richer Libyan elite, while the majorities were studying so-called Al-Koutab. Apart from the 
differences between the two types of colonialism (Italian dictatorial) and (British cultural), 
the situation regarding students‟ enrolment at those colonial schools was similar in Libya and 
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Malaysia. However, after Malaysia became independent English language continued to 
spread for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most important factor was the role that was 
played by the mass media, which includes national radio, television programs, newspapers, 
and English films/movies. These media forms were dominated by the English language 
which, in the words of Hanapiah, led indirectly to the promotion of social tolerance and unity 
among the Malaysian society regarding English language, and thus its spread (Lent, 1974; 
Lee, 1999; Hanapiah, 2003) The other factor behind the endurance of the English language 
was that it was given a high priority by the government as a second language for the country 
(Chio, 2004). Despite some resistance to this in favour of Bahasa Malaysia as the national 
language for the country, English began to take over everyday activities including such things 
as road and traffic signs, and advertisements. Paralleling the Libyan experience there was a 
sudden about turn by the Malaysia government that saw the suspension of ELA from 1970 to 
1990 (Nunan; 2003; Chio, 2004). However, this strategy came to be viewed as insular and 
unhelpful for Malaysia development and in 1990 there was a gradual reintroduction of ELA 
in Malaysia schools and universities (Lee, 1999; Chio, 2004). Today English is the medium 
of communication along with Malay, and it is the language that unifies the country 
(Hanapiah, 2002:04). Hanapiah argues that English has several important developmental 
functions that are essential for promoting growth and development in Malaysia in different 
fields. These include: business, employment, education, politics, tourism, law, media and 
translation. He added that:   
 
“Businesses and organizations have understood the importance of English as a tool 
required for business expansion, image building and sometimes it becomes as a matter 
of survival in today‘s era of globalization where local businesses are constantly facing 
intense competition both from local counterparts and foreign companies. Therefore, 
business strategists and organizations have taken some efforts or initiative to improve 
their command of English”.   
 
 
Hanapiah (2002: 65) used the Ampang Puteri Specialist Hospital – a private hospital in Kuala 
Lumpur - as a good example of the role of English in business area since he said:   
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“Recently the hospital management launched a ―Let‘s Speak English‖ campaign with 
the objective to motivate staff to learn and inculcate confidence in speaking the 
language. The management is planning activities for the staff to enhance the level of 
English proficiency so that English can soon be its primary medium of communication. 
Besides, the use of English at the hospital helps improve the organization‘s image in the 
eyes of the public”. 
  
The above statement by Hanapiah illustrates accordingly the importance of English language 
as it has taken on a status whereby it becomes impossible to get skilled posts without it. 
English, again, has become synonymous with progress, modernity and globalisation as the 
logical outcome of the process of modernity.  To illustrate this point in 2000 more than 
39‟000 Malaysian graduates were unable to find work because of their lack of English 
language skills, a pattern replicated in Libya, of course (Hanapiah, 2002). In evidence of that 
Hanapiah (2002:06) has quoted the Minister of Education, Tan Sri Musa Mohamad, as 
saying: “employers did not just look at one‘s qualification but also factors like personality, 
potential, English proficiency and experience”. We can see then how ELA has become a 
fundamental part of the nation‟s stock of human capital, a process that Libya is only 
beginning to undertake now after its long isolation from the global economy. The experience 
of students in Malaysia is stark, if you don‟t gain recognised English language qualifications 
your career prospects will be limited. Like Malaysia which has sought to pursue 
developmental policies based around a strong state and protectionist measures, including on 
capital flows, Libya is now moving in the opposite direction as it embraces neo liberalism 
and abandoning such controls. That said the state is also reducing its role in the Malaysian 
economy and is, again like Libya, trying to diversify its economy (Chio, 2004). 
 
Parallel to the vision 2019 for Libya (see chapter 3) that was created by the NESR a vision 
2020 was created in 1991 by the National Economic Program for Malaysia to accelerate its 
development. The vision of 2020 is an ambitious goal
87
 for the country to become a fully 
developed nation. Regarding this vision Nunan (2003:602) claimed that: 
                                                          
87 “This works in line with its strategic, long-term master plan to be at par with other developed nations in the world by the 
year 2020. Transfer of knowledge and technical skill occurs essentially through the provision of better education and 
training courses. At universities and polytechnics, students are exposed and taught various disciplines of knowledge in 
science and technology. Apart from reading English references, sometimes teaching is also being conducted in English both 
by local and foreign instructors. For training purposes, particularly when staff or workers are sent abroad to Europe, 
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 “It was only during the 1990s that the government realized that the loss of English 
would adversely affect economic development. Deterioration in the standards of 
English is seen as a major obstacle to the aspiration that Malaysia be declared a 
developed nation by 2020”.  
 
The English language was a significant factor in the development of Malaysian human 
capital, leading the Malaysia Prime Minister to say that:  
 
“In the development of our human resources, our private sector has the most important 
of roles to play. Train your own manpower. Equip them for their changing tasks. Look 
after their interests. Upgrade their skills. Manage them well. And reward them for their 
contribution”. 
 
With consideration to Malaysia‟s developmental efforts in particular regarding skills 
development, it is worth noting that this vision (2020) not only reflects the Malaysian 
government‟s aspiration for prosperity and a competitive economic development, also it hints 
to the acceptance of the norms and rules of the core of the MOWS since the main aim of this 
vision is to make Malaysia a developed nation by the year 2020 (Lee, 1999). Thus the 
Malaysian experience supports the idea that English language can be an important factor in 
social and economic development, but only in the context of a host of other factors such as a 
strong and directing state, protectionist policies in trade (particularly in finance) and a 
government that is authoritarian in outlook, placing national developmental goals before 
individual liberty.  These were policies of a specific time and place in the evolution of the 
MOWS (Samman and Al-Zo‟by, 2008), the extent to which the Libyan government could 
now copy them seems most unlikely, particularly given that the emphasis of the new vision 
strategies is against protectionism towards a more liberalised economy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Australia, United Kingdom or United States of America, preliminary, they are always been equipped with certain basic 
English language training skills” (Hanapiha, 2002:03). 
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7.2.3 Tunisia: ELA and Post-Colonialism 
As a neighbouring Maghreb country Tunisia has shared important experiences with Libya but 
a crucial difference: it was a French colony where French became the dominant language and 
cultural identity.  As a consequence Tunisia underwent a different colonial process with the 
traditional French model of direct control and cultural assimilation (Perkins. 2004). Unlike 
the Libyan government since the revolution, Tunisian governments have had a far more 
pragmatic approach to ELA as a tool of development (Battenburg, 1997). In fact this is an 
important issue of division between them. Ruling elites in Tunisia have been Westernised and 
integrated into military, political and economic power structures of the MOWS that have seen 
them reliant upon support and protection by the core in their capacity to rule (Amrani, 2011; 
King, 1998). In return Tunisia‟s elites gave the states in the core consistent political support 
and a subjugated population, particularly during the period of the Ben Ali Presidency. 
Tunisia‟s ruling elites put their relations with the core and their desire for stability, power and 
wealth before any Tunisian popular nationalist aspirations, confirming Fanon‟s fears that a 
colonial bourgeoisie would simply be replaced by a nationalist one. Libya, by contrast, 
underwent a revolution that was both populist and nationalist, alternating rhetoric of pan-
Arabism and pan-Africanism, and echoing Fanon‟s ideology of resistance to colonial power, 
none of which was likely to build Libya‟s relations with the state‟s in the core beyond a 
certain limit, most obviously the need for oil. In this respect the differences between Tunisia 
and Libya with regard to ELA has its roots in the post-colonial experience of the two 
countries: Tunisia‟s elites were a classic „comprador classes placing the interests of 
themselves and the ruling elites in the core before that of their own people (Parenti, 1995; 
Phillipson, 2008; and Wallerstein, 2006). Said observed ruefully how the representatives of 
the PLO, for example, shed their revolutionary nationalist ideology in favour of embracing 
neo-liberalism „… people who in the past were Fanonists a matter of a week ago and have 
now changed and become advocates of Singapore and open markets and development. They 
do nothing for the real mass of the Palestinians, who are landless peasants, stateless refugees, 
…‟ (Said, 1994b). A similar transformation seems to have befallen Libya‟s ruling elites as it 
embraces the new vision strategy.  
 
In contrast with Libya post-colonial Tunisian political and economic elites were happy to see 
the country integrated into the MOWS in return for support from the Western states in the 
core. Under President Ben Ali, Tunisia adopted the kind of neo-liberal policies now being 
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advocated by the Libyan government and sought to retain an increasingly authoritarian form 
of government. The Ben Ali era (beginning in 1987) has been marked by nepotism, 
corruption and increasingly brutal forms of governance, the military and police directed 
against the civil population and in particular independent Trade Unions (Toensing, 2011). 
The adoption of neo-liberal policies and authoritarian government makes sense in Tunisia‟s 
case because the consequences of its economic policies were to create mass unemployment, 
poverty and social unrest. Only an increasingly authoritarian government could contain this 
social mix. Libya, of course, has an authoritarian government and high unemployment but 
much stronger social development (health, education) than Tunisia. Whether this is enough to 
enable the government to cope with the introduction of the new vision policies and their 
likely social consequences is to be determined but in some respects Tunisia might be where 
Libya‟s current policies are taking it in the MOWS: a diverse economy which develops 
tourism, manufacturing goods for markets in the core, perhaps production of agricultural 
goods for export, and with increasing social inequality and poverty. 
 
In Libya, by contrast, the ideology of the revolution was in part rooted in the ideas of those 
like Fanon who had a clear and critical view about the relationship between language, 
identity and colonial power. Language could not simply be a neutral tool and the 
revolutionary regime shared this view. Thus in part Libya‟s uncertain development in the 
MOWS in its post-colonial period reflects its resistance to the norms and rules of the world-
system. In this respect Libya has more in common with other post-colonial countries that 
sought to resist these rules and norms and who subsequently became subject to varying forms 
of punishment by the states in the core, such as Cuba, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, 
Vietnam and Angola. In each case the nationalist-populist rhetoric of the post colonial 
government tended to lead to particular state forms, often embracing a mixture of libertarian 
rhetoric („a peoples council‟, for example) with a state that sought increasingly centralised 
and authoritarian control over its society, however fragile this control. The consequences of 
this for Libya have been profound and Dr Habiba
88
 the spokeswomen at the UNIC in Libya 
tried to explain why those strategies adopted by the Libyan government regarding colonial 
languages were problematic by a comparison she made between Libya and Tunisia that:  
 
 
                                                          
88
 The spokeswoman at the united information centre in Libya was interviewed in 31/03/2009. 
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 “Tunisia introduces French language starting at stage 3 in primary level; hence, they 
don‘t face any problems with these languages at their universities and to enter the job 
market. Therefore, Tunisian graduates become highly qualified and successful in terms 
of their human resources, especially academically”.  
 
 
Dr Habiba‟s views on the advantages of learning a foreign language for development were 
supported by Hanabiah (2002) since he suggested that: 
 
 
“Successful graduates at the university level, specifically those who achieve first class 
degrees, are people who have a very high level of mastery in English. This is because 
they certainly need to read and subsequently analyze a lot of reference books which are 
mostly written in English and complete assignments. The more they read they develop 
better understanding and writing skills and thus their performance in academics is 
probably getting higher”. 
 
 
Tunisia introduced ELA into its education system during the period when Libya was under an 
international embargo (1993 - present) as a response to its needs and aspirations. According 
to Daoud (1996:599) Tunisia added English to its curriculum because of the growing demand 
for it worldwide “as the means of access to the modern sciences, technology and economic 
development”. While, Battenburg (2003) claimed the recent governmental strategies towards 
English in Tunisia suggest the decline in French and its influence regarding political and 
economic development. Although Tunisia along with the other Maghreb countries (Algeria 
and Morocco) has been thought of as a francophone bastion, a competition between English 
and French in Tunisian educational institutions and programs seems to be taking place 
(Battenburg, 2003). The trends suggest that ELA in Tunisia might be displacing the 
traditional hold that the colonial language French has over the country.   
 
 
Daoud (2003:604) said of these trends in Tunisia that “to make people truly operational in 
English, the educational system must develop sound ELT/ESP programs that are driven by 
clear goals and objectives, delivered by competent reflective teachers, and sustained 
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systematic formative evaluation”. He emphasised the role that would be played by properly 
trained and qualified English teachers in English departments at the undergraduates and 
postgraduates levels in Tunisian where teachers become an agent of social change and 
competitiveness (Daoud, 2003). Furthermore, Battenburg (2003) in his analysis of Tunisian 
developmental strategies placed ELA alongside commensurate factors such as its location 
and atmosphere, its nearness to European markets, and its human resources, all of which, of 
course, could apply equally to Libya. Daoud (2003:604) emphasised the Tunisian 
government‟s role towards its human capital and institutions as a critical factor 
(government‟s encouragement) since he said: “there is a political will to gear both 
institutional and human resources towards promoting English as the language of economic, 
scientific, and technological development”. Again, the experience of Tunisia illustrates how 
far behind Libya has fallen in this aspect of development and the urgency with which a 
coherent government agenda needs to be implemented. But as with Malaysia the question 
remains to what extent ELA has been crucial in Tunisian social and economic developmental 
policies? The answer would appear to be that it has, as is the case with Malaysia, been one 
part of a number of policies, a necessary policy but not sufficient in its own right, to enhance 
Tunisian development. And this, of course, does nothing to diminish Tunisia‟s dependent 
relationship with the core of the MOWS, indeed, it only highlights it. Whilst Tunisia has 
enjoyed uneven development (when measured in terms of social equality) in return it has 
been clearly subordinated to the interests of states in the core of the MOWS who arm, offer 
political support and economic aid to a highly authoritarian but nonetheless pro-Western 
government, as long as it continues to serve their interests. Tunisia‟s ruling elites do not 
espouse the anti-Western rhetoric that we can see from former Malaysia Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohammed, for example. Libya has already begun to move down this path in 
taking an overt position alongside the West in the „war on terror‟ and in seeking to control the 
flow of migrants form Africa into Europe. Such trends seem likely to increase in the years 
ahead if the new vision strategy is to be pursued seriously.  
 
7.2.4 Libya and the New Vision Policies 
 
In keeping with other countries in the periphery and the semi-periphery the Libyan 
government is actively seeking to strengthen the relationship between educational research 
and business interests as set out in its NESR plan for 2004. According to the NESR 
(2004:119) “the LBES/GCR ranks Libya 97th out of 111 countries in university/industry 
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research collaboration indicating a serious weakness in the link between the education 
system and the needs of the economy”. Thus this is an effort on the part of the state to 
coordinate the educational system with the needs of the job market. To this end the NESR has 
identified three sectors that are the most vital sectors for the diversification of the Libyan 
economy: tourism, information and communication technology, and construction. For 
example, according to the NESR (2004:148) “an effective telecoms sector will lower the cost 
of business and bring new people to the workforce and help foster Libya‘s connections with 
other nations”. Regarding the construction industry it stated “Libya provides a good 
complement in both oil and gas and tourism sector, and is a critical growth sector as the 
economy expends and develops if developed well, it also represents a huge employment 
opportunities for Libyans”. All of these sectors are in dire need of Libyan graduates with high 
quality ELA. 
 
Each of the examples in this chapter makes a case to suggest that ELA as a measure of human 
capital is now seen as a fundamental part of any developmental strategy for a non-English 
speaking state in the world-system. As the level of competition for attracting global capital 
investment intensifies it places increased and often contradictory pressures on government 
policy. For example, the need for governments to minimally satisfy the needs of their 
population by providing welfare services as opposed to the needs of global capital which 
often want government to cut public spending on exactly those programmes. It is exactly the 
impact of these neoliberal policies and their polarisation of society that has led to the Jasmine 
revolution in Tunisia and elsewhere and which seems to represent a profound shift in the 
political culture of the MENA (Canagarajah, 2003). The Libyan government is undertaking 
these strategies at a time when many other governments are under pressure for having chosen 
to support the needs of capital rather than the needs of their national population. Against a 
backdrop of 30% unemployment this seems a very difficult strategy to follow if the situation 
elsewhere in the MENA is a guide. 
 
7.3 Libya‟s Incorporation into the MOWS 
If Libya is to take advantage of its commitment to promoting its human capital as a means of 
reintegrating into the global economy of the MOWS this can only be, as we have seen with 
other countries, in combination with a number of other factors. These key factors are: 
location, size of population, raw materials, and the other recent factors like tourism, and 
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human capital. What is clear from the example of other states in the periphery and semi–
periphery that have pursued ELA strategies as part of their social and economic development 
is two-fold: 
1. ELA is a necessary but not sufficient component of modern developmental strategies 
as global English has become the dominant language of the MOWS and the global 
economy. 
2. Any developmental policy pursued by a country has to take into account the historical 
and structural evolution of the MOWS (Wallerstein, 2010). There can be no 
meaningful ahistoric and generalised model of development as such an approach 
(exemplified by liberal views on development and modernisation) fails to understand 
the nature of power and hierarchy that underpins the development of the MOWS, 
producing the dependent relations between core-periphery and semi-periphery that 
structure the MOWS (Fine and Milonakis, 2008). Or as Gul and Pesendorfer put it, 
„populating economic models with ―flesh-and-blood human beings‖ was never the 
objective of positive economics‟ (Fine and Milonakis, 2009: 1). Libya‟s one 
redeeming strength, and it is an important one, is its oil resources which are 
strategically vital to the core of the MOWS. Its weaknesses when compared with, for 
example, the BRIC states of the semi-periphery: its small population, lack of military 
strength, late entry into the MOWS under terms and conditions that are not designed 
to enhance Libyan independence or development, its small domestic market, its 
geographical location in easy reach of the states in the core. All of these factors are 
essential when considering the circumstances of particular states in the MOWS. The 
conclusion to be drawn is that Libya‟s opportunities for controlling its development, 
are extremely constrained for these reasons.  
What factors does Libya have that can support its new vision policies though?  
 
7.3.1 Location and Natural Resources 
Libya is well located in North Africa with access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East.  
Libya remains rich in two strategically important global natural resources (oil and gas) that 
potentially give it access to capital with which to diversify its economy. In comparison with 
many other African countries, then, Libya is in a good position to develop rapidly if it can 
pursue policies that allow it to do so. The UN Human Development Report (2010:03) 
indicates that “Between 2005 and 2010, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya‘s HDI value increased from 
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0.726 to 0.755, an increase of 4 per cent or average annual increase of about 0.8 per cent” 
considering long-term progress that can be useful to assess Libya in contrast with its 
neighbours both in terms of geographical location and HDI rate. In example of that, the report 
was referred to countries which are close to Libya in HDI rank, and location and population 
size like Tunisia and Jordan, Libya placed at 53
rd
 out of 169 countries while they (Tunisia 
and Jordan) had HDIs ranked 81
st
 and 82
nd
 respectively. Thus, Libya between the periods of 
2005 to 2010 has achieved a high score in its Human Development Index
89
 not only 
compared with its close neighbours but also with oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait.  
 
Figure 7.1: Trends in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya‟s HDI 2005-201090 
 
 
Since 1969, the government has invested in crude oil and this has become the dominant factor 
of Libya‟s economic-social development (Vandewalle, 1998). This remains a mixed blessing, 
however, as even President Gaddafi has conceded, as it has led to a severely unbalanced 
economy. The 1970s saw state-directed investment in Libyan infrastructure, as Frank (1980: 
222) notes: “The greatest increases apart from petroleum were in the public sector. 
Transport and communications, mostly roads, public administration and defence, education 
                                                          
89
 Today the UNHDP (2010) places Libya above the average of 0.593 for countries in the Arab states in general, and above 
the average of 0.717 for high human development countries in particular. 
90
 This figure is from The United Nation Human Development Report UNHDR (2010). 
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and health all expended fast”. The capital for this was mainly the result of revenue for the oil 
industry. Libya has become a major oil producer worldwide and one of Europe‟s biggest oil 
suppliers via the State-owned National Oil Corporation to its customers mainly: Italy, 
Germany, Spain, and France. The following graph shows Libyan oil reserves in contrast with 
the other African countries in terms of its proven oil.
91
 
 
Graph 7.1: the Top African Proven Oil Reserve Holders-2007    
 
 
According to Otman and Karlberg (2007) Libya since 2005 has benefitted from the rising 
trend in international crude oil prices which have brought growth to the country‟s economy.  
Since then the government has adopted its new vision strategies aimed at both “diversifying 
the economy away from overdependence on hydrocarbons” where the FDI in both energy and 
non-energy sectors (like tourism) is estimated at US $6.9 billion compared to global FDI, 
projected to reach US $1 trillion in 2006 (Otman and Karlberg, 2007: 403).  
  
However, simply increasing oil production does nothing to diversify and strengthen Libyan 
economy and society. Thus, although the Libyan government has opportunities to integrate 
                                                          
91
  The graph was taken from the EIA, US Energy Information Administration Report on 08/11/2010. 
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into the MOWS it will remain utterly dependent on its oil revenues to achieve its broader 
social and economic goals for the foreseeable future. As the 2006 NES report says:  
“For a country at Libya‘s stage of development, the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) can be a very powerful tool to upgrade the sophistication of companies operating in 
the country. Foreign investors bring new knowledge, management techniques, and multiple 
linkages to foreign markets, not just capital. The challenge is to provide an environment in 
which the operational practices of foreign companies ‗spill over‘ to domestic companies 
existing or newly-started for example, by supplying the foreign owned operations or by being 
managed by Libyans with experience from working in these foreign companies” (NESR, 
2006: 22-23) 
 
7.3.2 Tourism 
In terms of tourism Libya seems to have the same advantages as other parts of the Maghreb 
with which to attract European tourists. Libya has a wealth of places representing the 
traditional part of the Roman era (see fig-2.3.1) Punic, „Carthaginian‟ in the west of the 
country for example and to the Greco-Roman era in the east of Benghazi (WBC Report, 
2007). The Minister of the Libyan Foreign Investments, Mr Al-Zilitni claimed that the 
country should concentrate more on developing its economy via the best usage of its location 
and generating a tourism industry. He added that: “the comprehensive geography and 
landscape of Libya which varies from huge desert, long sea cost, and civilized cities; all, can 
be used in business and tourism”. The problem again, for Libya when viewed in MOWS 
terms is that tourism is an industry that is notoriously unstable and which in an economy like 
Libya‟s does little to lessen or even significantly improve its dependency with the core. In 
short, as has been seen in many other countries, commodified global tourism is an industry 
that both reflects the dependency of economies in the semi-periphery and the periphery, such 
as Libya‟s, and which reinforces it (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). Tourism is dependent 
upon the ability of the Libyan government to attract tourists with high disposable incomes 
and they will tend to be from the Core. Again, given Libya‟s current economic and social 
position tourism seems an unavoidable industry to promote, despite its drawbacks.  
 
 
Fig 7.2 Some of Places Representing the Traditional Part of Libya 
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Saif Al-Islam suggested that the government should play the main role in providing a relative 
high ground for national and foreign investments. He added: 
 
 “In order to complete the planned tourism in the following: transfer of funds, and 
clearly determine the exchange rate, and restricting alcohol consumption and the 
development and adoption of plans and tourist clear to investors etc. also, the state 
need to provide maximum quality of services to tourists such as: Safety and modern 
infrastructure, promote the use of foreign language in the country” (Saif Al-Islam, 
2002: 214).  
 
In order for tourism to develop, then, it requires an investment in ELA as „global English‟ is 
the language of global tourism. Without it Libya will not be able to compete effectively with 
the other Maghreb countries for tourist revenues. According to Zaptia (2009) the tourism 
projects that have been introduced by the government and foreign investors are expected to 
create 10‟000 new jobs over the next decade, not a huge figure. However visa difficulty for 
tourists
92
 and the lack of the English language skills still act as deterrents to tourists to Libya 
when compared with neighboring countries such as Tunisia, long established as an example 
of the (safe) exotic orient for the Western tourist market.  
 
                                                          
92 According to the NES report (2006: 86) “Libyan visas are extremely difficult to get, both for business and leisure visitors, 
taking between 1 to 4 weeks to be processed. Although some ‗fast-track‘ processing has recently been put in place for large 
groups of leisure tourists travelling with approved operators, there is a long way to go—North African countries issue these 
on arrival. This reduces the attractiveness of Libya as a tourist destination, both for the tour operators and the tourists, and 
restricts the potential increase in tourist traffic”. 
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According to the Tourism Investment and Development Board (TIDB) this industry since 
2005 has attracted more than US (dollars) 3bn in committed investment (TIDB, 2005 cited in 
NESR, 2006). The private sector is seen as the main driving force of Libyan tourism and the 
goals for tourism are: to establish a good quality of international and national tourist 
services/operations; support business people to visit/conduct business in the country; improve 
air access, such as Al-Buraq Airline Company that verified the influx of new private entrants 
providing internal air links across the country; and establishing tourism related infrastructure 
like hotels, roads alongside with financial infrastructure (credit cards acceptance, and ATMs) 
(Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010; George and Miles, 2010; WBC‟s Report, 2007).   
   
7.3.3 Human Capital: Long-term Goals? 
Libya has the highest Human Development Indicators in Africa as the UNHDR (2006-2010) 
indicates
93
 and its goal of economic diversification was set out in interview by the Minister of 
the Libyan foreign investments Mr Al-Zilitni who added: 
 
“With such resources Libya could minimize dependence on the oil sector by 50% within 
the coming ten years. The aim is to reduce dependency by 80% over the next 20 years. . 
To achieve this we need to have an accurate planning system and to develop our human 
capital resources, setting up structures and roles, enhancing our infrastructures and 
finally organizing our political strategies”.  
 
 
These goals are, of course, very ambitious and it is hard to imagine that they can be fulfilled 
given what is required for them to become attainable. What becomes apparent is that ELA is 
not in itself sufficient to enhance Libya‟s developmental strategy, but it is a necessary part of 
a comprehensive strategy that includes infrastructural and human capital development. ELA 
is an unavoidable developmental strategy for any non-English speaking country in the 
MOWS that seek to become a functioning part of the global economy; to avoid embracing it 
risks under investment and exclusion from attracting FDI. Equally it is clearly not in itself a 
                                                          
93 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya‘s HDI is 0.755, which gives the country a rank of 53 out of 169 countries with comparable data. 
The HDI of Arab States as a region increased from 0.398 in 1980 to 0.590 today, placing Libyan Arab Jamahiriya above the 
regional average 
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sufficient quality to generate economic growth and foreign investment. Many countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have strong English language histories as part of their subjection to 
colonialism, but in general the region is viewed as the poorest and least economically vibrant 
in the world (Okolo, 2005; Chiswick, 2000; Appleton and Francis, 1998). To attract capital in 
the MOWS requires that a country in the periphery and semi-periphery has to have an 
economic, ideological or militarily strategic importance for the core or the distinctive 
qualities of the BRIC. As Alice Amsden has shown, this combination of factors was behind 
the growth of the so-called „Asian Tiger‟ economies after WW2 (Amsden, 1992). Arguably 
Libya, too, has strategic importance for the core given its vast oil and gas resources. The 
question remains, though, as to the terms on which this relationship will develop.  
 
  
7.4 Room for Manoeuvre?: To what extent can Libya benefit from its 
incorporation into the MOWS?  
 
According to the OECD (2006:13) “economically, globalisation means that national 
economies are increasingly plugged into each other and into the world economy”. Whereas 
the NESR (2004:30) stated that:  
 
“The prosperity of its citizens is the ultimate benchmark for the success of a country‘s 
economic policies and reflection of its underlying competitiveness. Measured on GDP 
per capita, adjusted for purchasing power, Libya has registered strong prosperity 
performance over the last few years, with capita income of about USD 11,000. It is 
among the most prosperous countries in its peer group and has registered solid growth, 
outpacing a number of comparable countries in the region”.   
 
Having said that it is clear that thus far there has been a low level of activity in this 
liberalisation process on the part of ordinary Libyan citizens. Historically the Libyan 
economy has been divided into two unequal and unbalanced parts: an energy sector of high 
value but low employment: and a non-energy sector (mainly the public services) which has 
low value and high employment. It is this long-term historical and structural imbalance in the 
economy that the government is now trying to redress by devising policies in cooperation 
with non-Libyan economists and advisors (Vandewalle, 2008, Porter, 2007; Martinez, 2007). 
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The problem that Libya faces is the same as any country in a similar situation, how to shift 
the balance of an economy where there is already mass unemployment without worsening the 
situation and potentially jeopardising the whole process?  This is a particularly pressing 
problem when one considers that the Libyan economy before 2004 was entirely owned and 
controlled by the state following the country‟s distinctive Green Book philosophy (Ahmida, 
2005; and Alafi and de Bruijn, 2010). According to Nasser (2003: 37) the government had 
enjoyed total authority over: 
 
“Imports or exports of a company and even a company‘s location and many senior 
appointments to Libyan companies are in the hand of the politicians and civil servants. 
As result Libyan companies as public enterprises are very sensitive to any change in the 
government‘s policies regarding economic, social and political issues”.  
 
This model for organising an economy is antithetical to the neo-liberal policies that have 
underpinned global economic integration since the early 1980s and so it became apparent that 
rapid reforms would be needed in order for Libya to become more coherently integrated into 
the MOWS. Hence the introduction of the new vision policies.  
 
According to a report by the Central Bank of Libya (CBLR, 2008:40) recent years have 
shown signs of improvement in the Libyan economic performance. For example, in terms of 
the most important indicators of foreign trade since 2005 the report illustrated that:  
 
“The Libyan exports in 2005 rose with 49.4% to about LD 31.1 billion, compared to LD 
20.8 billion in 2004. This rise is generally attributed to a rise in oil exports that account 
for 97.3% of total exports with 30.3 billion in 2005 compared with LD20.1 billion 
in2004 as a result of a significant rise in world oil prices in 2005 and an increase in the 
exported quantities. Foreign trade statistics, published by the National Information 
Agency, indicate that about 97.3% of Libyan exports are metallic fuel and other related 
fuel (oil exports), while other exports represented only 2.7%. It should be noted that this 
situation exposes the Libyan economy to international oil markets fluctuations and their 
direct effect on all domestic economic and social variables”. 
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The report also indicates that the Central Bank of Libya today supervises more than 42 
private commercial banks in the country, and contributed to the privatization of Libya‟s large 
banks. According to Alafi and de Bruijn (2010:12)  
 
“Two new private commercial banks and one private regional bank were licensed in 
2002. BNP Paribas acquired 19 percent of Sahara Bank in August 2007, with 
immediate management control and option to purchase additional shares of up to 51 
percent within 3-5 years, Wahda Bank was acquired by Arab Bank in February 2008 
under similar terms. Some key strategic companies are still earmarked for 
privatisation, particularly Libyan airlines, public telecommunication company, Brega 
Petroleum Company, and electricity distribution network. The stock exchange was 
established in 2006 and by end-2007, seven companies (mostly banks) were listed with 
a capitalisation of LD1.2 billion‖.  
 
The long-term structural problems facing the Libyan economy and society would appear to 
leave little room for the government to maintain its relative independence from the West as it 
integrates into the MOWS. Already the new vision policies with their emphasis on human 
capital development and ELA all indicate the extent to which the Libyan government is 
already constrained, and accepting that constraint, in terms of its control over social and 
economic policy. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusions: What conclusions can we reach from the Experience of other 
Countries in Evaluating Libya‟s Strategy for Promoting ELA? 
 
Ahmida (2005:84) observed that as a state Libya “continues to refuse to learn from its 
mistakes, viewing criticism as treason or conspiracy. This attitude in turn fosters brain drain, 
depriving the government of able professionals to deal with a complex international system”. 
Nonetheless since Ahmida wrote this in 2005 there have been many developments in Libyan 
policy that suggest that its policies are changing, and dramatically. Whether this is an 
indication that they are learning from past mistakes remains to be seen.  
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This chapter presented a comparison between Libya and its new vision policies and what has 
been achieved by other countries in the periphery and semi-periphery of the MOWS that have 
pursued the ELA as a developmental strategy. What the experience of other countries reveals 
is the difficulties facing Libya in it attempts to open up its economy and society in accord 
with the neo-liberal rules and norms of the global economy in the MOWS. ELA is not in 
itself a sufficient factor to guarantee development but it is increasingly a necessary one. The 
two related issues that the Libyan government and society face are: to what extent can they 
embrace and adapt to these neoliberal policies without simply reinforcing their dependency 
upon the core of the world-system? In short, does the neo-liberal developmental model bring 
a degree of autonomy to Libya or merely heighten its structural weakness with regard to the 
core? Other large-oil producing countries provide a salutary lesson here. Saudi Arabia and 
Algeria are both ruled by elites that are utterly dependent upon the Core, mainly in the form 
of US aid, for military and political support (El-Najjar, 2001). Their vast oil revenues have 
actually served to intensify their dependency on the core. The second issue faced by the 
Libya government and society is that of orientalism. To what extent are the neo-liberal 
policies that Libya has to adopt merely a neo-Orientalist discourse serving to legitimise the 
power of the core in the MOWS in general and Libya in particular? We will address these 
crucial questions in the concluding chapter. 
 
The possibilities for Libyan development in the MOWS seem fraught with dangers and major 
structural obstacles. Given the ossified nature of the governing regime and its patronage form 
of governance since the revolution, the undoing of this system threatens its legitimacy in a 
serious way. The new vision policies are dependent upon the good faith of the core and those 
seeking to invest in the newly liberalising Libyan economy and society. But such integration 
does not rest simply on matters of economic trust. There are always political-military and 
strategic questions that can direct and influence these processes and there is no doubt that the 
Gaddafi regime is not popular amongst governments in the core, no matter the overtures it 
has made in recent years to becoming a willing and subordinate part of the core led MOWS. 
The comparisons made in this chapter are intended to show the limitations of Libya‟s policies 
and the way in which the structure of the MOWS severely limits its options. Developing 
factors such as human capital, ELA and tourism are unlikely to generate the kind of economic 
development the Libyan regime needs if it is to both transform Libyan economy and society 
and at the same time maintain its own legitimacy. As Chang (see chapter two) made clear, 
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there is little evidence to suggest that education, by itself, is likely to generate significant 
economic growth for countries. Whatever the commitment of the Libyan government their 
resources are nothing compare dot the vast sums committed by countries such as China, 
South Korea and India to the very same policies. And these countries have had important 
strategic, political and economic advantages over Libya that stretch back decades. Libya‟s 
new vision policies are more likely to see it return to the regional norm of the MENA, a 
country shaped by growing inequality, the erosion of public services and welfare, and an 
economy increasingly deponent upon investment and tourism form the core. Given its 
relative structural and temporal entry into the MOWS and the lack of a wider political 
movement to overturn this system, this seems a realistic assessment of Libya‟s immediate 
future. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 8.1 Libya at the Crossroads  
The thesis initially was built on two inter-related concerns: the first was with the role that 
ELA strategies were playing in the Libyan governments „new vision‟ strategies for social and 
economic development; the second was with the implications for Libyan society of its 
integration into the MOWS. What are the opportunities open to the Libyan government and 
people to transform the social and economic basis of their society in a way which works to 
their own advantage rather than simply enhancing Libya‟s already dependent relationship 
with the core? 
In order to answer this I have presented an argument that seeks to situate Libya historically 
and structurally in the context of the evolution of the MOWS. Only in this way can one 
adequately evaluate the strategic possibilities open to Libya in the MOWS. The thesis 
proceeded as follows: 
 
8.2 Language and Development in Libya 
Looking back to the history of foreign languages in Libya during and since colonialism the 
first thing that emerges is that (1-1-a) Libya successfully preserved Arabic as the only official 
language in the country. (1-1-b) Arabic is the symbol of all Arabic nations‟ identity, but for 
Libya it has become also a tool for resisting the foreign colonial languages that would make 
dependency relations with the West deeper.  (1-1-c) Historically Libyan and Western 
relations have been limited and antagonistic since the September 1st revolution 1969. (1-1-d) 
The education system has become the key mechanism for the Libyan government in 
preserving and producing Arabic as the language of knowledge and culture instead of paving 
the way for the foreign colonial languages and knowledge. This policy was in order to 
prevent the Libyan education system from helping to serve the Western core states imperial 
goals, a practice pursued by governments elsewhere in the Maghreb, as mentioned earlier.  
(1-1-e) In Libya since the 1
st
 September revolution the education system is ruled by the 
government providing free education for all Libyans but with government control over what 
can be taught and learned. (1-1-f) Before 1986 foreign language learning was taught only as a 
unit for the secondary school and university students. But, since 1986, the Libyan 
government went further to establish a policy to stop the teaching of foreign languages 
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including English at all levels of its education system. (1-1-g) This decision theoretically was 
partly driven by Arabic nationalism resisting the Western influence in the region whether it is 
military, political, and economic or, in this case, cultural. Practically, the decision was as a 
result of hostile relations between the Libya and the West, mainly the USA. (1-1-h) The 
situation became worse in terms of diplomatic relations between Libya and the West after the 
international embargo was imposed on Libya in 1993. Thus, the second thing that comes out 
from the first chapter of language and development in Libya is (1-2-a) is these two 
experiences (the decision and the sanctions) to a great extent have affected the Libyan 
economy and society, when coupled with government policies, to deprive Libyan students of 
knowledge of global English. This, in turn, has added an important structural weakness to the 
Libyan economy which the new vision policies are now trying to address. 
 
8.2 Human Capital: English Language Skills in Libya 
(2-1-a) 2004 has been the turning point of the Libyan government policies as the government 
abandoned its long-standing ideological commitments in its new vision policies to embrace 
neo-liberal principles and attempt to integrate Libya into the MOWS. (2-1-b) International 
sanctions were lifted on the country in 2003-4, and the teaching of foreign languages policy 
has been re-introduced. However, by interviewing a number of representative people from the 
state, the private sector, students and the British Council, it is apparent that whilst (2-2-a) 
Libyan graduates are in dire need for global English skills thus far policies remain disjointed 
and there is significant internal opposition from the state bureaucracy as well as culturally 
amongst parts of the Libyan society. In the new global economic environment Libya has been 
encouraged to develop its human capital in order to take advantage of job opportunities, and 
thus empower its economy by the liberalisation of its job markets. Thus, (2-4-a) during the 
study human capital development is considered not only as a new vision policy but also as a 
question of power as revealed in the works of Said, Fanon and Wallerstein. Human capital is 
part of an orientalist discourse that underpins the spread of neo-liberal ideas about how to 
organise an economy and to pursue development, under the guise of a neutral scientific 
knowledge. However, as Said, Fanon and Wallerstein have made clear, power in the MOWS 
is increasingly about the production and control of knowledge as well as more traditional 
forms of power such as violence.  If human capital is part of an orientalist framework that 
tries to force the periphery and semi-periphery to discipline themselves in line with the 
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interests of the core, what chance is there that it can work to the advantage of a country like 
Libya? My conclusions have been that in terms of their strategic choices the Libyan 
government faces a massive contradiction in its policies. Accepting human capital 
development as part of a neo-liberal discourse that valorises profit and the private sector over 
human needs is not a risk-free strategy for the Libyan government. Therefore the second 
finding was (2-4-b) there are contradictions among the Libyan governmental strategies in that 
while the government espouse a commitment to maintaining social equality at the same time 
they are pursuing economic strategies designed to produce the very opposite. If Tunisia is an 
example of the consequences of such policies, or Algeria, we can expect to see much social 
unrest in Libya over the coming decade as inequality and poverty increase.  
 
8.3 Libya in the MOWS  
(3-1-a) The Libyan government has introduced strategies to develop its human capital so as 
to integrate itself in the global economy of the MOWS. However, this inevitably brings with 
it cultural changes as young Libyans, in particular, embrace modern Western consumer 
lifestyles that are far removed from the experiences of the post-revolutionary generation. 
Most young Libyans interviewed felt that ELA was vital to their futures, a perception that 
was widely shared. There was little critical understanding of the limitations of ELA as part of 
a broader developmental strategy in the MOWS when compared with the experiences of 
other countries. The perception that learning global English will enhance development was 
more an act of faith than a rational assessment of Libya‟s position in the MOWS. This view 
was shared with equal enthusiasm amongst most, but not all, government officials too. 
Proving the relationship between ELA and employment in the Libyan job market is therefore 
seen by the government and international agencies as the first step in finding solutions to 
unemployment in the country. (3-2-b) In addition the government realized the importance of 
establishing the relationship between ELA and attracting both foreign investment as well as 
enabling Libyan citizens to acquire jobs with foreign firms moving into the country. As was 
shown in the thesis, there are many important factors that suggest that Libya‟s social and 
economic opportunities in the MOWS will be severely limited, not least by the lateness of its 
integration into the system which is on terms that it cannot control or easily influence when 
compared to the BRIVC countries or the Asian tigers.  
 
227 
 
 
8.4 State Strategies for Promoting ELA in Libya  
(4-1-a) Privatization of the public sector has been encouraged by the state and become one of 
the new vision governmental strategies towards promoting private enterprise (Alafi and de 
Bruijn, 2010). (4-1-b) This has opened the door for more competition from private companies 
as several types of businesses including education and training centres, and thus more 
investment agreements/contracts with international companies and organisations promoting 
FDI and modernising the country's economy (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). (4-1-c) English 
language has become a crucial tool for those foreign companies dealing with the country 
especially within the private sector. (4-2-a) The Libyan government pursued the privatisation 
of the educational sector and to this end created (4-2-b) the Participatory Education 
Institutions which came about as a result of those governmental policies of modernisation. (4-
3-c) The role of human capital itself in Libya still seems to be a complex idea and a 
problematic concept in that it is a part of an Orientalist discourse regarding development. In 
theory the (4-3-d) new policies of neo-liberalism presented under the guise of a neutral, 
universal science of development present Libyan state and society with an opportunity to 
embrace liberal freedoms and development. In practice what seems more likely is that it will 
do (4-3-e) little more than make its economy ripe for further and deeper economic 
dependency on foreign capital whilst opening up its society to social change of a kind that is 
affecting other MENA countries.  
  
 
8.5 Libya, Human Capital and the Global Economy 
 
(5-1-a) The specific social and historical context as well as the geography, natural resources, 
position and entry in the MOWS, size and breadth of population and country, are all factors 
that have been taken into account when comparing Libya with other countries in the 
periphery and semi-periphery with regard to the impact of ELA policies on social and 
economic development.  Although Libya has one overwhelming and important strength, its 
oil resources, it faces numerous obstacles to its transformation in line with the new vision 
strategies. The evidence of other countries suggests that you simply cannot generalise about 
and abstract ELA as a factor of development, as neo-liberal human capital theory does. Only 
when it is situated in the historical and structural context of a particular state in the MOWS 
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can you begin to make sense of the utility of ELA for social and economic development. For 
this reason, and although Libya‟s oil is of crucial geo-political and economic importance to 
the core, it is not easy to see how ELA will aid Libya without a wider transformation of its 
governing institutions, not least of its state which remains problematically authoritarian and 
corrupt. Libyan government and society are at a crossroads and it is difficult to see how the 
new vision strategies will achieve the stated goals of reducing Libyan dependence on oil by 
80% in 10 years. This is hyperbole designed to convince a domestic audience as well as 
foreign investors. The other factor to be wary of is the extent to which the states in the core 
really want a more open, liberal and democratic Libya. After all, they have long-standing and 
beneficial relations with governments that are just as authoritarian as the Libyan government, 
in the MENA and elsewhere. There may well prove to be a mismatch between the new vision 
goals of the Libyan government and the interests of the Western states in the core who have 
no particular reasons to support the Gaddafi regime. In the end the success or failure of the 
new vision strategies may well rest upon the actions of the Libyan people rather than those 
undertaken by either the government or foreign investors.  
 
8.6 Theoretical Conclusion: Libya and the MOWS 
The limitations of Libya‟s policies have been made apparent in this thesis. In chapter two I 
gave an outline of the developmental state model which makes the case that Third World 
countries can develop more effectively by abandoning free trade policies and allowing a 
strong state to direct economic and social development by restricting the market and 
democracy. However, what I argued was that the developmental state model is not a 
generalsiable model across the MOWS but itself reflects that specific structural and historical 
circumstances of particular states at a specific time in the MOWS. South Korea could 
develop in the manner that it did and in relation to the US economy precisely because its 
economic „success‟ was more important to the US administrations in the 1960s as n 
ideological and political opposition to communism in East Asia. A strong, militarised and 
authoritarian government deponent upon the US economy and military for support was hardly 
an example of an independent state as developmental state theory would have us believe. On 
the contrary, this was a highly dependent core-periphery relationship and it was the 
dependent relationship that allowed the South Korean regime to make the policy choices that 
it did, knowing that it would receive US backing as long as it stayed in the Western camp 
during the Cold War. Thus the brutal suppression of civil society and pro-democracy 
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movements into the 1980s was perfectly acceptable to the core. This is the real nature of the 
developmental state model.  
 
The Libyan economy and society faces fundamentally different circumstances as it is 
integrated into the MOWS. The era of globalised capitalism, US led global military power 
and an almost universal acceptance of neo-liberal capitalism has meant that the choices open 
to the Gaddafi regime as it pursues normal relations with the core are very unfavourable. 
They are policies composed by the states of the core and their main international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO, major banks) and as such they reflect the attempts by 
those institutions in the core to intensify their own capital accumulation. The needs of Libyan 
citizens are at best of only secondary importance.  
 
What this thesis has shown is the way in which Libya‟s position in the MOWS has developed 
over the course of the C20, at times presenting the appearance of a relatively independence 
state, but always structural constrained by the demands of the MOWS. It has only been its 
rentier status that enabled Libya‟s government since the revolution to pursue such policies. 
There is an irony here, of course, in that what were once seen by its supporters as virtues of 
the Libyan revolutionary government (pro-Third World rhetoric and policies, defiance of 
neo-colonialism, relatively progressive social goals [though driven by a highly authoritarian 
state]) have now become the vices that have led it to embrace the MOWS and neo-liberal 
capitalism. Whilst other rentier states of the MENA adopted swiftly to a subordinate neo-
colonial relationship to the core after securing their independence Libya sought to take a 
different path and at least initially encouraged other Third World states to go with it in 
resistance to the neo-colonialism of the core. It is easy now when looking back to the period 
from the early 18960s to the later 1970s to view the rhetoric of the post-colonial countries of 
Africa and the Middle East as being naïve. After all, most of those states, as Fanon acutely 
observed, replaced a colonial bourgeoisie with a national one that ultimately represented a 
change of rulers and exploiters for the general population, not independence. But it would be 
cynical to dismiss the rhetoric of the time as being simply opportunistic. On the contrary, 
what the period since the early 19670s reveals it he long-term structural power of the MOWS 
(political-military, economic and cultural) to absorb dissent and transform it into compliance. 
In Libya‟s case this has taken much longer than for other states but without the support of a 
clear international political alternative to the logic of the MOWS there was always going to 
be a limit to Libya‟s resistance.  
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Oil was a problem for the Libyan economy but in a more complex way than for almost any 
other rentier state in the MOWS. Oil dependence produced a classic rentier state with 
authoritarian government, uneven development, and bloated public sector and patron-client 
relations. At the same time and in Libya‟s case almost uniquely, it enabled a revolutionary 
government that embraced the Third Wordlist goals of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism to 
support and promote revolutionary change in the Third World. The fact that much of these 
revolutionary changes produced highly authoritarian governments is another of the ironies of 
Libya‟s recent history. The reproduction of authoritarian rule was precisely what Fanon 
warned against and precisely what Said has written about in his works on the Palestinians and 
what Wallerstein has explained in his work on the MOWS.  
 
Of course, as Said has made abundantly clear, much of the criticism of the Gaddafi regime in 
Western scholarship is orientalist in the extreme, unable to accept or even see that the 
revolutionary opposition to Western neo-colonialism had any basis in fact. Thus Gaddafi is 
portrayed as mad, crazed and so on, Libya as a pariah state and a threat to world peace. The 
reality has been that since the revolution Libya has been very popular in much of the Third 
World both for the material support it has given to those resisting the core and because of its 
own anti-colonial rhetoric and defiance. The fact that scholars in the core cannot recognise 
the reality of their relationship to the rest of the MOWS gives much credence to Said‟s work 
on Orientalism. Nor is this an attempt to erase the failings and abuses of the Gaddafi regime, 
as I have noted throughout this thesis. Rather it is to illustrate that portrayal of the Gaddafi 
regime entirely reflects the power-knowledge conception of Orientalism found in the work of 
Fanon and Said. Governments in the Third World can be as abusive and brutal as they wish 
as long as they remain allies to the core. It is only when they resist the core that their 
authoritarianism becomes a problem that becomes the object of fierce criticism in the 
Western media and scholarship. But for Libya the cost of this limited independence, 
symbolically powerful, politically and economically limited, has been high and its integration 
into the MOWS promises to be a painful transition.  
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